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Primary Care Groups were statutory governance bodies of the NHS in England
that existed from April 1999 to April 2002. The membership policy for the
Boards of Primary Care Groups was different from previous local governance
bodies in that a) the majority of places were allocated to clinical professionals
and b) nurses were given a joint leadership role alongside doctors. The political
history of the NETS, sociological theory on professions and the division of labour
in health care suggests that the Boards would become arenas of contested
authority and power. Drawing on the research approach of critical realism,
propositions are derived from theories concerned with: power relationships
between interest groups, between professionals and bureaucrats and between
doctors and nurses. These are used to explore the roles and experiences of the
general practitioner and nurse Board members, drawing on data from eight
Primary Care Group case study sites. The analysis suggests that leadership roles
for primary care professionals are simultaneously supported, challenged and
subverted. The relationships between doctors, nurses and managers in local
policy decision-making are characterised by tensions and sometimes open
conflicts. It is suggested that the sources of the tensions are multi-faceted,
derived from both the hegemony of professional monopoly, challenges to that
monopoly and contested sources of authority. However, among both the
professional monopolists and the corporate rationalists there are those who are
able to span the boundaries of the structured interests in order to collaborate to
mutual benefit. Finally, it is suggested that the continued invisibility of nurses
and nursing in the policy communities is not an accidental byproduct of the
struggle between managers and doctors but rather it is a deliberately reproduced
element of that struggle.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Thesis
1.1. Introduction
In 1997, the newly elected Labour Government produced a White Paper
outlining its reforms for the NHS. A key feature was the introduction of new
local governance bodies called Primary Care Groups (PCGs), which were to have
"doctors and nurses in the driving seat" (Department of Health 1997:para 5.1).
The announcement signalled a new phase in the organisation of the NHS. To
one very familiar with the previous twenty years of political and internal history
of the NHS, it indicated that a new chapter was augured in the relationships
between professionals and managers, and in the relative power and authority base
between interest groups. The strong policy pronouncements about a leadership
position shared between doctors and nurses but not managers raised many
questions of feasibility in the face of an academic literature and personal
observation, which indicated not only the embedded power of the medical
profession but also the aspirations for control and authority by general managers
over professionals. These questions, derived from sociological theories on the
nature and source of authority for leadership, led to this study of PCGs and thesis
presented here.
1.2. The Context
Local governing bodies have been present since the inception of the NETS in
1948. Their constitutions and membership have reflected the wider health
policy themes of the government of the day. The Labour government of 1997
announced the creation of new governing bodies, called Primary Care Groups
(PCGs), as one element of its programme of reforms for the NHS (Department of
Health 1997). A recurring Labour Party critique of Conservative health service
policy over the previous eighteen years had been the imposition of unwelcome
major changes without evidence of their effectiveness, or consultation with or
agreement from those concerned (Webster 2002). The Labour Party pledged to
modemise the health service incrementally, after full consultation with those
involved, and to allow diversity in response to local requirements and
circumstances (Blair 1996). Within seven months of taking office, the Labour
Government published its detailed plans in the White Paper 'The New NHS:
Modern and Dependable' (Department of Health 1997). PCGs embodied the
Labour Party manifesto pledges of a governing body that was both locally
responsive and also consulted with all those concerned.
PCGs brought together all the GPs and primary care providers in a geographical
area with a population of about 100,000 (Department of Health 1997). The
PCGs, through their Boards, were charged with responsibility for improving the
health of their designated population, commissioning health services for them
and addressing primary care development (Department of Health 1997). Within
that overall remit, PCGs could operate with different levels of responsibility.
Increasing amounts of autonomy and independence characterized the different
levels. At level one, the PCG advised the Health Authority on commissioning
but remain a sub-committee of the Health Authority. At level two, the PCG had
devolved responsibility for the budget for purchasing hospital and community
health services for the population, but remained accountable to the Health
Authority. At level three, the PCG was a freestanding body known as Primary
Care Trusts (PCTs) with its own budget for commissioning services. At level
four, the PCT assumed full responsibility for commissioning and the direct
management of community health services. Shadow PCGs and Boards were
formed in October 1998 with detailed guidance on their tasks and governance
arrangements (Department of Health 1998, 1 998a). They assumed their full
responsibilities on the 1st April 1999. On that date, 481 PCGs were established
in England with an average population of 100,000 (Audit Commission 1999).
The guidance for PCG Board membership emphasised a leadership role for
primary care professionals, "The composition of Primary Care Group boards
reflects the need to ensure that family doctors and community nurses will be in
the lead" (Department of Health 1998b para. 13). This statement was repeated
throughout the detailed guidance on the establishment of PCGs (see for example
Department of Health 1998) and then PCTs (Department of Health 1999, 2000).
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The White Paper emphasised the proximity of GPs and community nurses to
patients but gave no more detailed explanation for the assignment of a leadership
role (Department of Health 1997). The membership guidance for the PCG Board
stated that it was to comprise : between four and seven GPs, one or two
community nurses, a lay member, a social services member, a Health Authority
non-executive member and a chief executive (Department of Health 1998b). The
guidance reiterated the need to involve all stakeholders and local primary care
professionals in the process of establishing the PCG.
1.3. PCG Board Membership
Many features of PCG Board membership were not new. Creating local NHS
governance Boards with professional members was not an innovation developed
by the Labour government. The medical profession had places on governance
boards at the inception of the NHS (Webster 1988), although the subsequent
health professional presence on Boards became more varied. Previous
governments had also placed emphasis on clinicians as leaders in commissioning
activities (see, for example, Department of Health 1995). Likewise,
mechanisms for involving primary care practitioners in the commissioning of
services were not new (Department of Health 1989). However, the PCG Board
constitution differed markedly from prior NHS governance Boards in two
respects:
• For the first time, a majority of places was assigned to clinical
professionals.
• For the first time, doctor and nurse members of Boards were assigned
joint leadership responsibilities,
One further notable difference from previous Boards with responsibilities across
primary and secondary care was that the professional places on the PCG
governing bodies were assigned to clinicians in primary care rather than in acute
care or public health.
The White Papers of this period emphasised that clinicians needed education and
managerial support to undertake leadership roles on Boards (Department of
Health 1997, 2000a).	 Individual skills were seen as the key to successful
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assumption of leadership roles. There was no acknowledgement that wider
group, organisational dynamics or power relations might affect leadership roles
within PCG Boards and the roles of the Boards themselves. However, analysis
of the NHS demonstrates that the success of different groups has been influenced
by factors beyond the skill level of an individual (Rivett 1997,Webster 2002).
The underlying dynamics between groups were likely to be important in the
assumption of leadership roles on the PCG Board.
Since the inception of the NHS, the hospital sector has had greater prominence
on the national policy agenda than primary care not least because it absorbs the
greater part of publicly funded health expenditure (Wanless 2002). General
practice, together with pharmaceuticals prescribed in primary care and
community health services, account for about a third of NHS expenditure
(Kennedy 1999). General practitioners form approximately 30% of doctors
working in the NHS (Department of Health 2003), while nurses and health
visitors in primary care represent about 13% of nurses working in the NHS
(Department of Health 2003a). Within medicine, general practice has long been
viewed as less prestigious than acute specialities (Rivett 1997). In the wider
health policy arena, despite government statements from the mid-eighties
onwards asserting the importance of primary care (usually meaning general
medical services), there was little shift in overall finances between the sectors
(Wanless 2002). It was not until the later stages of the internal market reforms,
when over 50 % of general practices were fundholders, that general practitioners
gained some prominence in resource allocation (Peckham and Exworthy 2003).
The pre-eminent position accorded to general practitioners on PCG Boards,
while a continuation of the fundholding trend, contrasted with the accepted order
in the medical and NHS world.
The creation of a NHS body with a majority of clinical members contrasted with
the policy of general management leadership over clinicians in the NHS, which
had been first asserted in the mid eighties (Department of Health and Social
Security 1984). The growth of managerial control was a feature of the NHS
during the years of the internal market (Ferlie et al. 1996) although the extent of
its success particularly with the medical profession was disputed (Harrison and
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Pollitt 1994). GPs as independent contractors had not encountered the expansion
of managerialism in the same ways as those professionals employed in the NHS.
However, the Conservative government had imposed the terms of the 1990
general medical services contract (GMS) on GPs without negotiation (Klein
2001). While relationships between Health Authority managers and GPs were
portrayed very positively during the development of GP fundholding (Audit
Commission 1996), there was also evidence of tensions and difficulties between
the two groups in commissioning processes (Exworthy 1994, Flynn et al 1996).
Against this background, the assignment of a leadership role to the professionals
but not the managers appeared to be an unusual departure in policy. Moreover,
the leadership role was not offered to the doctors alone, but was to be held jointly
with primary care nurses.
In clinical care, medicine sees itself (General Medical Council 2001) and is seen
by others as taking a leadership role vis-à-vis nursing, despite nurses' assertions
to the contrary (Witz 1994). The archetypal nurse subservient to the archetypal
doctor in charge remains a powerful image in the media (Hallam 2000). The
construct of a gendered division of labour has been noted since the nineteenth
century (Abel-Smith 1960). The extent of the structured divisions through
gender, class and race between the two occupations in the UK has been observed
since the late seventies. It has been documented by nurses (Carpenter 1977 and
1993, Salvage 1985, McKay 1989, Wicks 1998, Hart 2004) and by sociologists
(Doyal and Pennell 1979, Oakley 1985, Stacey 1988, Walby et al 1994, Davies
1995). The empirical focus of attention has been on the relationship between
doctors and nurses in clinical care activities. Although less noted, a similar
imbalance can be observed in the contexts of Health Authority Boards
(Department of Health 1990) and in the Department of Health (Rivett 1997).
The emphasis on a shared leadership role for general practitioners and primary
care nurses contrasted with their occupational relationships both in clinical care
and also managerial settings.
In primary care there was a further nuance in the relationship that the new policy
appeared to ignore. Unlike in the hospital sector, GPs are the direct employers of
practice nurses, a group that by 1998 constituted nearly 40% of all nurses
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employed in the NHS in primary care (Drennan et al 2004). There were two
further characteristics of primary care that had the potential to alter some of the
structured elements of relationship between the two groups. The first was that, in
primary care, significant numbers of nurses and health visitors worked in quasi-
autonomous community care and public health roles rather than caring for
individual patients under medical direction (Community Practitioners and Health
Visitors Association 1997). The second was that general practice was a medical
speciality where women were present in significant numbers: 38% in 2003
(Royal College of General Practitioners 2004).
The events leading up to the establishment of the PCGs indicated some of the
differing levels of power and influence in the policy arena between medicine and
nursing. The actual detail of the PCG constitution was developed over the
winter and spring of 1997/1998 against a backdrop of media concern about the
lack of hospital beds to meet the winter demands and a scarcity of medical and
nursing staff. During this period both the nursing unions and the British
Medical Association demanded significant national pay increases for their
members (Beecham 1997, Anon 1997). All the policy developed in this period
has to be seen in the context of a government committed to containing the pay
bill for the N}{S (Dobson 1998) but needing to retain the support of all NHS staff
groups, particularly the medical profession, for its modernisation plans. The
initial guidance for PCG Board membership was published in April, leaving
much of the detail to be negotiated at a local level (Department of Health 1998).
The general practitioners were divided in their opinions about PCGs (Anon
1998). In May, the General Practice Committee of the BMA publicly demanded
majority control of the PCGs (Anon 1998a). This was granted, along with the
right of the medical members alone to nominate the Chair of the PCG (Anon
1 998b). At the same time, the Minister for State for Health wrote to the leader
of the largest nursing union, reiterating the importance of nursing representation
but capping the nurse places at two on the PCG Boards (Milbum 1998). The
final membership composition was announced in August 1998 (Department of
Health 1 998a), along with a sliding scale of remuneration for Board membership




This thesis aims to explore the role of general practitioners and primary care
nurses on local governing bodies of the NHS and the factors that influence that
role, through studying Primary Care Group (PCG) Boards.
The political history of the NHS, sociological theory on professions and the
division of labour in health care suggest that the Boards would become arenas of
contested authority and power. Drawing on the research approach of critical
realism (Robson 1993), propositions are derived from theoretical perspectives
concerned with power relationships between interest groups, between
professionals and bureaucrats and between doctors and nurses. The propositions
are that:
• The doctors and nurses would not equally hold leadership roles. The
dominant structural interests expressed in the Board activity would be
medical and specific to the general practitioners
• There would be conflict between the professionals and the managers as to the
role of professional leadership in the activity of the PCG. This conflict
would be experienced differently for GPs and nurses
• The increasing numbers of women GPs would mean that gendered
experiences of Board membership would be less clearly associated with
occupational groups
• The nurses would have a differential experience of leadership according to a)
their position in the bureaucracy of the community health services or general
practice, and b) their clinical relationship to general practitioners
These propositions are used to explore the roles and experiences of general
practitioner and nurse Board members, thawing on data from eight Primary Care
Group case study sites in two Regional Health Authorities. Multiple data
collection methods were piloted and refined. The main data collection drew on
semi-structured interviews from a purposive sample of informants from within
and outside the PCG Boards and on PCG Board documents. Observational
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methods at public meetings were piloted but not pursued because, in Goffman's
(1959) terms, the "front stage performance" at the meetings revealed very little
of the relationships between participants. The methodological challenges of
researching elite groups in a rapidly changing policy environment provides a
recurring theme throughout the study. The data collection period stretched over
two years from March 2000 to February 2002. A template approach to data
analysis (Crabtree and Miller 1992) was undertaken assisted by computer
software, the QSR N5 programme. The template codes were developed from
both the theoretical propositions and converse propositions. The thesis presents
the evidence that supports or contradicts the propositions, as well as the absence
of evidence.
The thesis then turns to consider the significance of these empirical findings in
the context of the political history of the NHS, sociological theory on the
professions and the division of labour in health care. It discusses the empirical
findings in the context of Edelman's observations on the symbolic nature of
policy (Edelman 1985). It concludes by applying these observations to the
current and emerging iterations of local NHS governance Boards.
1.5. The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis commences with a review of the empirical evidence on the factors
influencing professionals' roles on local governing bodies in UK health care.
The NHS has passed though a number of re-organisations of governing bodies
since its inception in 1948. Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of studies of
local governing bodies from 1948 to the present day. The studies are grouped by
time period and a brief summary of the local governing bodies and the
membership policies is provided. The final part of the chapter draws together the
analyses from empirical studies. It is noticeable that many were descriptive
studies devoid of explanatory frameworks. Those analysts who did use
theoretical frameworks found the framework used by Robert Alford, which was
derived from political science, of particular utility (Alford 1975). He argued,
from his analysis of health policy development in New York, that three types of
interest groups are present in the health policy arena:
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. Those whose interests are structured into the existing institutions and
organisational arrangements (the dominant group),
. Those whose interests are to change the structures that support the
dominant interest group (the challenging interest group),
. Those whose interests are never represented except with enormous and
exceptional energy (the repressed interest group).
A number of the analysts drew on Lukes (1974) theories of the third dimension
of power. In this, the dominant group has so shaped the perceptions of those
around that they see the existing order in favour of the dominant group as natural
and unchangeable.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of theories of power in general and specifically
the application of these theories in the analysis of health policy and policy
communities in the UK. It examines the extent to which empirical studies have
identified structured dominant elite groups or a plurality of groups with equal
influence in the health policy arena. Commentators explaining health policy
development in the UK have offered insights that suggest both a plurality of
groups involved in policy making but also a structured hierarchy in status and
power. Nowhere is this contention more apparent than in the almost complete
absence of nurses and nursing from analytical texts of the NHS policy
development and indeed from Alford's seminal work. Strong and Robinson
(1988) offered the first empirical study to document the invisibility of nurses and
nursing to those influential in policy making and implementation.
Against this background, nurses but not managers were offered a joint leadership
position in the PCGs with doctors. The thesis then moves on to consider
sociological theories concerning both leadership and the relationship between
professionals and managers in a bureaucratic organisation. Weber (Gerth and
Wright Mills 1970) provides the starting point with his theoretical consideration
of authority for leadership. The development of theories on contested authority
between professionals and bureaucrats derive from Talcott Parson's translation
of Weber (Parsons 1949). Chapter 3 examines the empirical evidence of conflict
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between professionals and managers in the NHS, again contextualising the
studies within the prevailing organisational milieu. The evidence points to an
analysis that requires the internal divisions and hierarchies within each
occupational group to be made explicit. The chapter concludes by examining
the internal hierarchies of the occupations of medicine and nursing. The
examination of relationships however is not complete without consideration of
the interaction between medicine and nursing.
Chapter 4 reviews the empirical evidence on the relationship between the two
occupational groups in institutional settings and then in primary care. Medicine
views nursing as subordinate in patient care (General Medical Council 2001).
Case law in the UK supports this view (Montgomery 2003). The chapter uses
theories from sociology and anthropology on subordinate and oppressed groups
to explore nurses' response to medicine and to each other. It notes that the
majority of empirical studies focus on the relationship in hospital environments
and argues there are important contextual differences that may be important in
examining the relationship on PCG Boards.
Chapter 5 provides the detail and critique of the study methodology as well as
information on the PCG sample. The research approach drew on ideas of critical
realism (Robson 1993), which views social structure as both the product and the
medium of motivated human action. Critical realism is focused on developing
and testing theories to explain social reality. The propositions that this
investigation utilised were derived from the review of the literature and empirical
data in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. A multiple case study approach was undertaken in
eight PCGs in two Regional Health Authorities. The methodological challenges
of researching elite groups recur throughout the process of choosing data
collection methods, gaining access, undertaking data collection and analysis of
the data. The data collection period stretched over two years from March 2000
to February 2002. The chapter then turns to critique the research methods;
identifying a number of limitations and considering how these could have been
avoided. Chapter 5 concludes with a detailed account of the policy context
during the data collection period, the sample PCGs, the informants and the PCG
documents.
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The thesis findings are presented in the next four chapters. Chapter 6 considers
the roles of the GP and nurse Board members in the early stages of the PCG. It
explores first of all their motivation to become Board members, before
examining the differences in selection processes between GP and nurse
members. It then examines GP and nurse experiences of Board participation in
the first months. It considers how the local Health Authority context of the PCG
affected the types of roles Board members undertook. The chapter then
concludes by comparing and contrasting the motivations, expectations and roles
of the GP and nurse members in the establishment phase of the PCG.
Chapter 7 examines the leadership roles of the GP and nurse members. The
chapter explores this concept from the GP and nurse members' own perceptions
and then compares that with evidence from other sources and informants. [It
examines the sources of authority that the clinical members drew upon on,
considering in turn the clinical members: as representatives of a group of health
professionals, as holders of expert medical knowledge, as holders of knowledge
of the patient experience and health care needs, as experts in the business aspects
of health care provision, and finally as members of the medical profession. It
turns to examine the issue of lack of bureaucratic authority between the PCG and
the constituent GPs and finally considers issues of authority between peer
members of the same occupation. The chapter concludes with an examination of
one of the thesis propositions against the empirical evidence. This was that the
doctors and nurses would not equally hold leadership roles.
Chapter 8 presents the factors that supported and detracted from the GP members
undertaking a leadership role. First of all, it examines the relationships between
GPs, identif'ing a number of sources of tension. It explores a number of factors
that impact on these relationships including: past involvement in commissioning,
adoption of population perspectives, and conflicting business interests. The
chapter then considers evidence as to the relationships between GPs and
managers, differentiating between those internal to the PCG and those external to
it. It examines the sources of tension in the relationships, first from the GPs'
perspective and then the managers. It reviews the thesis proposition that there
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would be conflict between the professionals and the managers as to the role of
professional leadership in the activity of the PCG. The chapter concludes by
identifying the inadequacy of the neo-Weberian theory of conflict between
professionals and bureaucrats in explaining the empirical data in the thesis.
Chapter 9 considers the factors supporting or detracting from the nurse members
undertaking a leadership role. It explores the relationships between the nurse
members and three different groups: the other nurses in the PCG, the managers
and finally the doctors. In the same manner as with the GPs it examines the
relationship with managers internal and external to the PCG. It offers the
evidence from the viewpoint of the nurses, the doctors and of the other
informants. It concludes by considering the remaining thesis propositions in the
light of the empirical evidence. These were that: conflict between the
professionals and the managers would be experienced differently by GPs and
nurses; the nurses would have a differential experience of leadership according to
their position and employment; that the increasing numbers of women GPs
would mean that gendered experiences of Board membership would be less
clearly associated with occupational groups.
Chapter 10 reconsiders the three theoretical explanations explored in the
literature section of the thesis to account for the tension in relationships
documented in earlier chapters. The first was the interplay between structured
dominant, challenging and repressed interests in policy determination. The
second was the contest of authority between professionals, who derived it from
expert knowledge and profession membership, and officers of a bureaucracy,
who derived it from their position in the tiers of the bureaucracy. The third was
the response of nursing and nurses to medicine's subordination of their
occupation. Each of these is considered in the light of the study findings. The
thesis suggests that each of the theoretical perspectives offers an inadequate
explanation for the empirical data derived in this study. The concept of
leadership roles for professionals was simultaneously supported, challenged and
subverted. The relationships were sometimes collaborative but more often
characterised by close to the surface tensions and sometimes open conflicts. The
complex relationships of nurses to both GPs and managers suggests that their
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invisibility in the policy processes is not just an accidental byproduct of the
relationship between doctors and managers, but a significant element of the
contest for power and authority between those two groups. All of these
relationships are interwoven with issues of gender, race and class that are so
structured into the fabric of the interactions that they rarely become visible to the
participants. Further study of such governance bodies with these factors at the
forefront of the research design would help reveal their extent in the warp and
weft of decision making in the NHS. The chapter then turns to consider the
implications in the light of new and emerging governance arrangements, in
which the underlying policy themes of the PCG Boards can be identified.
The thesis concludes by examining a final question: whether the findings of the
thesis were just an example of the real, but imperfect, world of policy
implementation (Hogwood and Gunn 1984) or whether it was ever really
intended that doctors and nurses should lead the PCGs.
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Chapter 2: Local Governing Bodies in the NHS
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of NHS local governing
bodies and their membership in the first fifty years of the National Health
Service. The account draws upon both national policy, as derived from
legislation and its ensuing guidance, and empirical studies of governing bodies.
The account is divided into periods related to the organisational arrangements of
the NHS. This allows the empirical studies to be placed in their specific policy
and organisational context. The concluding section considers the analysis of the
empirical work and the elements of value in examining the roles of members of
current day local governance bodies.
2.2. Constituting Governing Bodies
Acts of Parliament and subsequent statutory instruments provide the legislation
from which local NHS governing bodies are constituted. These legally
constituted bodies are responsible for the provision of local health services as
specified in the National Health Service Act 1946 and its successors, within the
allocated public monies. They are accountable for their decisions and fulfilling
their remit to the government minister for the health services.
The names given to governing bodies are varied. In the business sector, they are
known as a "Board of Directors". "Board of Governors" is the term more
familiar in the education sector, while "Management Committee" is used in
voluntary organisations. In local government the terms "Council", "Local
Authority" and "councillors" are used. Members of any governing body can
have either executive or non-executive responsibilities. Those who have
executive responsibilities are employees of the organisation and are
responsibility for carrying out (i.e. executing) the decisions in the day-to-day
activities of that organisation. Those who have non-executive responsibilities are
not employees of the organisation and their activities are only within the
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governing body. Eligibility criteria for membership are specified in the
governing document of an organisation. These are variously known as
constitutions or company articles (as specified in company legislation). In the
provision of statutory organisations, their governing document will be specified
in the Acts of Parliament of Health and statutory instruments. Non-executive
membership criteria will often be either as a representative of others or as having
particular knowledge or expertise.
The nomenclature for local NHS governing bodies have changed throughout its
fifty-year history. Executive Councils, Hospital Management Committees, and
Local Authority Health Committees changed into Family Practitioner
Committees, Area Health Authorities and District Management Teams with the
1974 re-organisation. Area Health Authorities and District Management Teams
were re-organised in 1981 to become District Health Authorities. The 1991 re-
organisations created Area Health Authorities, Family Health Service Authorities
and Trust Boards: all with Directors rather than members. The Family Health
Service Authorities were dismantled in 1995, their responsibilities absorbed by
the Area Health Authorities. These transitions and subsequent ones are detailed
in Appendix 1.
It is worth a brief reflection on how the names for governing bodies mirror wider
government policy and intent. For example from 1948 to 1974 medical teaching
hospitals had Boards of Governors while all other hospitals came under the
jurisdiction of Hospital Management Committees and Regional Hospital Boards.
The terminology perhaps only reflects past divisions. The Local Authority
governing bodies used the term "committees" so named to reflect the democratic
tradition of local government. The independent charitable hospitals had Boards
of Governors, a name with the cultural overtones of both the business world but
also with benevolent and altruistic direction. The different names, it could be
argued, also reflected the continued differential treatment of the elite group of
consultants in the teaching hospitals. It is particularly noticeable that the first
time local NHS governing bodies were called Boards of Directors was under the
NHS and Community Care Act 1990 re-organisation. The underlying ethos of
this re-organisation was to introduce business and commercial principles into the
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organisation and financial management of the NHS (Department of Health
1989a).
The following section considers the studies of governing bodies in the NHS and
their memberships in historical order and then draws together cross cutting
themes. The studies are preceded by a brief description of the organisational
structures in the NHS for that time period.
2.3. Local NI-IS Governing Bodies 1948-1 974
2.3.1 The Structures
The first twenty-seven years of the NHS saw stability in organisational
structures. The tripartite structure of separate management for hospitals,
community health services and independent providers of primary health care
services, meant that there were three types of governing bodies. These were:
1. Hospital Management Committees reporting to the Regional Hospital
Boards in the non-teaching hospital sector, and the Board of Governors
for teaching hospitals reporting direct to the Ministry of Health. It should
be noted that the teaching hospitals indicated the presence of medical
schools. All hospitals had schools of nursing.
2. Executive Councils were the governing bodies for the provision of
services contracted from the independent professionals in the community.
These were general practice, dentists, opticians, and pharmacists.
3. The Health Committees in the local authority were the governing
bodies for health services provided in domiciliary and community
settings. This included including district nursing, health visiting, the
school health service, home help services and environmental health
officers.
The membership criteria for each of these bodies were different (National Health
Service Act 1946). Lay members in all cases were in the majority. However, the
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lay representatives in the Local Authority Health Committees were elected
councillors and in the other bodies were appointed by the Minister of Health. In
the Local Authority Health Committees, there were no health professional
members. It was only under the Local Government Act 1958 that they were
encouraged to co-opt professional members such as doctors, health visitors and
midwives (McEwan 1959). The Medical Officer of Health was the council
officer who managed the health department in the Councils. The Executive
Councils had to have one representative elected from each of the Local Medical
Committee, the Local Dental Committee, the Local Pharmacists Committee and
the Local Opticians Committee.
The Regional Health Boards and the Hospital Management Committees were to
have a quarter of places filled by Local Authority representatives, a quarter by
people with experiencing in governing hospitals in the voluntary sector and no
more than a quarter consultants and university representatives from the medical
schools (National Health Service Act 1946). Other places should be filled as the
chairman deemed fit (Webster 1988). Webster (1988) reports that in many
instances over fifty percent of members were medical professionals and the
Regional Boards were made up of a majority of people who were also members
of Hospital Management Committees or Boards of Governors. No other health
professionals had a designated place in the governing bodies.
Bevan was adamant that the medical membership in governing bodies would be
an "expert voice " (Klein 1995 p20) not a syndicalist representative. From the
beginning there was ambivalence as to the place of health professionals in
governing bodies. The independent contractors providing services for the NHS
had very different relationship to the governing bodies from other professionals.
In this first phase of the NHS, the presence or absence of professionals on the
hospital committees and local health committees may also have reflected custom
and practice of the pre-NHS structures. The custom of Councils was to have a
clear separation between the elected members' position in decision making and
that of its officials.
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2.3.2 Studies of Governing Bodies Before 1974
In this period there are two studies concerning the activities and working of
governing bodies in the NHS: the report of the Farquarson - Lang Committee
(Scottish Home and Health Department 1966) and Christopher Ham's critical
history of the Leeds Regional Hospital Board from 1947-1974 (Ham 1981).
The Farquarson - Lang Committee (Scottish Home and Health Department
1966) was a Scottish Home and Health Department sponsored investigation into
the working of the Hospital Management Committees. A nominated Committee
of Inquiry took evidence from knowledgeable key individuals in the Scotland
hospital sector as to how the system of Hospital Management Committees was
working and how they could be improved. It noted that there was confusion in
the way Board members understood their roles. The report recommended that, as
in business, Board members should focus on broad policy and objectives setting,
leaving the day-to-day operational management to the officers. This
recommendation was singled out for implementation in England (Department of
Health and Social Security 1968). The report also highlighted the tension
between the role of the hospital administrator and the senior medical officer in
advising the Hospital Management Committee and executing decisions. It
commented on these tensions without providing an analysis of the cause. It went
on to recommend that there should be only one senior executive post to which all
other executive posts reported. In essence it was the forerunner to the Griffith
Report (Department of Health and Social Security 1983) and the implementation
of general management (Department of Health and Social Security 1984).
Christopher Ham's critical history of the Leeds Regional Hospital Board from
1947-1974 was commissioned at the point of the Board's dissolution (Ham
1981). Ham focused on addressing two issues: firstly, the dynamics of public
policy making and secondly, the evolution of the NHS. He drew his conclusions
from examining the Minutes of the Authority and interviewing individual
members who were still alive and willing to contribute. He discussed the
problem of the selectivity in that issues that did not appear in the Minutes are
then neglected. However, he justified his approach as the interviews failed to
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identify any major issues that were not in the Minutes. He identifies six roles
that the members played. Five of these were representing particular interests;
local interests, patients' interests, a special interest, a professional interest (seen
most clearly in the medical membership), a particular organisation's interest. The
sixth was as the manager and allocator of resources (Ham 1981).
Ham identified that the officers to the Board, which included the senior
administrative medical officer, were very influential in the decision making of
the board. Their role of bringing issues, presenting information and offering
options for decisions to the Board placed them in a powerful position to
influence the work and opinions of Board members. He also documented the
conflict between the senior administrative medical officer and the senior
administrative officer in the late 1950's. He analysed this as conflict over
domain of influence and conflict over seniority. He argued that the medical
officer assumed seniority by virtue of his profession but that the administrative
officer refused to accede to this. He cited this as evidence of the tension referred
to in the Farquarson —Lang report (Scottish Home and Health Department 1966)
but pointed out that the conflict was not apparent when other individuals took up
these posts. He suggested that in situations where principal officers were
enjoined to work together equally, personalities had a significant bearing on
working relationships.
Ham examined particular issues such as the allocation of resources for the lower
status medical specialities such as psychiatry and geriatrics over the time period.
He observed that very few additional resources were given to these services and
little change occurred. He contrasted this with the major developments that the
Board supported in acute specialities and acute hospitals. As he pointed out, this
lack of attention and investment was all the more surprising when the central
policy pronouncements during the sixties insisted attention be paid to hospitals
for mental illness and mental handicap. These central government policies
followed public inquiries into the levels of care in psycho-geriatric and mental
handicap hospitals (for example Department of Health and Social Security 1969).
27
Ham observed that it was the medical interests that frustrated the changes
required to implement central government policy. He commented that it
appeared much easier to prevent change than to achieve it (p197). He noted that
the non-medical members of the Board often did not pursue their challenges to
medical opposition or dominance of views (p198).
Ham considered his findings against several interlinked theoretical frameworks
of power in policy making, including that of Alford (1975). These theories are
discussed in detail in chapter three. Ham concluded that none of the interest
groups represented in the Board had the power to impose their will on another
group; "collective decision making took the form of bargaining in a system of
bureaucratic politics resulting in small changes in the status quo "(Ham 1981
p197). He concluded that conflicts between interest groups were not visible as a
struggle but as suggested by Alford (1975) the medical interests were dominant
and systematically benefited by the status quo. He argued that his evidence
supported more closely an explanation of power held by an elite group, rather
than by a number of groups as in pluralist theories of power. He identified a
number of structural factors that contributed to the power of the medical
profession in the activities of the Board. The first factor was that they, unlike
other professional groups, had membership of the Board. The second factor was
that the Board gave significant weight to the views of the Medical Advisory
Committees. The Medical Advisory Committees to Regional Hospital Boards
and Hospital Management Committees were specified by statute. No other
professional group was required to organise a collective advice-giving structure
to the governing bodies. The third factor was that the medical members, as
actual service providers to patients, carried the additional force of current
experience. The fourth was that other members of the Board accorded deference
to medical views on any subject. While Ham identified the medical profession as
a powerful group he also noted an internal hierarchy of influence. Consultants in
acute specialities were the most powerful in their influence, while doctors below
consultant level and doctors in the non-acute specialities appeared less
influential. These influential consultants established the pre-emptive importance
of medical research and medical teaching interests to the extent that this
assumption was never challenged or questioned in any of the discussions of the
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Board (Ham 1981 p 205). Ham argued that this was an example of the latent
third dimension of power as theorised by Lukes (1974).
Ham's study provides a valuable base line of analytical discussion to consider
other studies of governing bodies in the NHS. His analysis used both Alford's
and Lukes' theories, which were published at the time of his study. His analysis
is fixed within the NHS organisational context of its time. It is also firmly
anchored on the consideration of the medical interests; the other professional
groups are notable by their absence. The next section considers the succeeding
governing bodies in the NHS.
2.4. Local Governing Bodies in the NHS 1974 -1991
2.4.1 The Structures.
The 1974 re-organisation saw the dismantling of the tripartite system of
provision of hospitals, community health services and the independent contractor
services (The NHS Reorganisation Act 1973). The Local Authorities no longer
provided the nursing and school health services. Area Health Authorities (AHAs)
now governed community health services together with all the hospital services.
AHAs were responsible to Regional Health Authorities (RHAs). This set of
reforms introduced, for the first time, a separate body to represent the views of
patients and residents known as the Community Health Council. A central
policy theme of the Labour government was of consensus in decision making
(Klein 1995). This policy increased the participation of multiple interest groups
in the governance of public services.
The Area Health Authority (AHA) was the local governing body. The "grey
book" guidance for this reorganisation was very prescriptive in stating that
members should "devote their limited time to major issues of planning and
resource allocation,.. .Officers have executive authority to implement policies
and plans delegated to them after agreeing with the Authority specific targets and
measures of performance,... the Authority should monitor and control
performance in relation to the agreed measures of performance" (Department of
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Health and Social Security 1972 section 1.29). The Board membership was
between 16-19 people with stipulated places for representatives of different
interest groups. The Local Authority could nominate up to 6 councillors. The
medical profession had one place for a consultant, one for a general practitioner
and one for the Dean (or representative) of the Medical School. For the first time
the membership was widened to include one designated place for a nursing,
midwifery or health visiting representative and one for a Trade Union
Representative. This broadening of involvement of different groups was
mirrored in the operational management. Every AHA was divided into a small
number of Districts. Each District had a management team (DMTs) who were
the executive officers for the hospital and community health services. The DMT
comprised of the district administrator, the district finance officer, the chief
medical officer and chief nursing officer, who each managed their own function
of the service. This team were jointly responsible for the management of the
services by consensus (Department of Health and Social Security 11972 section
2.44).
In 1981 the organisational tier of Area Health Authority was dismantled (The
Health Services Act 1980). The governing body was then located at already
existing district level and known as the District Health Authority (DHA). The
membership criteria for the DHA Boards remained the same as for the previous
Area Health Authority. The opportunity was taken, however, to re-iterate that the
central role of district health authority members was one of policy and strategic
decision making (Department of Health and Social Security 1981)
The governing body for the independent contractor services also changed. In
1974 the Executive Council was renamed the Family Practitioner Committee. It
too expanded its membership to between 20-30. The policy guidance stipulated
that there were to be equal numbers of professionals and lay members
(Department of Health and Social Security 1972). The professional membership
continued to be representatives of the professions independently contracted to the
NHS but now included one place for a nurse. The lay membership expanded to
include up to 4 councillors representing the Local Authority. These changes
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represented the widening of participation in the governing of the public services.
This governing body was untouched by the dismantling of the AHAs in 1981.
Although the membership of each body increased at this point, the actual
numbers of governing bodies decreased substantially. In Scotland, Hunter stated
there was a reduction from 150 previous organisations to 15, with a decrease of
1,224 places for lay people, although he did not give his source for these figures
(Hunter 1979)
Three significant changes from the previous membership arrangements for
governing bodies are notable. Firstly, the majority of the membership was seen
as representative of a particular interest group or organisation rather than as an
expert or having particular individual knowledge as previously. The second
change was that service providers other than the medical profession were given
membership of the governing body as non-executive members. The third change
was that the executive group expanded to include a chief nurse and fmance
officer. The inclusion of other service providers was echoed in the mandatory
professional advisory committee structure (Department of Health and Social
Security 1972 section 1.2 d) with which Klein describes the organisational
arrangements as being "festooned" (Klein 1995 p 90). Nurses and midwives,
dentists, pharmacists and opticians now also had the authority to convene
professional advisory committees; in the first instance to the Area Health
Authority and then with the 1981 changes to the District Health Authority
(Department of Health and Social Security 1981).
The age of consensus in operational management was short lived. The Griffiths
Report (Department of Health and Social Security 1983) condemned both
consensus and unidisciplinary management. In 1984 general management was
introduced into the NHS (Department of Health and Social Security 1984). This
was a significant and highly disputed organisational change (Rivett 1997). A
hierarchy of accountability to one person, the general manager, was implemented
for all employees of the District Health Authority. The general manager, rather
than the district management team now became the executive member of the
governing body (Department of Health and Social Security 1984).
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2.4.2 Studies of Governing Bodies 1974-1990
During this period a wider interest in the roles and relationships of Board
members is evident through an increase of empirical studies focused directly and
indirectly on Boards. There were five studies of hospital and community health
services governing bodies and their membership in this period. These were: a
national study of the working of the NHS (Royal Commission on the NHS 1978),
an ethnographic study of the interest groups and decision making of one AHA in
rural Scotland (Taylor 1977), a study of the decision making processes in
resource allocation in two AHAs in Scotland (Hunter 1979), an action research
study supporting the development of members roles in two DHA (Ham 1986)
and a study of the work of DHAs (Haywood 1983 and Haywood and Ranade
1985) which investigated the motives and behaviours of board members in 6
Health Authorities (Ranade 1986). For the first time, there was also a study
investigating the work of the Family Practitioner Committees (Alsop and May
1986). Additional sources of information came from two postal surveys
requesting demographic information of English NHS Board members. The first
reported that the majority of members were from management and business
backgrounds (Elcock and Hayward 1980), while the second reported that women
and people from minority ethnic backgrounds were under-represented in the
membership in general and most noticeably in the chair positions (Kings Fund
1990). Two studies focused on the introduction of general management provided
incidental findings on perceptions of Boards and their membership (NHS
Training Authority 1987, Robinson et al 1989). In order to aid understanding
these studies will be considered in two groups: before and after the
implementation of general management
2.4.2.1 Studies Prior to the Introduction of General Management
The national study of the working of the NHS (Royal Commission on the NHS,
1978) considered the effectiveness of all the administrative structures that had
been established following the 1974 re-organisation. Multiple methods of
enquiry were used across the four countries of the UK, seeking opinions from
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representatives at every level of the NHS. Semi-structured individual and group
interviews were the main data collection method. Research Paper Number One
included a small section on authorities and member involvement (Royal
Commission on the NHS, 1978 section 10). It described the perceptions of
Authority Board members, officers and staff of the role of the Authority and the
relationships between members and officers. Overall, they concluded there was a
lack of certainty in the role of the members. It should be noted however that a
key finding of the whole report was that "uncertainty in role" was the prevailing
feeling in an "over-elaborated organisation" (Royal Commission on the NHS
1978 p 224 section 8).
The report did not differentiate between the types of Board membership except to
note concerns expressed that the dual role of Local Authority councillors as
Health Authority members created conflicts of loyalty and interest. Some Board
members reported confusion between their role and that of the newly established
Community Health Council. Tension between the role of officers and the role of
members was described in some areas. Officers were reported to perceive the
members as too involved in the operational running of the service with
insufficient technical knowledge. However, both officers and members pointed
to examples of Boards failing to take up roles in broader policy making and
objective setting. Instead, Boards tended to receive and "rubber stamp
decisions offered by the officers. The impact of the members on the service was
perceived to be slim (p75 section 10.13). The researchers concluded that the
variation in roles and relationships of members and officers that was reported
was the result of local political traditions. It was not the consequence of the
increased opportunities for professionals to be involved in decision making or of
consensus management. It is not clear how they reached this conclusion from the
data they presented. They did not offer any examples to demonstrate their
methods of analysis or show comparisons between different areas.
In contrast to the broad study of the Royal Commission, Rex Taylor (1977)
provided a very focused investigation. He studied one small Area Health
Authority over twelve months in rural Scotland, focused on identif'ing potential
interest groups and their influence on resource allocation decisions. Data
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collection methods included interviews, observations of public board meetings,
public Council health committee meetings, the Area Medical and Nursing
Advisory Committees and field work which involved "lingering and loitering"
(Taylor 1977 p583) in doctors surgeries, in Health Centres, hospital corridors,
offices and car parks. The analysis was framed by reference to professional - lay
and managerial-professional conflicts, although these central themes are not
explained.
Taylor identified three "potential interest groups" within the Area Health
Authority Board: the elected members who obtained their positions through
popular vote, the professional members who obtained their position through
workers' syndicalism and the appointed members who obtained their position
through patronage. He argued that they were only mobilised as interest groups
when the routine business was transformed into controversy. Taylor identified
five occasions when the professional members made a controversial proposal.
This resulted in the elected members, and to a lesser extent the appointed
members, forming a group in opposition. He used one of the controversial
proposals (the replacement of a resident island GP with a nurse and visiting GP)
to illustrate his analysis. He noted that the management team had a difficult
relationship with the Board, particularly with the elected and professional
members. He argued that this was a function of the smallness of this particular
study site. He hypothesised that in larger areas with more local interest groups
the officers to a Board could play these off against each other, allowing more
centrally determined polices to be pursued. Taylor made the case that the source
of the conflict between professionals, lay people and managers stemmed from the
different definitions of the "public good"(p591). He argued that for professionals
the definition had been shaped by years of professional training, for managers by
the needs of ongoing service structures and for lay people by sectional and local
interests. This part of his report was very thinly argued. He seemed to be
arguing for homogeneity in the views of each of these interest groups. However,
the material he presented indicated that this was not the case, particularly for the
"professional interest group". He described at some length how the Area Medical
Advisory Committee (AMAC), an extremely influential body in this instance,
was dominated by one section of the local medical profession. He was also clear
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that the views of other professional advisory committees were not sought over
any aspect of resource allocation.
Taylor provided a useful descriptive case study, however it was weak in its
defence of the analytical statements and puzzlingly devoid of reference to other
contemporary studies (for example Alford 1975) or contemporary sociological
debates on managerial-professional conflict (for example Green 1975). David
Hunter (1979) has provided much stronger analytical material in a study
contemporary with Taylor's and also undertaken in Scotland.
Hunter (1979) examined the processes in decision making in allocating ring
fenced funding for new developments in two Scottish Area Health Boards over
two financial years. He collected data through semi-structured interviews with
key informants, examination of documents and attendance at some meetings.
Hunter argued that there was a "policy triad" (p 634) in the new re-organisation
formed of a) Board members, b) officers and c) the professional and lay advisory
bodies. His study reported on the difficulties within this triad. Both members
and officers were reported to have great difficulty in identifying exactly what the
member role was. Some members contrasted it with the role in the previous
organisation, which they viewed as more intimately involved in the management
of the services. He quoted Board members as describing the work of the Board
as a "rubber stamping agency"(p23 1) with decision-making now in the hands of
the officers. This observation echoed the findings of the Royal Commission
reported above. He went on to describe the relationship of members to officers
as "verging on the parasitic rather than the symbiotic" (p263), referring to the
members' dependence on the officers for information and knowledge about the
services. He contended that the officers were powerful in relation to the Board
members as they had by statute to form a group. Issues on which they had
already reached consensus were then presented to the Board members. He argued
that the professional advisory bodies appeared to have little influence but
conceded that the proposals for the development funds did not represent radical
change in service provision from current services. Like Ham (1981) he gave an
example of development fund allocation to the acute hospital sector, in the shape
of a new orthopaedic surgery unit, which appeared to completely ignore the
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contemporaneous injunctions from central government to invest in long term and
community care (p635).
Hunter used Lukes' (1974) theory of the three dimensions of power to explain
his observations and made reference to Alford's (1975) theories on three
structured interest groups. He stated that while the officers appeared the most
active element of the policy triad, this should not be confused with being the
most influential. The officers' assessment of the allocation exercise was that they
were reacting to pressures as and when they surfaced rather than being
proactively in control of the decision making (p635). Hunter argued that this was
an example of Lukes' third dimension of power; a structural element in support
of one interest group that precludes any other issues from even being raised.
Hunter contended that the process of resource allocation in the health service
stemmed from the appointment and then the decisions of individual medical
consultants. All resource consequences for the health services, from buildings to
staffing, flowed from these two acts. (p.636). He viewed this as a subtle process
rather than a form of medical conspiracy, "The medical profession may be said,
then, to set the agenda for development fund allocations if only by their
preventing or hindering, by their very existence, the emergence of an alternative
policy agenda" (p.639).
Hunter's study was focused on the issues of the acute health care sector, in itself
providing an academic example of the structural dominance of this sector over
other parts of the health service. While he argued that there was a policy triad of
Board members, Health Authority officers and professional and lay advisory
committees, his empirical evidence showed that his third arm of the triad was
formed of multiple interest groups who had differential levels of influence. It
would be more appropriate in the light of his conclusion on the structural
influence of individual medical consultants to expand the notion of a triad,
disaggregating his third group into its component parts. It is hard to see how
Hunter's policy triad fits with his reference, in his concluding chapter, to
Alford's three interest groups. He does however provide more evidence for
uncertainty regarding the Board members' role and for the differential influence
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between officers and members of Board. However, he makes no comment as to
the effect of the different source of Board membership.
2.4.2.2. Studies after the Introduction of General Management
There are three empirical studies of governing bodies in the period after the
introduction of general management in the NETS: Haywood and Ranadé (1985),
Ham (1986) and Alsop and May (1986). The context of these studies is of a
changing environment in the roles and relationships among senior officers, and
between officers and members of Boards. It is also set at a point when the
central government cut public expenditure in all areas and the Department of
Health implemented changes in determining the financial allocations to
individual DHAs (Webster 2002).
Haywood (1983) investigated how the new District Health Authorities (DHA)
were working in six areas, using semi-structured interviews with a sample of
members. His conclusion was that the officers dominated the work of the
Health Authority, confirming again the findings from the Royal Commission. He
declared no theoretical frameworks in analysing his work but argued that the
members lacked the pre-requisites of power as they had no electoral legitimacy
or "caucusing" behaviours. This argument is flawed as the Local Authority
members had been elected as councillors and certainly operated in political
environments.
Haywood followed this with a more detailed study in the same DHAs:
"concerned with ways in which chairmen and members can carry out their
responsibilities to ensure they make a real rather than symbolic contribution to
the work of the Health Authority" (Haywood and Ranadé 1985 p1). The motives
and behaviours of members were particularly explored. The data collection was
through eighty interviews with Board members and district management teams,
combined with observation of the DHA meetings and recording member contacts
with the chief officers. Ranadé (1986) argued that the terms of reference for
membership of the DHA meant there was ambiguity as to whether member
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loyalties were to the administration of the NHS or the group they represented.
She devised a typology drawing on an incentive analysis framework used in the
study of British Local Authority councillors. She used the typology to predict
which type of members were most likely to achieve individual influence within
an Authority and to "diagnose" some of the reasons for the observed differences
in the corporate influence between the six Authorities. She proposed that there
were five types of members; strategists, specialists, loyalists, back benchers, and
representatives (Ranadé 1986). This is very different from Ham's analysis of
roles where he identified only representative roles (Ham 1981). Ranadé typified
the Strategists as having entered public service as a personal challenge, with a
personal interest in health services and a clear sense of purpose. The Specialists
had also entered public service as a personal challenge, with a personal interest in
health services or with a very specific purpose in mind but then used their expert
knowledge to carve out a role in the Authority. The Loyalists became members
for compensatory reasons to make up for not finding their main work roles
challenging enough. She argued the Loyalists were the most active and
enthusiastic members. Backbenchers had not thought through their reason for
membership, neither having a specific purpose or representative role. Within this
group she identified a group of professionals that included doctors and nurses
who thought they had to be members as part of an organisational or professional
duty. Backbenchers were characterised as being inactive members.
Representative types were portrayed as maintaining a watching brief on behalf of
those they represented. Their activity on the DFIA was highly specific. Their
loyalty to a sectional interest was viewed as greater than to the DHA and often
resented by other members. Two people fell outside of these five categories and
these she named the mission types. These two people were described as judging
"everything against the light of their ideological principles" (p 185) and quickly
politicised discussions, speaking a lot in all discussions. Other members disliked
these two individuals. Ranadé argued this was primarily because the other
members considered the mission types main loyalties to be outside the health
service, their representative group and their organization.
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The study then asked the six chairman and the district administrators (reported as
the two most powerful positions in the DHA) which three members they viewed
as having the most influence in the DHA discussions. Although Ranadé reported
that "they sometimes said groups of people like clinicians' '(Ranadé 1986 p 193),
she dismissed this and focused on her own typology" but it was clear that the
most influential members came from the strategists and specialist types
(p193). She stated that they were more likely to be seen as influential if they
took the initiative rather than just reacted. 	 Ranadé did not consider other
theoretical frameworks. Her analysis focused on personal motivation rather than
structural interests. The evidence she provided, particularly with regard to the
backbenchers and the representatives could be interpreted as examples of
different types of interest group behaviour.
Christopher Ham (1986) provided a different perspective through an action
research study in the same period. He was employed as a consultant to the
members of two newly formed DHAs. He worked with them through
development seminars and individual interviews over eighteen months to explore
their perceptions of their roles and develop solutions to address the identified
issues. He also collected data on the activities of the DHA through observation
at meetings and documentary analysis. He concluded that the influence of
members over policy making was limited, although less so in one of his sites and
less so with the passage of time.
Ham identified five factors that influenced the contribution of the members to the
work of the District Health Authority (DHA):
Individual attributes, both in time available for DHA work and skill at
committee work.
Preparation and training, both the offer and take up was very uneven.
• The organisational structures of DHAs; in particular consensus
management meant major differences had been argued through so that the
officers only presented single policy options to the DHA.
• The organisational cultures of the DHAs: in both study sites Ham
identified that the officers and the Chairmen perceived the role of the
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members as providing a means of accountability rather than determining
policy as envisaged by the central guidance. This influenced how they
involved members in the work of the DHA.
• The power structure in the NTIS: he argued that ministers of health
developed a more interventionist stance in the local implementation of
central policies during this period. This curtailed the possibility of greater
member involvement in strategic policy development. In one of the case
studies, members perceived their role in policy making as further reduced
by the need to implement service cuts as a result of central decisions to
allocate resources to DHAs differently.
Ham reported that the chief officer and the chairmen were perceived as the most
influential members. However, he made no comment on the various types of
members, treating them as homogeneous. While he made reference to Haywood
and Ranadé's study (Haywood and Ranadé 1985) he did not draw on Ranadé's
typology. Instead he reviewed his observations against Alford's constructs of
dominant, challenging and repressed interest groups. He argued that while it
could appear that the managers as the challenging interest group had moved to a
dominant position through placing issues on the agenda for discussion, none of
these issues presented challenges to the prevailing system of consultant led
hospital health care. This, he argued, demonstrated the structural nature of the
dominance of the medical profession in the health care system. It is not clear
why Ham did not view proposed service reductions at the DHA as proposals that
challenged medical interests. Ham also argued that the community interest
groups remained repressed: citing little evidence of influence in the DHA work
from the Community Health Councils (CHCs), community organisations, trade
unions, the Local Authority or the Family Practitioner Committees. The latter
organisation seems to indicate a very liberal interpretation of the idea of groups
representing "community interest". It may be a true reflection of repressed
interests but they are very diverse, including health care professional groups.
The argument that the members of DHAs were not viewed as influential in
decision making was supported in two other studies whose primary focus was the
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introduction of general management. The Templeton Series reported on a series
of interviews with district general managers (DGMs) across England on the
implementation of general management. The researchers noted that the DGMs
viewed the Board members of the DHA as peripheral and unnecessary in the
decision making process (NHS Training Authority 1987). However, they saw
the presence of a Board as important in terms of public accountability. Robinson
et a! (1989) investigated the impact of general management on the nursing
profession. Their data collection included a postal survey of 193 chief nursing
advisers across the UK. One small part of this requested perceptions of the level
of influence nurse members held in the decision making of the DHA: 40%
perceived the nurse members were not influential while 17% considered them
very influential.
Alsop and May (1986) also used Alford's theoretical framework in the only
investigation into the work of the Family Practitioner Committees (FPCs) in the
thirty seven year history of the NHS. There were no studies of Executive
Committees. This study was based on a postal survey of the 90 English and
Welsh FPCs requesting examples of innovative and developmental work by the
Committee, supplemented by an unspecified number of iiiterviews and
discussions with FPC administrators (i.e. the chief officer of the FPC), members
and practitioners. They described in detail the tension for FPCs as a result of not
managing the independent contractors but still needing to ensure a certain range
and standard of care was provided. They depicted this as "responsibility without
power" (p170). While the study portrays the work of the FPCs with all the
contracted independent practitioners, it is the work with the general practitioners
that provides the bulk of the material. They observed how the general
practitioners were particularly well organised in electing their representation
through the Local Medical Committee. Their members were present and active in
all Committee and sub-committee business. Alsop and May (1986) recorded the
difficulties for the FPC in the absence of a specific contract for General Medical
Services between the NHS and general practitioners. They showed how some
FPCs failed to fully use the authority available to them in ensuring standards in
deputising, practice premises and practice administration. They argued that the
capability of a FPC to improve standards in general practice was reliant on
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developing a good working relationship with the Local Medical Committee and
the individual practices. The net result was the FPCs developed their policies
around practitioners, not around populations or communities (p167). Their lack
of accountability to the population was demonstrated in the "astonishing "(p169)
lack of information produced by the FPCs for the public, including in a number
of instances failure to even produce an Annual Report. Alsop and May (1986)
used the term "amateurish" (p170) to describe many of the FPCs.
They proposed that the FPC was the focus for the interplay of various interest
groups and applied Alford's (1975) concepts of dominant, challenging and
repressed interest groups to their findings. They viewed the change from the
Executive Committee to FPC, with its increased non-professional membership,
as an attempt by the corporate interests of central government to control both the
FPCs and the practitioners from the centre. However, they argued that the
professional interests remained dominant in the work of the FPC while the
community interests were repressed. In each FPC area, they observed that while
the individual practitioners were concerned with their own personal goals and
security, the collective professional interests were well organised and
represented. In comparison, the community interests were unlikely to be so
coherently represented as the lay members were neither elected nor had a clear
constituency to represent.
The studies in this period are characterised by the use of theoretical frameworks,
in the main concerned with power relationships. It was a period characterised by
membership through representation. The end of the decade brought a review of
the NHS that augured a radical shift in the organisation of the NHS and
consequently the membership of governing bodies.
2.5. Local NHS Governing Bodies 1991 - 1997
2.5.1 The Structures
The NHS and Community Care Act 1990 introduced internal market principles
to the administration of the NHS. The White Paper (Department of Health
1989a), which preceded the Act, and its subsequent twelve working papers spelt
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out the government major objectives. It split the NHS into two types of
organisations either purchasing health care services on behalf of the population
or providing the health care services. The District Health Authorities (DHAs)
carried out the purchasing function. Family Health Services Health Authority
(FHSAs) replaced the old FPCs. The Health Authorities Act 1995 removed the
tier of Regional Health Authorities, dissolved the FHSAs and passed their
responsibilities to the new Health Authorities (HA). The provision of services
was through freestanding organisations that were called Trusts and the
independent family practitioners: general practitioners, dentists, pharmacists and
opticians.
The 1990 Act introduced the option of fund holding for General Practitioners.
This meant that practices with large patient lists could both provide and purchase
services for those patients. The late eighties had seen increased attention paid to
primary care, and general practice in particular by central government
(Department of Health and Social Security 1986, 1987). A managerial role was
given to the new FHSAs with the introduction of the 1990 contract for general
medical services (Rivett 1997). This contract addressed some of the deficits
Alsop and May (1986) had identified. It provided explicit levels of service and
clinical care statements for the first time and introduced financial incentives for
achieving target levels of public health work such as childhood immunisation
and cervical screening. GP fund holding however created a very different role
for one section of the medical profession in the administration of the NHS and
signalled a new policy emphasis on leadership from primary care (Department of
Health 1991). Klein described that rapid rise in the power of the GP fund holders
to influence the hospital consultants as "nothing less than a revolution" (Klein
1995 p241). General practices provided with public funds to purchase services
for their patients were not required to have a governing body. The reduction of
finance available to District Health Authorities through the rapid increase of GP
fundholding led to a range of "locality commissioning "initiatives in many health
Authorities. These were intended to persuade GPs they need not become fund
holders in order to influence commissioning (Mays and Dixon 1996).
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The governing bodies of the new Trusts, DHAs and FHSAs were intended to be
very different from the past. The White Paper argued that previous bodies were
ineffective through their size and their omission of senior managers (Department
of Health 1989a). It also argued that it was problematic for members to reconcile
roles for both responsibility for a service and also representation of the
community. The governing bodies of all the new organisations were called
Boards and their members Directors. The emphasis in the guidance was the
recruitment of non-executive members for their experience and skill in complex
management and contractual issues rather than as a representative. Membership
was restricted to a maximum of eleven people with lay membership in the
majority. The professional membership of these bodies was radically curtailed in
comparison to the previous structures. The executive membership on Trust
Boards had to include a medical and nursing director. The non-executive
membership of the FHSA Boards had to include a nurse member (with no
clinical or managerial responsibilities in the geographical area), a GP, a
pharmacist, and an optician, all appointed through the Regional Authorities
rather than elected by their peers. The executive membership of the DHA Board
stipulated only one health professional: a Director of Public Health (NHS &
Community Care Act 1990, Section five).
2.5.2 Studies of Governing Bodies 1991- 1997
This period saw a change in the types of empirical studies undertaken. The
Department of Health took an interest in gaining greater knowledge about the
work of governing bodies. This was the result both of the criticisms of previous
Boards within the White Paper (Department of Health 1 989a) but also the
aspirations to fundamentally change the governance and management of the
health services. In the early period, three studies were commissioned in order to
address the development needs of Board Directors. The NHS Training
Directorate funded the largest study in this period (NHS Training Directorate et
al 1993) for the clear purpose of improving the development of Board
participants. The Audit Commission conducted two investigations (Audit
Commission 1993, 1996) in order to produce organisational development
material: as did South East Thames Region (Stern et al 1995).
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Despite the aspirations of the government policy to introduce a new type of
person to the governing bodies of the NHS, Ashbumer et a! (1993) revealed that
there was actually a strong degree of continuity in non-executive membership in
FHSAs and Health Authorities. Their study aimed to examine the practical
operation of the new Authorities and to identify the development needs of
members. It was undertaken in order to produce a resource manual, which
included summary papers of the research findings with training and development
materials (NHS Training Authority et al. 1993). The empirical work consisted
of a postal survey of all members of NHS governing bodies in England in 1991
(response rate of 69%) and twelve case studies in two regions, Trent and North
East Thames. Data collection involved a series of interviews with Board
members of 2 RHAs, 4 DHAs, 4 Trusts and 2 FHSAs over two years, as well as
observation at some Board meetings.
The national postal survey provided evidence that the number of Board members
who were women or people from minority groups had decreased after the 1990
reforms (Ashburner et al 1993). The researchers argued this was a direct result of
the recruitment of people from the business sector. The postal survey was
undertaken at a very early point in the establishment of the new organisations.
The study papers did not discuss the theoretical or empirical work that informed
the development of the questionnaire. However, commentators on Board roles,
such as Christopher Ham in the health sector and Lorsch and Maclver (1989) in
the private business sector, were cited in the discussion sections. The
conclusions from the survey were that while about half of the informants agreed
that the executives held the balance of power in decision-making, there was also
strong agreement from the executive members that they did not put forward
proposals that they thought the non-executives would have difficulty in
supporting. A third of the members agreed that a substantial part of the Board
work was rubber-stamping managers decisions. FHSA non-executive members
were least likely to agree that executive members had more influence in decision
making (Ashburner et al 1993).
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The case study element of this study was also presented without a theoretical
framework (Ashburner et a! 1993a). It is of particular interest as it included data
on two FHSAs and as such was only the second study to do so. The researchers
noted that the patterns of discussions were different in the FHSAs Boards from
the other bodies. In all the other Boards, the Executive members dominated the
discussion. In the FHSAs, the discussions tended to be dominated by the lay
non-executives, which the researchers explained through two factors. Firstly,
there was only one executive member, as opposed to a group of executives in the
other organisations, and secondly, the FHSA practitioner non-executive members
spoke primarily to their own professional area and some rarely spoke in
meetings. Some further insight into this situation comes from a separate paper in
which the researchers observed that in the inner city FHSA case study the
majority of members were unclear and dissatisfied about their role (Ashbumer
1993a). The members viewed the executive member as the most influential in
the work of the Authority although some of them saw the Authority itself as
having little effect on strategic development because they viewed policy as
centrally imposed. These Board members believed they could influence the rate
and pace of development rather than the direction. The researcher gave two
examples when major decisions were made by the executive and the chairman
outside the authority meeting and presented as a fait accompli to the members.
On both occasions, major arguments arose and the members delayed the
decisions until later meetings after they had fully discussed them. The first
occasion was concerning a decision on the commissioning strategy: the second,
the decision to merge with the DHA.
Ashbumer et a! (1993a) argued that although the involvement of professionals in
overall numbers had dropped from the previous structures, the positions the
professionals held as executive members increased their influence. From their
observations, the researchers argued that "the majority of medical professionals
were held in high esteem" (Ashburner et al 1 993a p1 4) and suggested this
demonstrated a greater scope for corporate influence than in the past. The Trust
medical director was particularly noted as a pivotal position on the Board. They
stated, "It is less clear that the nursing director roles are seen as equally
important. This may be partly accounted for by the incumbents, who in some
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instances seem less confident of their corporate role. For example, in a number of
the research sites, the nursing directors made the least frequent contributions of
all the directors" (Ashburner et al 1 993a p 15).
The production of educational materials was a strong theme from the studies in
this period. The Audit Commission (1993) visited seven FHSAs and talked with
members. It concluded that the business skills of the non-executive members
were not being utilized. It promoted good practice examples of FHSAs involving
non-executive members. A later study, based on visits to ten Trusts and Health
Authorities, concluded that non-executive skills were poorly used and produced
best practice practical guidelines on how to utilise the skills and talents of non-
executive directors (Audit Commission 1996). A South East Thames NHS
Region sponsored study investigated the induction and development needs of
non-executive directors through a postal survey to 50 directors (Stem et al 1995).
It concluded that providing knowledge of how the NHS worked was important so
that the directors could participate more effectively. It produced
recommendations on induction programme content.
The one study of Board members during this period that did not have as an end
point training and development materials was carried out by Edward Peck. Peck
(1993) studied the establishment and first eighteen months of one first wave
Trust. He observed that the chief executive was very influential in the selection
of non-executive directors to the Board (Peck 1993). The chief executive worked
to ensure that non-executive members were people that he felt able to work with
and who could help further Trust relationships with other significant extemal
organisations. This was in direct contrast to central government requirements that
the sole criteria was business acumen for non-executive membership
The main part of Peck's investigation examined the aspirations and perceptions
of Board members in the NHS Trust (Peck 1993a). He used structured interviews
to ascertain members' aspirations for the Board and then eighteen months later a
second interview to obtain their perceptions of the functioning of the Board. He
also observed fifteen Board meetings during this period. His observations were
structured through classifying (and timing) each member's contribution to nine
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categories of behavior on all agenda items. The categories ranged from the very
passive such as receiving information to the very active such as challenging the
chief executive or chairperson. Peck observed that over sixty per cent of the time
in Board meetings was used to receive information and reports from the
executive members. The chairman and chief executive contributed most to the
meetings both in frequency and in amount of time. The non-executive members
mostly asked questions. Peck did however acknowledge that he was not allowed
to observe an unspecified number of confidential meetings and sections of
meetings of the board. His conclusions were only based on the meetings the
chairman and chief executive permitted him to attend. He noted that while one of
the most frequently mentioned aspiring roles for the Board had been to develop a
strategic direction; this was not one of the roles mentioned in reviewing the
successful roles of the Board eighteen months later. He concluded that the Board
had failed to make any significant impact on the major issues occurring during
the year. Peck drew on a typology of Boards of Directors developed by Molz
(1985). Molz (1985) categorized Boards into seven types determined by the
method of control exhibited by the Boards of Directors. It was presented as a
continuum:
• Managerial control,
• Review and approve control,





Peck concluded that this Board of Directors could be classified as under
"managerial control". Peck pointed to the recruitment process as one explanation
although the extent to which other chief executives had been as influential in
selecting their non-executive members was not explored.
The studies in this period had a strong descriptive element and appeared to draw
very little on the analysis of the studies of the preceding decade. The majority
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of them were funded in order to address specific organizational development
needs and contrast sharply with preceding studies in that.
2.6. Governing Bodies 1997 onwards
2.6.1 The Structures
The demise of the conservative government of eighteen years brought further
reorganization to the health service. The Labour Party took power in May 1997
with a mandate to remove the internal market and GP fund holding in the NHS.
It introduced a wave of reforms that included PCGs (Department of Health
1997). PCGs were a feature of the English NIHS. Under devolution, Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland had decided on slightly different local arrangements.
The PCGs were described in detail in section 1.2. The PCG Board (level 1 and
2) was composed of 4-7 GPs, 1-2 community nurses, a lay member, a social
services member, a Health Authority non-executive member and the chief
executive (Department of Health 1998b). The membership policy for the PCGs
boards was designed to place "doctors and nurses in the driving seat in primary
care groups" (Department of Health 1997 paragraph 5.1). This statement was
repeated in the constitution of the Boards for level 3 and 4 PCGs (known as
PCT5) prior to secondary legislation (Department of Health 1999) and in the
announcements of PCT pilot sites (Department of Health 2000).
PCGs were in existence for only three years. The composition of Boards for
PCTs introduced a number of changes from the level I and 2 PCGs Board
(Department of Health 1999). The Boards were to have: a lay member majority
(including the chairperson), the chief executive, the finance director plus three
professional members from a new body called the Professional Executive
Committee which had to include at minimum one GP and one nurse. The new
Professional Executive committees introduced places for professionals other than
GPs and nurses.
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2.6.2 Studies of Governing Bodies 1997 onwards
The major reforms brought a number of studies, funded in different ways,
concerned with evaluating the changes. Central government funded three of the
studies in England. The first was an evaluation of the forty short-lived, GP
commissioning pilots, which were precursors of the Primary Care Groups (Regen
et al 1999). This study then focused on twelve primary care groups (Smith et a!
2000, Regen et a! 2001). The second was a survey of Health Authorities prior to
the formal establishment of PCGs (Audit Commission 1999) and after the first
six months (Audit Commission 2000). The third was a three year longitudinal
survey of seventy two Primary Care Groups (Wilkin et al 1999,2001,2002). The
British Medical Association General Practice Committee also undertook a
national postal survey of all 277 PCGs to monitor the progress and development
of PCGs and PCTs after six months (British Medical Association 2000). In
addition, primary health care academics were particularly interested in the
innovation. They used the PCGs as a focus for a variety of population based
studies (for example Majeed et a! 2000, Lucas and Bickler 2000) and a plethora
of studies on the education and training needs of members of PCGs (see for
example Bate et al 1999).
The Audit Commission reported on two investigations. The first was a postal
survey to all English Health Authorities (Audit Commission 1999) just prior to
April 1999. The detail of the questionnaire, the completion rates and the
objectives of the investigation were not given. The report included material from
other sources in the Department of Health. The report was a mixture of
description, judgments on the observations e.g. "This may prove a sensible
approach" (p 8) and general injunctions for Health Authorities and primary care
groups. The report provided baseline information on the PCGs such as
populations served. Of the 481 PCGS, 17% were starting at level 1, and 83 % at
level 2. 97% had elected a GP as chair. One third of PCGs had co-opted non-
voting members such as pharmacists. 75% had appointed a chief executive, of
these 61% had previously been employed by health authorities, 12% employed in
general practice and only 500 employed outside the NHS (Audit Commission
1999). The report observed, "The GP and practice nurse board members are not
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representative of all general practice. Former fund holding practices, training
practices and those serving more affluent areas are more likely (in relations to the
prevalence of these types of practice) to contribute a member to a PCG Board
than others" (para.10). Detailed figures were not offered to support this
statement. The questionnaire itself was not provided in the report and
consequently it is difficult to assess the veracity of this information.
The Audit Commission followed the postal survey six months later with a further
survey of 57 PCG chief executives and an unspecified number of interviews with
PCG Board members and staff "elsewhere" (Audit Commission 2000 p3). The
investigation focused on "organizational development, early progress on
objectives, and the resources available and future plans" (Audit Commission
2000 para. 5). The report described its findings, provided examples of PCG
activity it considered good practice, commented on observed problems and then
provided recommendations for action for PCGs and Health Authorities. The
report noted that some PCGs had not opened the Board meetings to the public,
while those that did also had closed meetings. The report commented on
observed board meetings although this activity had not been declared in the
methodology. The authors noted that little effort had been made to assist the
public either in attending or understanding the proceedings once there. They also
observed that the GPs were most vocal in the meetings but that few decisions or
actions seemed to be taken. The majority of PCGs in the survey had co-opted a
member of the Community Health Council to the Board. It described the trend
for PCGs to establish a range of sub-committees to undertake its work and that
these often co-opted people from outside the Board e.g. practice managers. 60%
of the 57 PCGs in the survey had appointed a nurse and GP as joint lead
members for clinical governance: while in 7% of PCGs a nurse member had sole
responsibility (Audit Commission 2000). The report did not attempt any
theoretical analysis or explanation for its observations. A significant part of the
report provided recommendations on managing the transition to PCT status.
The BMA surveyed by post all the chairmen of the PCGs in September 1999 and
received information on 277 (British Medical Association 2000). The intention
was to provide baseline information very similar to the Audit Commission postal
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survey. However, it did provide insight into particular aspects not covered in
those reports. The GP members were exclusively elected to the Board The PCG
Board links to the Local Medical Committee (LMC) were well developed, 70%
of the PCGs reported formal links with the LMC and 40% had formal
representation on the LMC. The survey also revealed great variation in the
remuneration to chairmen and GP Board members. Health visitors were the most
frequently reported nurse members on the Boards, with over a third of the total
places.
The Department of Health commissioned two other studies. The first evolved out
of an evaluation of the forty OP commissioning pilots established in April 1998
(Regen et al 1999). The speed of the implementation of PCGs overtook these
pilots and the evaluation continued but changed to focus on twelve PCGs. The
authors provided no theoretical frameworks but used a non-attributed structure,
process and outcome framework. The report provided description without
offering explanation. It suggested aspects which were likely to be found in other
developing PCGs, e.g. the reported enthusiasm of nurses to be involved, and
highlighted issues that were likely to be problematic for PCGs e.g. engaging non-
lead GPs.
The evaluation team then focused on twelve PCGs from the cohort of previous
OP commissioning pilots (Regen et a! 2001). The aim of this phase was "to
identify lessons that might emerge from the operation of this set of twelve case
study PCG/Ts for the further development of PCG and PCTs" (Regen et al
200 lpS). Data collection was undertaken twice with a twelve month interval. It
was composed of semi-structured interviews with board members and senior
health authority personnel, focus group discussions with Board members,
observation of some PCG/T Board meetings and a postal survey of all "grass
roots" GPs in the twelve PCTs.
The two subsequent reports (Smith et al 2000 and Regen et al 2001) provided a
detailed account of frequently observed phenomena but no explanatory
theoretical frameworks. The emphasis in both reports, like the first (Regen et al
1999), was on recommendations for the emerging new bodies, this time PCTs.
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The researchers observed that the PCG boards initially spent a great deal of time
on PCG organizational issues. At the second data collection period the focus had
changed to service development issues, and the formation of the new PCTs
(Regen et al 2001). Regen et al (2001) reported that typically in Board meetings
the chief executive would make the most contributions, followed by the chair (in
each of the case studies this was a GP) and then some of the GP members. Much
of the Boards' activity was reported to be in ratification rather than decision-
making. PCG chairs and chief executives as a pair were viewed as the locus of
power on the Board. In the second year, one or two other GPs were seen to join
the locus of power. The researchers attributed this to these GPs taking lead
responsibilities for issues such as prescribing, clinical governance, and
commissioning. The nurse members were viewed as less influential than the GP
members but more influential than the lay members. Despite the nurses having
taken lead responsibilities in areas such as clinical governance and health
improvement, the research team reported perceptions of a reduction in the level
of nurse member influence by the second year (Regen et a! 2001).
The third centrally funded evaluation was the national tracker survey of a
representative sample of 72 PCGs (Wilkins et al 2000 and 2001). It aimed: "to
describe how PCGs and PCTs tackle their core functions, evaluate achievements
against national and local policy goals, identify features associated with
success"(Wilkins et al 2000 p 1). Data collection was undertaken annually in the
autumn in 1999, 2000 (only 71 PCGs at this point) and the spring 2002 (Wilkins
et al 2001, 2002). Two data collection methods were used. The first was face-to-
face interviews and telephone interviews with chief officers, chairpersons and
Health Authority leads. The second was a postal questionnaire to members with
lead responsibility for clinical governance, prescribing, information management
and technology, the social service representatives (year 1 and 2), one GP and one
nurse member on each board (year 1 only), and CHC representatives (year 2
only). The large research team also published articles on additional data
collection not declared in the main methodology (for example: a survey of
clinical governance leads in London PCGs, Heywood et al 1999, a survey of
primary care investment plans, Leese and Gillam 2001). The reports from the
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first two data collection periods were descriptive. The first report provided a
description of the establishment of PCGs as organizations. It confirmed the
establishment of sub-committees but also the existence of formal and informal
executive committees (Wilkins et al 2000). As in the Regen Ct al (2001) case
studies, members ranked the chair and chief executive as most influential
members in decision making followed by the GPs. "Most PCGs have succeeded
in welding a disparate group of professionals and lay people into an effective
corporate unit. They have established clear policies and priorities to carry them
forward, and they have begun to implement changes to deliver better services"
(Wilkin et al 2000 p1). It observed that many of the PCGs were concerned with
mergers and forming PCTs. It provided recommendations for organizational
development. The second report was also descriptive (Wilkin et a! 2001). It
noted that all the PCG/PCTs had extended the range of primary care services
available while progress on commissioning, health improvement and partnership
working with local Authorities was much slower. Managerial capacity and
information management and technology were reported to be inadequate to
achieve the priorities and targets of the PCGs. The third report focused on the
development of PCTs (Wilkin et al 2002). It was apparent that this longitudinal
study, like the evaluation of the GP commissioning pilots Regen et a! 1999) had
been overtaken by the speed of implementation of the new organizational
arrangements.
2.7. Discussion
This review of empirical studies of NHS governing bodies reveals a number of
themes. This section comments on:
• The nature of these studies,
• Recurring themes regarding the role of the governing bodies,
• Recurring themes regarding the role of different membership groups
within the governing bodies.
It concludes by identifying how the present study addresses the gaps identified in
the empirical knowledge base.
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2.7.1 The Nature of the Investigations into NHS Governing Bodies
A number of features are evident from the review of empirical studies:
. The absence of interest during the first thirty years of the NHS,
The high incidence of descriptive studies from government funded
researchers,
. The use of theoretical frameworks in analysis in the decade between
1977- 1986 and their absence at other times,
The paucity of material considering the governing bodies for independent
contractors,
. The focus on the production of educational materials for non-executive
members from NHS funded studies following the reforms of 1991.
It would appear that there was a very low level of interest from both the
government and academic community in the governing bodies throughout the
first thirty years of the NHS. The Scottish Health and Home Office sponsored
the first documented investigation (Scottish Home and Health Department 1966)
and even that was commissioned nearly twenty years after the establishment of
the NHS. It is puzzling as to why academics in political science were not more
interested in these bodies.
The impetus for the first group of studies (Taylor 1977, Royal Commission for
the NHS 1978, Hunter 1979, Ham, 1981) clearly came from the first major
administrative re-organisation of the NIHS. This pattern is evident in the next
twenty years where studies following successive re-organisations of NHS
administration. Studies conducted in the decade following the 1974 reforms
explicitly used theoretical frameworks from political science and sociology
applied to medicine (Taylor 1977, Hunter 1979, Ham 1981, Haywood and
Ranade 1985, Alsop and May, 1986). This was also a period of prolific
theoretical development in political and social sciences applied to health care
(see for example Freidson 1970, fllich 1975, McKeown 1976, Alford 1975,
Larson 1977, Navarro 1976). It is noticeable that the central government funded
55
investigations provided descriptive studies with little use of theoretical
frameworks for analysis (for example Royal Commission, 1978, NHS Training
Directorate et a! 1993, Regen et al 2001, Wilkins 2000). The emergence of post-
modern theory in these years was not referred to in the studies and consequently
cannot explain the absence of theoretical frameworks. It is particularly
noticeable that prior to the implementation of the 1997 reforms there were only
two studies investigating governing bodies concerned with the independent
practitioners (Alsop and Mays 1986, Ashburner 1993a) and that there were no
studies concerned with the Local Health Authorities. This is an indication of the
low level of importance placed on primary and public health by funding bodies
and academics in comparison to the hospital sector. The introduction of Primary
Care Groups prompted three large government funded studies (Audit
Commission 1999, 2000, Regen et al 2001, Wilkins Ct al 1999, 2001). These
studies provided description only and were intended to provide organisational
development materials for the new forms of health service organisation. There
was also an absence of theoretical analysis in these studies.
2.7.2 Issues Concerning the Role of the Governing Bodies
From the earliest study (Scottish Home and Health Department 1966) a tension
was reported in the role of the governing body between making policy decisions
and the execution of decisions. Boards in general and non-executive members in
particular were reported to be confused in their role (see for example Royal
Commission 1978, Hayward and Ranadé 1985). Hence successive governments,
at times of both stability and also change, have stated that the role of the Board
was one of strategic policy making and not operational (for example Department
of Health and Social Security 1968, Department of Health 1990). However, the
studies provide evidence as to the difficulty in separating these two activities.
Hunter (1979) described the Board members as "verging on parasitic" in their
relationship with officers in order to gain enough operational detail from which
to inform decision making. Ashbumer et at (1993a) described the creation of
"quasi" executive roles for non-executive members e.g. in placing them on
appointments panels, internal grievance panels or serious incident investigation
56
panels. Another observation from non-executive members challenged the view
that local level policy making was possible at all in a centralised state run service
(Ashbumer 1993).
Evidence would suggest that chief executives have not perceived the role of the
Board or Board members as one of policy making (NHS Training Authority
1987, Peck 1993). The district general managers interviewed in the Templeton
studies (NHS Training Authority 1987) viewed the Board's main role as one of
ensuring public accountability, while in Peck's case study the chief executive
saw the primary purpose of the non-executives as aiding relationships with
significant external organisations. The studies of Primary Care Groups have not
considered the issue of the role of the Board in policy making or the perceptions
of chief executives to the role of the Board.
2.7.3 Themes in the roles and relationships of different membership groups
on Boards
A complicated picture emerges on the roles and relationships between different
types of members, not least because the studies are set in periods with different
constitutions. One constant through the different constitutions of governing
bodies has been the presence of executive and non-executive members on
Boards. The relationship between these two groups has in the main been
portrayed as one where the executives are very influential in decision making in
comparison to the non-executives. From the Royal Commission on the NHS
(1979) onwards, reference is made to a perception by many non-executives that
their role is one of "rubber stamping" i.e. just providing the official agreement
for decisions already made by the executive members (Hunter 1979, Haywood
and Ranadé 1985, Ashburner et al 1993). This observation has been made about
the governing bodies for the hospital and community services as well as the
bodies for the independent contractors (Alsop and May 1986, Ashburner 1993).
While this supports the argument that executives or managers dominate the
activity of the Board there is evidence to the contrary. Some of the studies
observed that it was the chief officer and chairperson jointly who were viewed as
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most influential in the work of the Board by other members (Haywood and
Ranadé 1985, Alsop and May 1986, Ashburner et al 1993, Regen et al 1999,
Wilkins et al 1999). Some studies reported that the managers only offered the
policy options they believed the Board would be able to agree (Hunter 1979,
Ham 1986, NHS Training authority 1987). During the period of consensus
management, it was argued that usually the process of reaching consensus by the
officers left little for the Board to challenge (Royal Commission on the NHS
1978). Hunter (1979) warned that it was important not to confuse high levels of
activity with high levels of influence. The managers in Hunter's case studies
reported that they were not in control, merely responding to demands usually
precipitated by consultant activity. Taylor (1977) supports this view in his case
study in which he analysed situations of conflict. He portrayed the management
team as the lacking any influence in the process of decision-making. He did
however speculate that this was a result of the small size of the service and
population; in larger communities increased numbers of interest groups would
allow the managers to gain influence by playing off different interest groups
against each other.
The studies on Primary Care Groups have not examined issues of conflicts of
interests or the impact of having professionals who provide the services also
being non-executive Board members.
The constitutions of governing bodies have, in fact, always provided for the
presence of three different interest groups. These can broadly be categorised as
the managers, the professionals and lay people. The categories, professional and
lay people, however do not convey the extent of the variation. The lay people on
the Board have had different characteristics at different periods of time. Some
were clearly representatives of the local population, such as the elected local
councillors. Some had skills and experience to contribute at particular points
such as previous governors of charitable hospitals in the first years of the NHS or
business acumen with the instigation of the internal market. However, even at
the point where non-executives had been recruited for their business acumen, a
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majority believed their role included being the voice of patients, particularly in
the FHSAs (Ashbumer et al 1993).
Before the 1974 reforms, professionals meant almost exclusively medical
professionals although dentists and pharmacists had representation in the
Executive Committees. After the 1974 reforms, nursing also gained
representation although their presence fluctuated afterwards in successive re-
organisations. Medical and nursing professionals have held executive and non-
executive positions at different periods. It is, however, the medical profession
that is considered influential in all the studies. Nurse members are rarely referred
to and, when they are, it is to describe but not explain their lack of influence
(Hunter 1979, Taylorl977, Ashburner 1993, Wilkins et al 1999, Regen et al
2001).
Ham (1981), Hunter (1979) and Alsop and May (1986) draw on Alford's (1975)
theories arguing that medicine was the dominant interest group in the governing
bodies while the officers were the challenging interest group, and the interests of
the community were not heard. Surveys, which reported demographic details of
governing body members, indicated under-representation of considerable
sections of the population (Kings Fund 1990, Ashbumer et al 1993). Lay
members have been perceived as the least influential, particularly at points when
they have been in the minority (Wilkin et a! 1999, Levenson and Joule 1999).
Taylor (1977) provided a rare example of conflict in which the lay
representatives organised to oppose and defeat the proposals of the medical
members. However, Hunter (1979) and Ham (1981) noted that open conflict
was not evident in their studies although there was evidence of tension between
the medical membership and managers (Scottish Home and Health Department
1966, Ham 1981, Taylor 1977, Ashburner 1993). Hunter (1979) and Ham (1981)
argued that the interests of the most powerful section of the medical profession
were served through an unchallenged acceptance of the status quo by the
governing bodies. Their work directly exposed the different interest groups
within the medical profession, an observation that was supported in later studies.
Ranadé's (1986) analysis suggested that the sole motivation for Health Authority
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membership by many medical professionals was to protect the interest of the
group they represented. The case studies of FHSAs agreed with this view
(Ashburner 1993a). The studies of the PCGs have not addressed motivation for
Board membership.
The policy guidance for the PCGs placed the general practitioners and primary
care nurses jointly in leadership roles. The descriptive studies of the Primary
Care Groups described perceptions that the GPs were more influential than the
nurses, and that the chairperson together with the chief executive were seen as
the most influential in Board business. However, they do not offer any
explanations. These studies have treated the GPs and primary care nurses as
homogeneous groups. Yet empirical studies of the professional groups, together
with the variation in recruitment practices would suggest there is heterogeneity
within these groups. The published studies of PCGs have not drawn on
explanatory theories from political and social sciences to direct either their data
collection or interpretations. This present study draws on theories of authority
and power and the structured nature of occupational relationships to explore the
leadership role of general practitioners and primary care nurses in local
governing bodies of the NHS through studying the experience of Primary Care
Group Boards. It is these theories that will be considered in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Power and Leadership in Health Policy Processes
3.1. Introduction
PCGs were simultaneously: a local decision making body for the allocation and
monitoring of public funds to health care provision with its own bureaucracy,
and an element of a national bureaucracy for the administration of a state health
service. The members of the Board were given equal status but at the same time
the clinical professional members were given specific leadership roles. This
chapter is therefore concerned to identify theoretical and empirical work: firstly,
on the nature of power and influence in policy making and implementation,
particularly in health policy, i.e. at the macro level and secondly, on the nature of
leadership in organisations, particularly health service organisations i.e. at the
meso level.
3.2. The Nature of Power in Public Policy Making
".... A discussion of the public policy process needs to be grounded in an
extensive consideration of the nature ofpower in the state" (Hill 1997 p1 8)
The starting point of this chapter is a brief consideration of the definition and
nature of power itself. Definitions of power have always been given through the
relationship between individuals or groups, not as an attribute in isolation.
Weber defined power as, "the chance of a man or number of men to realise their
own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are
participating in the action" (Gerth and Mills 1970 p180). Weber distinguished
between coercion as an illegitimate form of power and authority as legitimate
form of power. Dahl refined Weber's definition to, "A has power over B to the
extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do "(Dahi 1961
p203). Bacharach and Barataz (1962) critiqued this definition as it implied that
power was always visible through decisions. It did not address covert
mechanisms or subtle cultural processes. They argued that "power is also
exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and
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political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political
process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively
innocuous to A" (p 948). They argued that power was covertly exercised when A
was able to resist issues of significance to B from even becoming a matter for
decision-making: a form of non-decision making. Gramsci (1971 quoted in
Ritzer 2000) offered a further form of covert power in his theory of "hegemony"
or cultural leadership, in which a set of beliefs became so pervasive in society
that they legitimised the dominance of one group over another. Lukes (1974)
went on to build on all these ideas and argued that the exercise of power could be
observed in three dimensions. The first dimension was the exercise of power in
observable conflicts of interest where A prevailed in getting A's preferences
followed over B. This is the basis for studies that examine the actual decisions
made. The second dimension was the exercise of power in covert conflicts in
which A was able to prevent issues in B's interest reaching the political process
or B anticipates the negative reaction of A and fails to raise them. The third
dimension involved the exercise of power "to shape perceptions, cognitions and
preferences so that they accept their role in the existing order of things because
they see or imagine no alternative or because they see it as natural and
unchangeable" (Lukes 1974 p24). Consequently there is neither overt nor covert
conflict but what Luke's described as latent conflict. In Lukes's view, latent
conflict exists when there would be a conflict of preferences between those
exercising power and those subject to it if the latter were to become aware of
their interests.
Given that the exercise of power is in the interaction between individuals and
groups, how can power relationships in a democratic state be understood? A brief
summary of the main explanatory frameworks derived from political sociology
and political science is given below, before considering the application to health
policy making. These theories can be categorised into two broad groupings: those
based on ideas of power being held by a minority through social structures at the
expense of other groups (structural dominance theories) and those arguing that
power is shared between competing interest groups (pluralist theories).
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3.2.1 Pluralist Theories
Classical pluralist theory argues that power is dispersed through different groups
in a democratic society: that multiple interest groups have equal opportunity
through the democratic process to exert power and influence. The complexity of
the modem liberal state prevents one single group, class or organisation
dominating society. Power is dispersed among many groups rather than
cumulative in a ruling group or elite (Smith 1995). DahI, a leading proponent of
pluralist theory argued that there were multiple centres of power which meant
that political decision-making was the peaceful resolution of conflicting interests
(Dahi 1961). This position was heavily criticised: a) for failing to account for
the different dimensions of the exercise of power (as discussed above), b) for
focusing on the process of the decision making rather than the consequences of
the decisions, and c) for ignoring the differential power levels between different
interest groups (Walt 1996). The challenge that there were differential levels of
power between groups came from structural dominance theories. These
challenges led to a revision of pluralist theories. Hall et a! (1975) suggested a
notion of 'bounded' pluralism, in which the issues of economic policy are
decided within an elitist framework (see below) but that most domestic policies
on health, education, transport and housing are likely to developed through
pluralist processes. However, Ham (1999) was able to identify only two studies
of the NHS in the 1 960s as rooted in a pluralist framework of analysis. Analysis
of the power relationships in decision making in the UK health service have
drawn on other theories as outlined below.
3.2.2 Structural Dominance Theories
In this broad grouping, it is argued that a dominant but small group within
society exercise power in their own interests. Different schools of thought
provide different explanatory theories as to the source of this domination.
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3.2.2.1. Marxist Theory
Marxist theory contends that the dominant minority is defined by its control of
the means of production in society. Economic domination is therefore the
source of political domination (Giddens 1973). The economic relationships are
reproduced, legitimated and reinforced through the structures and institutions of
a society such as the legal system and the education system. Marxist theory
argues that the ruling class creates recruitment mechanisms to positions of
political authority that ensure the monopoly by ruling class members. Decision-
making and the exercise of power through the political system are then made in
ways that support the interests of the ruling class. Gramsci (quoted in Ritzer
2000) in the mid-twentieth century proposed that the ruling class exercised
cultural leadership or hegemony: this meant that a set of beliefs became
dominant in society that legitimised the power relationships in society The
notion of a hegemony resonates in Lukes's (1974) ideas of a third dimension of
power discussed earlier. Challenges to the pivotal role ascribed to a group
determined by economic position alone came from theorist of dominant elite
groups.
3.2.2.2. Elite Theorists
Elite theorists also support the notion of a dominant minority group in a state but
rejected the notion that this group is an economically determined class. Elite
group theories originate from the work of Italian political scientists Mosca and
Pareto in the early twentieth century (Bottomore 1964). They argued that the
dominant minority group ensured that decision-making was in its own interest,
but that it was an autonomous and independent social force, which could recruit
from any part of society. These ideas were taken forward in the mid- twentieth
century by empirical work in the UK and USA, which focused on networks of
power elites. C Wright Mills described a power elite in the USA formed from
the command positions in federal government, business and military institutions
(Wright Mills 1956). He argued moreover that the political, military and
economic elites all exercised a considerable degree of autonomy and were often
in conflict (Evans 1995). Bottomore (1964) analysing British society argued that
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"elites" were mainly occupational groups that had high status for whatever
reason in society. More contemporary commentators have argued that family
groups, state executive members, executive members of multi-national
corporations now form the membership to elite power groups (Dowding 1996).
A separate group of theorists have addressed not the determination of the
dominant group but the socially structured position of subordinated groups.
Feminist theorists argued that both Marxists and elite theories of the distribution
of power failed to adequately explain the inequality experienced by women in
society. Feminists argued that patriarchy i.e. the primacy of the male over the
female, was a dominant ideology present in all economic, social and political
institutions (see for example De Beauvoir 1953, Millet 1971, Mitchell 1971,
Firestone 1973). Therefore, the consideration of the distribution of power was
incomplete unless it incorporated the differential experience based on gender.
Minority group theorists have argued that there has been a failure to account for
the subordinate position of other groups. People from groups visibly different
from the majority of the population, whether by race, disability, religion or
sexuality have had their position as a subordinate group institutionally structured
(Ritzer 2000).
3.3. Health Policy and Policy Communities in the UK
Policy making has been described as messy set of negotiations and iterative
activities between levels of government and interest groups (Sabatier 1999).
Analysts of public policy making in general, rather than specifically health
policy, point out that the interplay of interest groups, agendas and contexts
ensure that the process is not rational, linear, or ordered (Sabatier 1999).
Edelman (1985) first drew attention to the fact that politicians often promulgate
policy that is purely symbolic: symbolising to the electorate a set of aspirations
rather than defined enforceable actions. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973)
demonstrated that even when central policy intentions were for action, the
nuances of policy were worked out at a local level for implementation, where
different sets of interests are likely to have influence. This section examines
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health policy development in UK through the theoretical perspectives outlined
previously.
3.3.1 Analysis of Health Policy Development in the UK
There have been a number of analyses of the policy making in the NHS using
structured dominance theorists. Analysts using a Marxist framework have argued
that policies are made in the interest of the dominant, capitalist group in society
(Doyal and Pennell 1979, Mitchell 1984, Iliffe 1988, Widgery 1988). The
persistent differential experience of morbidity and mortality and provision of
health care services is explained through reference to the conflict of interest
between the social classes. Challenges to this view have come from perspectives
that argue for the need to understand other dynamics that cannot be explained by
class conflict alone. It has been argued that the pervasive gendering of NHS has
a significant effect on the differential experience of women and men as producers
(Davies 1995, Riska and Wegar 1993) and consumers of health care (Clarke
1983, Porter 1990, Doyal 1995). Likewise, the differential experience of people
from minority ethnic groups in participation in the policy making process and
receiving differential services has been used as an analytical framework,
independent of social class (Torkington 1985, McNaught 1988,Wattersl996).
Other policy analysts have sought to use structured dominance frameworks that
acknowledge the professions as elite groups in the development of health policy.
Many have been drawn to the work of Robert Alford (1975) and as such it is
worth exploring this in more detail. Alford examined the apparent inertia and
lack of change in the New York City hospitals from 1950 to 1970 despite twenty
major inquiries. Each inquiry followed a declaration of crisis in the provision of
health care for those without or with low levels of insurance. The inquiry reports
described increasing costs, inaccessible and complicated clinic and hospital
structures, and expanding government agencies. In order to explain this
situation, Alford differentiated between "interest groups" in the conventional
sense and those structural interests present or not present in the institutions of a
society. He classified these into dominant (i.e. currently present), challenging
(i.e. being created by the changing structure of society) and repressed (i.e. not
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present). A defining difference for Alford was that the dominant, unlike the
repressed, structural interests did not have to continuously organise to promote or
defend those interests. Alford argued that the professional monopoly of
medicine over the production and distribution of health services was the
dominant interest, structured into health care institutions. Those who shared this
interest were the "professional monopolizers". In his analysis, the 'challenging
interest' was "in breaking the professional monopoly of physicians" (Alford
1975 p15) and gaining control over the production and distribution of health
care. He argued, this was a shared interest held by those employed in various
bureaucratic organisations involved in the provision and funding of health care,
including medical schools. He labelled those who shared this interest "the
corporate rationalizers". The "repressed interest" was the provision of health
care to those who had no current financial mechanisms of securing it. This group
Alford labelled "the community" but in fact he meant very specific sections of
the population. He included: " white rural and urban poor, ghetto blacks, the
neighbourhoods just poor enough that no doctor wants to establish his practice
there, middle class families rendered newly medically indigent by sharply
escalating costs and those occupations affected by job-related diseases, and
many more" (p 15). Alford argued that his concept of structural interests did not
preclude groups holding conflicting interests within a dominant structural interest
and that "the concept leaves open the extent to which and the conditions under
which coalitions form and constitute 'interest groups' in the usual sense" (p 14).
However, one of his central theses was that "the developing structural interests
in corporate rationalization contradicts and challenges some fundamental
interests of professional monopolies and that this contradiction accounts for
much of the sometimes muted, sometimes blaring, conflict between doctors and
hospitals, fee for service and prepaid practice, and health planning and the
health market." (p 15).
Alford provided a framework that acknowledged multiple interest groups in the
health care arena (thus providing a pluralist foreground) but differentiated some
groups by virtue of the presence of their interests within the structural fabric of
the health care institutions (providing a structured dominance background).
Although Alford does not refer to Lukes' (1974) theoretical constructs of power,
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he provides an illustration of Lukes' third dimension of power, through
identifying the hegemonic nature of the power of medicine in the health care
arena in the USA in the same period.
Alford's analysis was critiqued at the time of publication for failing to consider
the dominant class basis of the medical profession in the USA (Navarro 1976).
However, this is just one type of unifying structural interest that Alford has
ignored. There is no discussion of relative social values placed on different
genders, ages, ethnicities and the structured presence of these values in health
care supply, provision or institutions. Alford's empirical data is located in a
very specific period and health care system. His analysis, located at a slightly
later time period, was concurrent with a period of upsurge in feminist as well as
minority rights activism in America. Alford only discussed the medical
profession and the officials in bureaucracies as holding a unifying structural
interest. The majority of the health care labour force, including the nurses, do not
feature in either his presentation of the empirical data or his analysis.
Alford's framework has been used in the analysis of decision-making by local
NHS governance bodies (Hunter 1979, Ham 1981, Alsop and May 1986). Each
applied the framework in a looser manner than Alford but identified the
hegemonic nature of the interests of the medical profession, and the absence of
representation of the community views. Ham (1981) pointed out that it was the
structural interests of a very specific group of acute medical and surgical
consultants, rather than all doctors, that were pervasive and unquestioned.
Government policy shifts in the organisation of the NHS have led analysts to
question further the 'fit' of Alford's typology in the UK. Policy shifts to an
internal market in the NHS was another point where the applicability of the
Alford typology was examined. Using empirical data from a doctoral case study
of commissioning, North argued that Alford's typology fitted at a national level
but became problematic at a local level (North 1996). She argued that the internal
market shifted the orientation of groups of local managers so that those employed
in purchasing or providing organisations pursued very different objectives. She
also questioned, in the configuration of responsibilities in that period, whether
GP fundholders should be categorised as 'corporate rationalizers' rather than
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'professional monopolists' (North 1995). In this she provides an example of how
many UK analysts have come to use Alford's typology as shorthand in which
"professional monopolizers" equals doctors acting in the interests of themselves
and thereby their medical profession and "corporate rationalizers" equals those
acting in the interest of a particular bureaucratic organisation. The shorthand
version dispenses with Alford's definition of the corporate rationalizers as those
who would break the monopoly of medicine. Using the typology in this way
has meant that analysts have been able to identify that some doctors act as
corporate rationalists within the medical profession in their engagement with the
UK state funded system (Elston 1991).
A recent empirical study examining the role of health consumer groups in the
UK argued that policy shifts had ensured that the interests of users of the health
service were now recognised and represented in the policy process (Baggott et al
2004). They argued that the interests of the patients are therefore not repressed
in Alford's terms; although they conceded that medical concepts remain
dominant and the "institutional bias against health consumer groups is still
evident (Baggott et al 2004, p329). In this, the authors provide a pluralist
perspective in policy making that retains a structured dominance. This has been
a recurring theme in UK health policy analysis.
Many analysts have pointed to the influence of "policy communities" and "issue
networks "made up of multiple interest groups but noted a hierarchy in their
status and power (Walt 1996, Ham 1999). Cawson (1982) argued that the
inclusion of the provider interest groups in health policy making was a form of
corporatism rather than pluralism. Heclo (1978) used the term "iron triangle" to
describe policy making which included a small number of participants who never
changed in contrast to "issue networks" where a greater number of interest
groups were present in less stable relationships. Haywood and Hunter (1982)
demonstrated the existence of "iron triangles" in the development of policies for
the care of older people.
Klein (1983,1995,2001) throughout his analyses of health policy in the UK
acknowledged the structural dominance of the medical profession but situates it
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alongside the structural dominance of successive governments mandated to fund
a national health service. At the point in time of Alford's analysis, Klein (1974),
characterised interest groups as chess pieces in a multi-dimensional board where
alliances, sacrifices, conflicts and agreements are part of a more complicated
overall strategy than the individual elements would suggest. He elaborated:
"One needs to conceptualise policy-making as a sort of multi-
dimensional chess.... In a field like the health services, it is the inter-
relatedness of areas and issues that seems to be the norm. If the medical
profession adopts a particular stance on issue X, it may well be because
section A of the profession wants to enlist the support of section B on
issue Y. Similarly, government may well give in to the demands of the
medical profession on issues Z, because it wants to conserve its political
and administrative resources for the coming conflict over issue W."
(Klein 1974 p 236).
However, he was clear that the chess pieces were overall aligned in two opposing
groups: the medical profession and the government of the day. Klein (2001)
described the internal political history of the NHS as "the history of relations
between the government of the day and the medical profession". He
characterised it as a union between "technocratic paternalism and professional
self interest"(p23 1) creating an unwritten agreement in which the state provided
ring fenced finance and the medical profession had clinical autonomy to decide
how to use resources within the ring fence. Klein demonstrated that there have
been shifts in the balance of power between the government and the medical
profession when the wider socio-economic climate has altered. He used case
studies of policy making in the face of concerted medical profession opposition
(for example, the introduction of the limited list for prescribing in 1984, the
Working for Patients reforms in 1989 and the GP Contract in 1990) to
demonstrate the impact of a changed political and economic climate from the
nineteen eighties onwards. He concluded that the medical profession was not in a
dominant position when faced with a determined government and that history
suggested, "The power of the medical profession is in inverse relationship to the
size of the stage on which a specflc health care issue is played out." (Klein
1995: 55-6).
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3.3.2. Nurses and Nursing in the Policy Communities
While policy commentators point to the power of the producer interest groups in
health policy making, it should be noted that rarely is any other group than
medicine referred to. Alford (1975) made no reference to any other health care
provider profession. An analysis of the indexes of well-known texts on UK
health care policy demonstrates the low visibility of nurses for health policy
analysts (Ham 1999, Levitt et al 1995, Walt 1996, Barker 1996). They provide
only one or two references to nurses and nursing in comparison to multiple
references to the medical profession. Salter (1998), who was later appointed as a
Dean of a Faculty of Nursing, provides a rare example of an entire chapter within
a UK health policy book that addresses nurses and nursing.
Nursing has always had a presence in the policy communities since the
establishment of the NHS (Baly 1980). However, the extent and influence of its
presence has fluctuated. Dingwall and colleagues (1988) described the
development of the Nursing Division in the new Ministry of Health in 1941 but
pointed out that the Chief Nursing Officer was initially placed in a very low
status civil service rank and never achieved parity with the Chief Medical
Officer. White (1986) noted in the mid eighties that the size of the Chief
Nurse's department and her portfolio of responsibilities had grown and shrank at
successive re-organisations. The repetition of this pattern led Jane Salvage, an
Editor of the Nursing Times in the eighties and Nursing Director at the Kings
Fund and the European Office of the World Health Organisation in the nineties,
to write in 2003 of an overwhelming sense of déjà vu at reporting that "a fierce
battle has been raging to keep England's chief nurse at the top table in the latest
Department of Health reorganisation, following leaks that her post would be
down graded" (Salvage 2003 p1 9). In the 1991 re-organisation, the chief nurse
was denied a place at the policy board of the NHS and her responsibilities and
staff reduced. A change of Minister of Health enabled her to reclaim her place
(Rivett 1997). The Department of Health re-organisation in 1997 initially saw a
reduction in the Chief Nurse's department and responsibilities, unlike the Chief
Medical Officer (Webster 2002). While the Chief Nurse's portfolio then grew,
71
the announcement of further decentralisation in the NHS (Department of Health
2001) also marked the further reduction of her directly managed department.
During 2003 the size of the Chief Nurse's Department was further reduced from
a directly managed team of twenty-five to two (O'Dowd 2004). Leaks of
information to journalists in 2004 about a further reorganisation suggested
further down grading in of the Chief Nursing Officer post so that unlike the Chief
Medical Officer post, it would be within the domain of the Head of Human
Resources of the NHS Executive rather than directly accountable to the Chief
Executive as previously (O'Dowd 2004). This move would suggest that the
value of the Chief Nurse to the NHS Executive was related to ensuring sufficient
supply of nurses to the workforce rather than an expert in health care or health
service delivery. The example of the Chief Nursing Officer position
demonstrates that while the interest of nursing is technically structured into the
organisation, those supporting the interest repeatedly have to behave in ways that
Alford (1975) described as repressed in order to ensure the interest is
represented.
Nurses' representative organisations have had a presence in the policy
communities although the extent of the involvement has also fluctuated. In
their analysis of the establishment and first two decades of the NHS, Dingwall
and colleagues argued, "There is then no logical pattern to the participation of
nurses in the health policy process whether at the centre or the periphery. What is
also striking is the lack of evident action by nursing organisations on policy
questions, especially when contrasted with the strenuous BMA to lobby on
behalf of its constituency" (Dingwall et al 1988 p 109). Unlike medicine, nurses
have not had one representative organisation but have been split in their
membership to a number of professional and trade union organisations
throughout the history of the NHS (Hart 1994). The presence of most of these
organisations has been most obvious at points of negotiations and disputes with
the Department of Health as an employer on pay and conditions of employment
(Webster 2002, Rivett 1997). Members of nursing organisations, particularly the
Royal College of Nursing, have participated in policy communities on issues
wider than nursing, as evidenced through member lists of official committees and
reports to House of Commons committees, throughout the history of the NHS.
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However, documented accounts of nursing organisations' activity in policy fields
are most readily available from first person narratives on issues concerned with
the organisation of nursing such as the shift of nurse education into the auspices
of higher education (Clay 1987) and the legal right of nurses to prescribe
medicines (Jones 2004). Dingwall et al (1988) argued from an analysis of the
first decades of the NHS that the aspirations of nursing organisations succeeded
in becoming policy when they were convergent with a wider policy agenda of the
government of the day. Strong and Robinson (1988) undertook policy
ethnography of the introduction of general management. In this they recorded the
invisibility of nurses, nursing organisations and nursing activities in the world of
the policy makers, managers and doctors at regional and district levels of the
NHS. In their analysis, the doctors treated the nurses as occupational and gender
subordinates and the managers' attitudes reflected this (Strong and Robinson
1990). Klein (2001), in his analysis of the political history of the NHS,
observed that the nursing profession, despite its numeric dominance, was
invisible in the health politics of the NHS. Klein gave no explanation for this
observation. Others have explained this invisibility in part through an
occupational socialisation process that makes nurses unwilling to voice their
opinions (Clay 1987). Other commentators have argued that the position of
nurses and nursing is a socially structured reflection of both the low status of
women and the cultural definitions of nursing as women's' work (Salvage 1985,
Colliere 1986, Robinson 1992).
Davies (1995) has argued that the invisibility of nurses in the UK policy arena
has been sustained not because the problems lie within nurses and nursing but
because the social institutions that they operate within are gendered to assert the
primacy of the masculine over the feminine. She has made the case that the
gendered nature of the organisations of the NHS, both the bureaucracy and the
profession of medicine, actively devalues the feminine work of nursing and
diminishes those who both undertake the work and represent it in the public
world. Davies suggested that introduction of the contract culture would involve
a "clash of masculinities" (Davies 1995 p 184) between the profession of
medicine and the managers in the bureaucracy, which could offer an opportunity
for nursing to make alliances and become more visible in the debates on public
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policy. Latimer (1996) has suggested that this analysis is based on an ideal type
of nursing and nurses. The focus purely on gender fails to account for the
experience of male nurses in the mental health services or the inclusion of some
nurses in policy communities at different periods. Other commentators have
pointed to the contrast in social class, (with all its nuances of difference in
education, financial security, culture, social networks) between the majority of
nurses and the doctors and policy elite of the civil service (Carpenter 1977,1993,
Faugier 2004). While there a number of studies and analysis considering the
position of the ostensibly repressed interest group, the community or patients, in
the UK policy arenas (see for example flisley 1980, Brownlea 1987, Rigge 1994,
Beresford and Croft 1993, Mclver 1996, Harrison and Mort 1998, Berrow 2002),
the empirical studies and analysis considering the position of nurses are
relatively few.
Having considered the relevant theories and empirical evidence in the nature of
power in health policy in the UK, it is now necessary to consider the issue of
leadership against this background.
3.4. Sociological Perspectives on Leadership
The concept of leadership has an extensive literature in sociology, in social
psychology, and the related applications of organisational development and
management theory. The Shorter English Oxford dictionary offers the definition
of leadership "the dignity, office or position of a 1.; also, ability to lead" (p1189).
A leader is "one who leads "(p 1189). It also offers multiple definitions of "lead"
including; "to give direction by going in front", "of a commander, to direct the
movement and action of others ", "to guide, direct to a place", "to guide by
persuasion", "to guide with reference to opinion", "to direct by ones example",
"to have the foremost position in an organisation", "to have the official initiative
in the proceedings (of a deliberative body)".
The nuances in the definition of leadership help explain the different focus of
academic interests, for example, social psychologists focus on theories of
leadership concerned with individual traits (Kirkpatrick and Locke 1991), styles
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of decisions making (Vroom and Jago 1978) and the inter-play between
individual characteristics and contexts (Fiedler 1978). This study, however,
addresses the sociological concerns of the nature and sources of authority that
confers leadership and ensures that followers will be influenced.
3.4.1 Weber and Leadership
Weber defined authority as a legitimate form of power, in which "there is the
probability that certain commands will be obeyed by a given group of people"
(Gerth and Wright-Mills 1970 p29). He postulated three modes of claiming
authority: traditional authority, charismatic authority and rational/legal authority.
Traditional authority was that inherited or conferred by a higher authority e.g.
monarchy. Charismatic authority rested on the appeal of leaders with
extraordinary personal characteristics. Rational - legal authority was enacted in
law or contractually established, often characterised by position in a hierarchical
organisation. Weber considered the "bureau" as the archetypal organisation
based on rational-legal authority. Legitirnisation for authority in a bureaucracy,
he argued, was conferred through position in the hierarchy and its accompanying
rules and regulations of behaviour. Officers were educated and therefore expert
in the administration of the business of the bureaucracy. Weber viewed the
bureaucratisation of society as a threat to individual liberty and postulated that
politicians provided the important counter balance to this process (Gerth and
Wright-Mills 1970).
3.4.2 Sources of Authority and Conflict Theories
Talcott Parsons in his translation of Weber highlighted in a brief footnote the
potential for conflict between professionals, who derived their authority from
expertise recognised in their membership of a profession, and bureaucrats who
derived their authority from their position in the bureaucracy (Parsons 1949
cited in Blau 1974). Consequently, professionals in a bureaucratic organisation
drew on authority for leadership from sources other than position in the
hierarchy. It was argued by Parsons (1954) and other contemporary sociologists
such as Gouldner (1954) and Blau (1956) that this alternate source of authority
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created an inherent tension and conflict between professionals and managers in
any bureaucratic organisation. The expert knowledge medicine has access to and
control of, is highly valued both by society and the state (Turner 1987).
Sociologists found empirical support for the "conflict theory" in the late fifties
and sixties particularly focused on law and medicine (see for example Scott
1966). In the same period business management theorists also began to write
about the "problem" that professionals caused for businesses and managers. This
was based on their perceived allegiance to the values of their profession rather
than the values of their business organisation (see for example Drucker 1955).
By the mid nineteen seventies, theorists argued that the polarisation, through the
use of ideal types (in the Weberian sense) in the conflict theory was an
oversimplification, which was weak in its explanatory powers. These challenges
arose from a) critiques of the prevailing attribute theories of the professions
particularly medicine, and b) from empirical studies. New scrutiny of the nature
of professions contended that professions:
• Were not always a source of public good (for example Illich 1975),
• Served the interest of dominant groups in society such as the bourgeoisie
(for example Navarro 1976) and men (for example Ehrenreich and
English 1973),
• Were concerned with self—interest rather than with service (Freidson
1970).
Larson (1977), through a historical analysis of the development of medicine,
argued that "professionalisation" was an occupational strategy for a) ensuring
particular expert knowledge was required by the public and then b) controlling
the supply and nature of their expertise. Larson pointed out that that the medical
profession derived the authority of its expert knowledge through embodiment in
the laws of the state. During this period, other theorists pointed to the extent of
state legitimisation for the medical profession to have professional autonomy i.e.
to determine its own rules and regulations.
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Professional autonomy has been broadly classified into three areas (Freidson
1970, Turner 1987):
Economic autonomy, the right to establish remuneration levels in the
market place,
Political autonomy, the right to assert the expert opinion on health
matters at a public policy level,
Clinical (or technical) autonomy, the right of the profession to self-
regulation as well as the right of the individual doctor to exercise
clinical freedom in the care of patients.
Starr (1982) differentiated between "social authority" i.e. control through giving
commands as described by Weber and "cultural authority" i.e. the probability
that medical definitions of reality and medical judgements would be accepted as
valid and true. This definition reflects Gramsci's theory of hegemony (Ritzer
2000). A few analysts at this point began to point to evidence that medical
authority might be lessening (see for example Armstrong 1976, Elston 1977).
Haug (1973) argued that the knowledge gap between the general public and
doctors was narrowing, resulting in a more critical public attitude that diminished
the medical professions claim to authority based on expert knowledge.
Empirical studies of the time both built on these critiques and questioned the idea
of overt conflict. Green's observational study (1975) of three hospitals in
Scotland found little evidence of a clear-cut conflict between medical
professionals and administrators. Green reported that the managers and the
majority of doctors never came into contact with each other. The conclusion
was drawn that the relationship could be more satisfactorily explained by other
theories such as a negotiated order of status in hospitals (Strauss et al 1973).
Green argued that issues of hierarchy within medicine were as relevant as
postulating a medical versus administrator conflict. Alford's policy study of
New York (Alford 1975 and section 3.3.1 above) was published at the same time.
He described covert tensions rather than overt conflict between the medical
profession and the officers in bureaucracies. He used a theory of an underlying
structural interest over professional monopoly rather than draw on the theories of
conflict between professionals and bureaucrats. However, his empirical data
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demonstrates tension and conflict over the authority to make policy decisions
between the officers in the bureaucracies and the representatives of the medical
profession.
Davies (1983) used case studies of the history of organised nursing in Britain and
the USA to argue that issues in hospital order related to social divisions in the
wider society such as gender rather than relations between bureaucrats and
professionals. Davies (1995) later drew on the analysis of Bologh (1990) and
Jones (1993), amongst others, to argue that both bureaucracy and profession are
gendered ways of organising social institutions that emphasise the superiority of
cultural notions of masculine rational action and actors. In analyses the conflicts
become ones of "clashes of masculinity" (Davies 1995 p 184) rather than
sources of authority.
3.4.3. Revisiting the Evidence to Support the Conflict Theories: The
Introduction of General Management
In the UK, empirical studies of the eighties shifted position from the previous
decade, informed both by the debates in political science about the nature of
power and by the introduction of the concept of general management into the
NHS. General management was the term used to describe management of
professionals and health services by people without clinical qualifications (see
section 2.3.1). It was an early example of what came to be described as the new
public management (Hood, 1991). For UK policy analysts of the time it exposed
the conflict in authority between clinicians and managers (Day and Klein 1983).
Harrison and colleagues (1992) investigated whether the general managers
asserted their authority over health professionals in six District Health
Authorities. General managers revealed that they rarely raised issues with
doctors that they considered might be contentious, specifically in order to avoid
conflict. The authors concluded that general management rarely challenged the
medical domain. An observational case study in the mid-eighties of the
implementation of general management at a district and unit level noted that staff
relationships at ward /clinic level were completely untouched by the turmoil at a
higher level in the organisation (Cox 1991). In contrast, Pettigrew and
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colleagues (1992) described in great detail the conflict, sometimes overt, of
authority and leadership between managers and medical consultants in their case
studies of strategic change in eight English District Health Authorities. They
described the relationships between clinicians and managers as fragile and ever
changing. They note that a "federal"(p 177) system of clinical teams, led by a
consultant, reinforced professional diversity, autonomy and organisational
independence. The relations were likely to be easier either where the managers
had been previously administrators and "semi-immersed in the world of the
clinicians" (Pettigrew et al 1992 p283) or where the clinicians were managerially
minded. They observed, "the relationships could quickly sour but were slow to
build up" (Pettigrew et al 1992 p283). These three studies did not consider any
another professional group outside medicine. It should also be noted that they
focused on the acute sector. In contrast, the community health services, which
were predominately nursing services with a few of doctors in community
medicine, family planning and child health, continued to have a management
structure in which the professions were more likely to be represented (Ottewill
and Wall 1990).
In contrast to their dealings with the medical profession, general managers were
frequently successful in asserting authority over nursing and nurses by virtue of
removing the senior nursing management structure. Two empirical studies from
this period provide detailed evidence of the how nursing management and
leaders were removed from positions of authority. Robinson and Strong studied
the impact of the reforms on nursing through two rounds of interviews and
observations of meetings in seven District Health Authorities and a national
survey of Chief Nursing officers (Robinson and Strong 1987, Strong and
Robinson 1988, Robinson et al 1989, Strong and Robinson 1990). Owen and
Glennerster (1990) undertook detailed case studies over three years of the
relationship of general management with the nursing profession in four District
Health Authorities in the North West Thames Region of England. Both studies
recorded the removal of the nursing management hierarchies and positions for
nurses at the top (and often) middle management level in organisations. Some
general managers appointed nurses to senior positions as advisers in the
organisation but without the authority to directly control the nurses or the activity
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of nursing. Many of those who remained in senior positions were given roles
concerned with quality assurance of services other than medical. The studies
demonstrated the precarious position of the senior nurses, the frequent overt and
covert conflict with the general managers, and the managers' perception that the
senior nurses had little expert knowledge. Strong and Robinson (1988) came to
the conclusion that nursing had been caught in the cross fire of set of reforms
which were intended to assert authority over the medical profession.
As the eighties progressed, managers were developing a new strategy for
exerting authority over the medical profession. Harrison and Pollitt (1994)
characterised this as "incorporatism" i.e. incorporating doctors through
appointment to managerial positions and assigning managerial responsibilities
such as budget control. Empirical studies of the late eighties and nineties in the
hospital sector demonstrated the growth of new medical manager roles (Lorbieki
et al 1992, Packwood et al 1991). However, a major impetus for accepting these
roles came from a desire to protect clinical autonomy from lay managers
(Parkhouse et al 1988).
3.4.4. Revisiting the Evidence to Support the Conflict Theories: The
Introduction of the Internal Market in the NHS
The NHS reforms, introduced with the NHS and Community Care Act 1990, and
the 1990 GP contract, demonstrated the continuation of two strategies for
exerting authority over professionals: 1) the management of professional activity
by non- professionals and 2) the incorporation of professionals to positions in the
management structure. The reforms also included a third strategy that of
accountability to others in clinical activity. Elston (1991) argued at the time of
the introduction of the reforms that they were likely to fail in attempting to
incorporate doctors into NHS management. She provided a detailed analysis of
the situation in the UK, which pointed to an adjustment in relationships but not a
generalised waning of either medicine's technical autonomy or its cultural
authority. She concluded that new forms of institutionalised professional
control were more likely to succeed in influencing individual clinical behaviours.
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Incorporation of professionals in the management processes was signalled by the
return to medical and nursing representation to Boards, this time as executive
Directors (NHS & Community Care Act 1990 Section 5). However, most
Medical Directors of Trusts reported they saw their role as one of representing
their medical colleagues rather than managing their activity (Baker 1994).
Surveys of clinical directors (i.e. medical directors at the unit level in hospitals)
reported their disinclination to have direct authority or attempt to exert authority
over their consultant peers (Mole and Dawson 1993). Attempts at direct
management of medical consultant activity produced conflict as evidenced by the
consultant bodies in two Trusts passing votes of no confidence in the chainnen of
their Boards, John Spiers and Roy Lilley, leading to their resignation from post
(Court 1994). In contrast, an interview study of Nurse Directors, commissioned
by the Chief Nursing Officer one year after the reforms, emphasised their role in
leading the nursing workforce and exerting authority over nurses and nursing as
well as contributing to the corporate agenda (Noons et al undated).
General practitioners and consultants experienced these sets of reforms
differently. The central government strategy of involving professionals in the
contracting process of the internal market (Department of Health 1989b)
provided an example of conflict between managers and consultants. The Joint
Consultants Committee reported to the Minister of Health that there was
widespread exclusion of consultants by managers in the contracting processes at
a local level (Department of Health 1993). In order to pacify the consultant body,
a ministerial Task Force was established, followed by an injunction from central
government to the local managers to involved professionals in commissioning,
the newly adopted term for contracting (Department of Health 1995, 1995a).
In contrast 'GP fundholding' was a completely new strategy by which a section
of the medical profession, which had previously been semi-detached from the
rest of the NHS through its independent contractor status, was fully incorporated
into the internal market processes. GP practices were delegated finances and
responsibilities for purchasing health care on behalf of their registered patient
population (see section 2.4 for details). GP fund holding was viewed as a
success and quickly extended (Department of Health 1992, Department of Health
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1994) but later evidence indicated it made little difference except at the margins
of health care (Le Grand et a! 1998). However, one empirical study demonstrated
that it transformed the relationship between hospital consultants and general
practitioners. Hospital consultants had to consider GPs as important customers
for the first time, re-orientating their attitudes (Ferlie et a! 1996). The
introduction of GP fund holding was followed by the introduction of other
models of GPs involvement in the commissioning process (Department of Health
1997a). Involvement in fund holding had the effect of increasing the number of
managers directly employed by GPs (Mamoch 1996); this was in contrast to the
relationship between doctors and managers in the acute sector. A second
consequence was that the tensions in the relationships between general
practitioners and community health service managers over the availability of
community nurses and therapists to individual practices became more visible.
Flynn et al ((1996) studied the contractual process for community health services
in three areas. They recorded the adversarial and confrontational attitudes of GP
fund holders to community health service managers in contracting meetings.
Goodman (1998) reported similar attitudes in nine case studies of GP
commissioning and purchasing of district nursing but noted that in one area the
GP fundholders worked more co-operatively to the point where they agreed to
use their fundholding monies to address Trust overspends.
This set of reforms also brought a drive to make the medical profession more
accountable to the organisation for their performance. General managers for the
first time were included in the process of drawing up of job plans for consultants
and in the process of deciding which consultants should receive distinction
awards, which was a system for rewarding clinical excellence with increased
salary (Department of Health 1989c). In practice, Salter reported that two thirds
of merit awards remained at the discretion of a national body, whose membership
was predominately medical (Salter 1998). These reforms also required that every
doctor should take regular systematic audit of their practice (Department of
Health. I 989d). The challenge to the authority of the medical profession was
subverted however as medical audit was undertaken in a variety of ways
(Kerrison et al 1993). Studies of the period suggested that the medical profession
successfully appropriated audit as an internal professional process rather than one
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of external managerial scrutiny (Pollitt 1993, Humphrey and Berrow 1993). In
contrast, the nursing profession had already started to engage in more public
auditing of its practice, promoted by nurse managers (Reid 1988). The
Department of Health now promoted a system wide approach to nursing audit
(NHS Management Executive 1991). The adoption of systems for auditing
nursing quality was widespread and usually led by nurse managers (Redfern and
Norman 1994). Audit of nursing practice was therefore open to scrutiny by
managers in contrast to medical audit.
3.4.5. Revisiting the Evidence to Support the Conflict Theories: The Retreat
from the Internal Market
The re-organisation of the NHS under the labour government demonstrated a
continuation of the strategies to incorporate professionals in the management of
the NHS (Department of Health 1997). However, the most significant arena in
which the authority of the medical profession was challenged was in the self-
regulation of clinical practice. The 1990's saw a series of major scandals in
medical practice that shook public confidence in the medical profession and
provided the politicians with a "policy window "(Ham 1999) to push through a
raft of reforms, previously not attempted for fear of the scale of medical
opposition. The three highest profile of these scandals were:
The high rate of deaths of children undergoing heart surgery in Bristol
Royal Infirmary because of inadequacies of the surgeons (Department of
Health 2001 a),
The illegal retention of organs from children removed at autopsy at
Alder Hey Hospital in Liverpool (Department of Health 2001b),
. The sentencing of Harold Shipman, a general practitioner, for the murder
of 15 healthy elderly patients (O'Neill 2000).
The medical profession acquiesced to a set of reforms that made the
performance of the individual doctors open to a level of scrutiny, which had
never been attempted before (Salter 2001). For the first time the chief
executives of NHS organisations were responsible for clinical quality as well as
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financial probity (Department of Health 1999a). Clinical governance, an
organisational system to link all aspects of quality assurance with clinical risk
management (Department of Health 1 998e) was introduced. Every Trust and
Primary Care organisation were set target dates to implement systems for
monitoring clinical performance and ensuring that national determined clinical
standards (such as in the National Service Frameworks) were being met. All
doctors were required to take part in audit: it was no longer voluntary. The
reforms also introduced state, rather than professional, mechanisms for directing
and scrutinising clinical quality (National Institute of Clinical Excellence and
the Commission for Health Improvement). The government questioned the
current professional self-regulation mechanisms (Department of Health 2000a).
Reforms were made to the state mechanisms for dealing with doctors whose
clinical practice gave rise to concern (Department of Health 1999b). The
medical profession responded to these challenges to medical self-regulation by
the acceptance of the principle of re-validation for consultants by the Royal
Colleges for the first time (Salter 2001). In the case of nursing, the government
introduced legislation for major changes in the professional registering body.
The Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) replaced the United Kingdom Co-
ordinating Council for Nursing Midwifery and Health Visiting (UKCC). The
legislation ensured that non-professionals were the majority of members on the
NMC Board and its business committees (Department of Health 2002b).
The late twentieth century history of the NHS demonstrated repeated challenges
to the authority of the professional by managers within the bureaucratic system
of the NHS. The medical profession successfully resisted these challenges in
contrast to nursing. The last years of the century, however, saw the
establishment of a number of bureaucratic measures to assert the authority of the
managers over the doctors, potentially curtailing the clinical autonomy of the
individual doctor but not the profession. Conflict theorists however have
addressed the professions as though they were homogeneous. Clearly there are
differences between the professions but there are also internal divisions within
professions. It is helpful to understand the internal divisions in the professions in
order to comprehend the variety of relationships between managers in the NHS
bureaucracy, medicine and nursing.
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3.5. Medicine and Nursing: Divided Professions
Medicine is a stratified occupation with subdivisions holding differing levels of
power and prestige (Elston 1993). Specialists (i.e. the consultants) have been
accorded greater prestige than the generalists (i.e. the general practitioner), which
Honigsbaum (1979) traces back to social class divisions. In 1995 general
practitioners constituted 50 per cent of the UK medical workforce but fewer than
20 per cent of medical graduates positively opted for a career in general practice
(Health Policy and Economic Research Unit 1998). The differential positions of
prestige and influence held between consultants and general practitioners is also
evidenced by the scant attention paid by policy analysts to general practitioners
up until the introduction of GP fundholding. Aside from the hierarchy of status
associated with speciality and medical schools, medicine organises itself in a
nationally recognised hierarchy from newly qualified doctors to consultants.
Each consultant has a "firm" i.e. a hierarchically organised team of doctors
working for them with differentiated job roles. The differential position between
junior doctors and consultants is reflected in salary, different levels of authority
and status symbols in the hospital environment.
The structuring of the medical profession is a reflection of wider social
structures although beyond Honigsbaum's (1979) historical analysis there
appears to be little empirical evidence as to the influence of social class on
current generations of doctors. While originally a fiercely defended male
occupation, the twentieth century saw a gradual increase in female entrants
(Elston 1993). By the nineteen nineties, half of all entrants to medical school
were female (Pringle 1998). Despite this shift, the medical profession is a
gendered occupation, with men more likely to be in higher status positions and
higher status specialities than women (Allen 1988, Elston 1993). Women now
form about fifty percent of general practitioners (Royal College of General
Practitioners 2004). However, analysis in the early nineties identified that
women GPs were more likely to be part-time and employed in ways that meant
they had reduced income and influence in group practices (Elston 1993).
Medicine is also structured by ethnicity. Doctors from minority ethnic groups,
85
particularly of Asian and African origin, are over represented in less prestigious
specialities, in less prestigious hospitals and in general practice in areas of
multiple deprivation (Coker 2001). There are few empirical studies that compare
and contrast the relationships between doctors and managers whose positions are
socially structured in different ways.
Nursing, like medicine, is not a homogeneous occupation. While medicine is
recognised as having power differentials between its specialists and generalists,
the claims for differentials between the occupational groups of nurses, midwives
and health visitors has largely been unrecognised by others outside the nursing
profession. Clay (1987), as General Secretary of the Royal College of Nursing,
recounted that the factional fighting between general nurses, midwives and
health visitors, completely bemused the politicians and almost resulted in the loss
of the legislation for a university based nurse education and reformed nursing
registration body. Nursing has always been organised hierarchically. However,
it lost its nationally uniform frameworks with the introduction of general
management. As a result, titles like senior nurse and clinical nurse have different
roles and responsibilities dependent on the local context (Cameron and
Masterson 2000) unlike medicine in which consultant, registrar and other titles
correspond nationally. Even recently introduced positions such as nurse
consultant and matron vary according to local contexts (Guest et al 2001).
Nursing, like medicine, has also been structured in less obvious ways. Rosemary
White in a series of historical studies of the mid-twentieth development of
nursing in the UK demonstrated further divisions within the nursing profession
that are particular relevance in considering the application of professional and
bureaucrat conflict theories in nursing (White 1985, White 1986). Drawing on
work from managerial studies as well as the sociology of occupations, she argued
that three groups could be determined that held different motivation, reference
values and aspirations. These were the generalists, the professionalists and the
nurse managers:
The generalists emphasised the nursing as a practical skill, learnt as a
craft, which could be broken into task elements and divided for
efficiency. The generalists were primarily interested in material rewards
and a functional status.
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• The professionalists aspired to the occupational strategies of a
profession, seeking control on entry to their ranks, a defined knowledge
base transmitted through a profession controlled education system located
in higher education, and market monopoly.
• The nurse managers adopted the values and knowledge base of the
bureaucrats in managing the organisation rather than their occupational
group. They preferred nurses who were generalists and did not challenge
their authority or the status quo. They suppressed the development of
professionalists because they challenged the authority of the managers
(White 1985).
Carpenter has pointed to the stratification in nursing by social class, arguing that
the generalists were more likely to be from working class backgrounds, while the
professionalists and senior nurse managers were more likely to be from middle
class backgrounds (Carpenter 1977). He has also pointed to the class and gender
divisions in the recruitment of nurses to different types of hospital. London
teaching hospitals (i.e. with medical schools) actively recruited its student nurses
from middle class backgrounds throughout most of the twentieth century.
Carpenter identified the dominant representation of London teaching hospital
nurses in many of the nursing professional organisations (Carpenter 1977).
Nursing has always recruited men in the UK, predominately to specialities such
as mental health nursing and learning disabilities (Carpenter 1980). The
recurring nursing workforce crisis from the inception of the NHS saw active
international recruitment of qualified nurses into jobs and people into UK student
nurse training. People of colour were actively directed into less prestigious areas
of nursing and less prestigious hospitals (King Edward's Hospital Fund for
London 1990). The over representation of male nurses in senior clinical and
management positions (Jones et al 1981, Davies and Rosser 1986, Finlayson and
Nazroo 1998) and the under representation of nurses from black and minority
ethnic groups in those positions (NHS Leadership Centre 2002) provides
evidence that even in a predominantly female occupation, the structural
stratification of the wider society is replicated in ways that are not immediately
obvious. Carpenter has argued that a social division analysis is important in
considering the occupation of nursing, in which arenas of employment, work
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roles and levels of seniority have been stratified through gender, class and race
(Carpenter 1993).
3.6. Conclusion
This review indicates the structured dominance of the medical profession in the
health policymaking process in the UK. However, it is evident that the power of
the medical profession to influence policy is reduced when the issue is of wider
concern in the government than the Department of Health. Treasury pressures
and public outrage at medical scandals has provided the authority to create policy
even in the face of opposition from the medical profession. While other groups
are present in the policy communities, the medical profession has pre-imminence
both in its contribution and the recognition of its powerful position by others in
the policy community. There is little evidence that the profession of nursing
has influence, or is viewed as influential by policy analysts. In considering
leadership within health policy making and its implementation, there is evidence
of ongoing conflict and challenges between managers and the professionals. The
conflict is not necessarily overt but it clearly forms an important backdrop in
understanding the development and implementation of health policies. It is
evident that the medical profession has been repeatedly successful at resisting the
challenge to its authority from the managers within the NHS. However, nursing
has rarely been considered in its relationship with the managers of the NHS. The
few empirical examples that exist demonstrate both conflict and accommodation
to the authority of the managers. Nursing and nurses are more frequently
considered through their relationship with medicine and it is this relationship that
will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4. Doctors and Nurses
4.1. Introduction
The policy guidance for the Board membership of the PCG prescribed a joint
leadership role for doctors and nurses. However, the roles and relationships in
clinical care, suggest that this would not be a straightforward relationship in a
decision making body. The depiction of the omnipotent male doctor supported by
the subservient female nurse provides a stereotype of roles that belies the
complexity of the relationships across the breadth and history of health care
provision in the UK. This chapter reviews the empirical evidence in the
relationship between the two occupational groups in institutional settings and in
primary health care.
4.2. Perceptions of the Relationship Between the Occupations of
Medicine And Nursing
It has been argued that the gendered nature of both politics and the health service
has rendered nursing, tacitly defined as women's work, of low value and
invisible (Stacey and Price 1981, Witz 1994, Davies 1995).
The medical profession has held and continues to hold a clear view of the
subordinate position of nursing in patient care. This relationship is explicit in the
language of the documents of the registration body for medicine, the General
Medical Council. Doctors 'delegate' tasks to nurses and only 'refer' patients to
other doctors.
"Delegation involves asking a nurse, doctor, medical student or other
health care worker to provide treatment or care on your behalf..........
Refrrral involves transferring some or all of the responsibility for the
patient's care, usually temporarily and for a particular purpose, such as
additional investigation, care or treatment, which falls outside your
competence. Usually you will refer patients to another registered medical
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practitioner. If this is not the case, you must be satisfied that any health
care professional to whom you refer a patient is accountable to a
statutory regulatory body, and that a registered medical practitioner,
usually a general practitioner, retains overall responsibility for the
management of the patient" (General Medical Council 2001 paragraphs
47&48)
Despite delegation of tasks to nurses, the GMC asserts that it is always a doctor
who always holds the responsibility for continued management of patient care.
Armstrong (1979) made the case, through examination of government reports on
nursing and professions allied to medicine in the 1970s, that there was a
dwindling of the medical hegemony prevalent at the inception of the NHS.
However, common law demonstrates the continued medical hegemony as well as
invisibility of nursing to successive governments and the judiciary (Montgomery
2003). Most famously, the House of Lords ruled that nurses administering
prostaglandin to induce abortion were not contravening the 1967 Abortion Act,
which stated that only medical practitioners could undertake abortions. It was
ruled that doctors, not nurses, undertook the abortion as the nurses only acted on
the orders of a medical practitioner, (Montgomery 1992). English case law in
medical negligence suits reveals that nurses are not deemed negligent if they are
carrying out the orders of a doctor, irrespective of the inappropriateness of the
order (Gold v Essex County Council 1942 AlT ER 237 cited in McHale and
Tingle 2001).
4.3. A Brief Overview of the Development of an Occupational
Hierarchy in Health Care
The division of labour in health care in the UK has a history that demonstrates
how one occupational group, medicine, has organised to gain state sanction for
securing the pre-eminence of its knowledge and skill based services in the health
care market (Johnson 1972, Larson 1977). More than that, it demonstrates that
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the gender divisions in society were replicated in establishing a hierarchy of
authority and reward in labour processes (Stacey 1988). The process of
occupational monopoly depends on state sanction for three dimensions:
Occupational control of entry to its ranks that requires acquisition of its
knowledge base through a university system of education,
• Access to a client group that precludes or subordinates other occupational
groups,
The right of autonomy at the point of using or applying the occupational
knowledge and skills (Turner 1987).
In analysing the power of the medical profession in the USA and UK, Freidson
(1970) concluded that when one occupation had state sanctioned autonomy in a
division of labour, that sanction implicitly included the domination of other
occupational groupings. Turner identified three modes of dominance by an
occupational group to other occupational groups: subordination, limitation and
exclusion (Turner 1987). The relationship between medicine and nursing over
time demonstrates all three modes.
The history of the development of nursing as a paid, trained, state sanctioned
occupation in the UK demonstrates its dependence on the sponsorship of the
medical profession through acknowledging its subordinate position to the
medical profession (Abel-Smith 1960). A defining feature of this hierarchical
relationship has been its gendered nature. The construction of a predominantly
male profession, sanctioned in state legislation during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, was simultaneously supported by the construction of a
much larger predominantly female occupational group to undertake the tasks
necessary to support medicine in its growing power base of the hospitals. Abel-
Smith's history was one of the first to focus on the social stratification between
medicine and nursing (Abel—Smith 1960). It took until the later part of the
twentieth century for a critical analysis to begin to reveal the reproduction of
gendered relations and wider male hegemony in the assertion of medicine in the
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division of labour between medicine and nursing (Ebrenreich and English 1973,
Gamarnikow 1978, Versluyen 1980).
During the nineteenth century, the profession of medicine both gained a state
sanctioned register of medical practitioners with a university education
(Cartwright 1977) and secured sole right for its members to perform certain acts
within the state, such as death certification and medication prescription, to the
exclusion of other occupational groups. Fifty years later midwifes also attained a
state sanctioned register, followed by nurses in the Nurses Registration Act of
1919 (Baly 1980). However, the entry criteria to the Register depended on
training in "schools" in hospitals rather than an institution that was part of
organised education (Davies 1980). Any rights gained by nurses in other
legislation were either shared with medical practitioners, such as the Midwifery
Act 1902, or limited so that they were only at the specific direction of the
medical profession (for example in administering medicines controlled under
legislation through the Therapeutic Substances Act 1925).
4.4. The Response of Nursing to a Subordinated Position
Members of subordinated groups in any society display a number of common
behaviours. Clarke et al (1975), in considering social class and culture, argued
that the relations between a subordinate and dominant group are always intensely
active and always oppositional. They made the case that working class culture
was created through a continuum of "negotiation, resistance and struggle"
against the dominant class culture (Clarke et al 1975 p103). They suggested that
the subordinate class had a repertoire of strategies and responses that include
ways of coping as well as resisting the dominant culture. Cohen (1980),
described a cultural repertoire of responses to subordination that included
"learning how to get by, how to make the best of a bad job, how to make things
thoroughly unpleasant for 'them' "(Cohen 1980 p 161). Roberts (1983) argued
that nursing demonstrated "oppressed group behaviour". She drew three sources
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to argue her case: the work of anthropologist Memmi (1965) studying
colonisation, the writings of the leaders of the American Black Liberation
movement of the early seventies and Friere (1972), a liberation educationalist.
She argued that nurses as an oppressed group displayed aggression and violence
horizontally in their own group, not vertically to the dominant group. She
proposed that nurses in position of authority to other nurses assimilated the
norms and values of the dominant culture and actively participated in repressing
the subordinate culture. The subordinate nurses resisted this assimilation and
resented the super-ordinate nurses who promulgated it. Considered together
these theories suggest that members of subordinate groups:
• Accommodate, normalise and mediate their situation,
• Resist and challenge the dominant group,
• Create their own, sometimes counter, culture to the dominant culture,
• Treat with suspicion those members who assimilate to the dominant
culture,
• Are more likely to display overt aggression to their own group than to
the dominant group.
These theories will now be considered against the empirical evidence.
4.5. The Nurse and Doctor Relationship in Institutional Settings:
Accommodation, Normalisation and Mediation
The twentieth century history of cyclical labour shortages for nursing and high
drop out rates from nurse training in the UK (see for example Ministry of Health
et al 1947, Department of Health and Social Security 1972a, Seccombe and
Smith 1996) provides evidence that large numbers of young women are not
prepared to work in a subordinate occupation. However, there are nearly half a
million qualified nurses employed in the English NHS (Department of Health
2003). The sheer scale of the numbers of women employed as nurses, midwives
and health visitors in the public and private sector suggests that a degree of
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accommodation, normalisation and mediation occurs, underpinned by a range of
motivators and incentives.
While Gamarnikow's (1978) seminal historical analysis of the development of
nursing, revealed an analogy between doctor/nurse/patient relationships and that
within the Victorian family of father/mother/child, the analogy repeated in
contemporary populist and academic literature is that of nurses as "handmaidens"
i.e. female servants to the doctor. Empirical evidence from the twentieth century
suggests a complex relationship in which nurses mediate their position. Stein
(1967) argued for a modification of the stereotype of subordinate nurse,
describing "the doctor —nurse game". In this "game", the nurse preserved the
appearance of subservience while actively involved in the decision-making in
patient care and treatment. The doctor preserved the appearance of omnipotence
through seeking information and opinions from the nurse without actually asking
for it. The nurse was therefore a covert participant in clinical decision making
not merely a recipient of the doctor's orders. Stein's arguments were not
supported by any empirical evidence beyond his experience but were (and are)
widely referred to.
Late twentieth century empirical studies observing doctor and nurse interactions
in different hospital and clinical settings in the UK have offered a different view.
Devine's (1978) observations of and interviews with 11 doctors and 22 nurses on
two paediatric wards revealed that relationships between the consultants and the
nurses were more likely to reflect the doctor-nurse game than between the junior
doctors and the nurses. A further challenge to the depiction of nurses only
covertly participating in clinical decision-making came from observation of the
working relations between nurses and doctors in an Accident and Emergency
Department (Hughes 1988). Hughes concluded that the nurses in this working
environment were overtly undertaking diagnostic activities, offering advice and
information on clinical decisions to the medical staff, particularly to new and
junior doctors. Senior nurses frequently intervened in the work of junior doctors
pointing out shortcomings and effectively taking control. Porter's (1991)
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participant observation of doctor nurse interactions in the critical care ward of an
acute hospital provided further evidence of nurses overtly participating in clinical
care decision making and little evidence of the doctor-nurse game. This led
Porter to speculate whether Stein's observations were true of a particular time
period when the gender division between the two groups was very distinct and
when doctors had a greater level of control of nurse education and employment.
Indeed, Stein revisited his observations later that decade and announced that
nurses had unilaterally abandoned the doctor-nurse game (Stein et al 1990).
Large-scale interview studies, across multiple hospital sites, of doctors and
nurses confirm that it is important to specify context and position in both
occupational hierarchies when considering medical and nursing relationships.
Relationships between nurses and junior doctors were reported to be very
different to those with senior registrars and consultants (MacKay 1989, MacKay
1993, Walby et al 1994, Halford et al 1997). The studies by Mackay reported
the almost invisibility of the junior grade nurses to all grades of doctors. All
four studies revealed tensions and conflicts between the two occupational groups
over work roles (perceived by both groups) and occupational behaviours (mostly
perceived by nurses and junior doctors). Allen challenged these findings from an
observational and interview study, at one 900 bed acute hospital, in which she
examined the relationships between medicine and nursing as nurses absorbed
more roles of the junior doctors over ten months (Allen 1997). She reported little
inter occupational friction in face to face relationships as the negotiations took
place between senior members of the occupational groups in committee meetings
away from clinical care environments.
The potential for the gendered nature of the relationships between doctors and
nurses to change has increased as the twentieth century progressed. There has
been a significant increase in women admitted to medical schools and a slight
increase in the numbers of men admitted to nurse training (described more fully
in Chapter 3). In the UK, there has been little empirical work investigating the
impact of these changes. Walby et al's interview study of relationships between
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doctors and nurses in 5 acute hospitals concluded that "gender appears highly
relevant when looking at the internal hierarchy of each profession, in that men
rise to the top more than women, but it has only a minor, in any effect on the
nature of the interaction ofprofessionals in conflict situations (Walby et al 1994
p73). However, some of their data examples given in the body of their text can
be interpreted to demonstrate that occupational gender shift does affect
relationships. A Finnish survey of female doctors reported they perceived their
relationship with female nurses to be different from male doctor colleagues. In
junior medical positions they described making friends with the nurses to gain
help in undertaking their work and having their instructions followed in patient
care. They reported that only when they were in consultant positions were they
able to behave to the female nurses in the same way as their male peers
(Gjerberg, E. & Kjolsrod, L. 2001). Conversely, an interview study of male
nurses in England reported that their relationship with male doctors was different
from their female colleagues. They perceived that male doctors found their
presence difficult and actively avoided working with them (Savage 1987).
4.6. The Nurse and Doctor Relationships in Institutional Settings:
Counter Culture, Resistance and Challenge
Medicine has a hegemonic impact on the culture of health care provision.
Nursing actively creates its own culture, some of which assimilates the dominant
culture but other aspects have developed in resistance, thus creating a counter
culture. Nursing accepted the dominant culture that nurses follow orders but
over time have created a counter culture that assimilates that behaviour into their
cultural understanding of all professional behaviour, later using it as a source of
challenge to medicine. Walby et al (1994) from their empirical data described
issues of conflict between doctors (particularly junior doctors) and nurses in five
hospitals. They explained the conflict through an essential cultural difference in
how doctors and nurses perceived and enacted "professionalism":
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"The medical notion of profession was one where an educated person
was able to respond to individual problems in undetermined, innovative
yet trustworthy ways. The nursing notion was one of technicality, of
pinning down exactly what was to be done and the training and staff
needed to do it to agreed standards. The nurses often saw professionalism
as being a rule governed process, intimately tied with checking and
monitoring. Doctors saw a professional as someone who exercised
independent judgement. "(Walby et al 1994 p61).
Walby and her co-researchers noted that neither group appeared to recognise the
difference in the other.
Resistance and challenge to the dominant group has been present throughout the
history of nursing as a paid, organised occupation. Nurse leaders in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century simultaneously acknowledged a
subordinate position to doctors, while denying the influence of medicine on
aspects of the occupation of nursing (Wicks 1998). Even Florence Nightingale,
often portrayed as a key protagonist for the subordination of nursing to medicine,
was clear that one of her objectives was for nurses to control the occupation of
nursing:
"The whole reform in nursing both at home and aboard has consisted
in this; to take all power over nursing out of the hands of the men, and
put it in the hands of one female trained head and make her responsible
for everything (regarding internal management and discipline) being
carried out." (Letter from Florence Nightingale to Mary Jones 1867,
cited in Abel-Smith 1960:25).
In contemporary times, nursing as a profession refuses to acknowledge a
subordinate position to medicine. The Nursing and Midwifery Council, unlike
the licensing body for medicine, omits any statements about the relationship
between medicine and nursing in the official documents. There is no mention of
doctors in its key documents such as the Code of Conduct for Nurses, Midwives
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and Health Visitors (Nursing and Midwifery Council 2002), the curriculum to be
followed to attain registration (United Kingdom Central Council 1999) or the
competencies to be obtained to be registered as a heath visitor (Nursing and
Midwifery Council 2002a). The subordinate relationship is only referred to
where statute exists that specifies the different medical and nursing occupational
roles such as in the prescription and administration of medicines (Nursing and
Midwifery Council 2002b). Health visitors went so far as to declare in their
professional documents that they were 'autonomous practitioners' (Council for
the Education and Training of Health Visitors 1979), although this assertion was
omitted from later documents (Council for the Education and Training of Health
Visitors 1983). In complete contrast to the evidence from case law, (as described
above in 4.1.3.) the nursing profession has asserted and continues to assert that
the nurse alone is to be held to account for her/his actions (Nursing and
Midwifery Council 2002).
Resistance and challenge to medicine is demonstrated in the pursuit of the status
of profession for nursing. Witz has argued that nursing has been following an
occupational strategy of "dual closure" (Witz 1994 p 23), thorough challenging
medical definitions and control over what it does and clearly defining who can
and cannot practice as a nurse. The history of the late twentieth century
demonstrates examples of the pursuit of the professional project in the UK
(Davies 1995). This can be viewed in terms of Turner's (1987) three criteria of
attempting to obtain a university system of education for entry into nursing, in
trying to control of access to a client group and asserting the right of autonomy in
exercise occupational skills.
The pursuit of education at university level for nurses in the UK was given
impetus by the problems of recruiting and retaining a nursing workforce for the
NHS (Department of Health and Social Security 1972a). The sixties and
seventies saw experiments in providing degree level education for nurses
alongside the nursing qualification at Edinburgh, Manchester, Southampton and
Surrey Universities (Owen 1977 p17). Edinburgh University piloted nursing
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degrees in this period. University based education for all nurses and midwives
was technically achieved in the late nineteen eighties (Davies 1995), on the back
of government policy drives to widen access to higher education (Clay 1987,
Rivett 1997). This shift in curriculum and educational setting was known as
Project 2000. However, the reality was a lower status education compared to
medicine. The registration of nurses and midwives was set at diploma rather than
graduate level and mainly located in the universities created from the old
polytechnics, not the universities that housed medical schools. Salter (1998)
points out that not only did the nursing profession fail to achieve graduate level
entry criteria but also the nurse managers lost control of the funding for nurse
education to the general managers (Department of Health 1 989e). Turner's
(1987) two other criteria for developing occupational monopoly were: a) control
of access to a client group precluding others and b) the right of autonomy at the
point of using or applying the occupational knowledge and skills. The examples
of nursing attempts to control access to a client group are not obvious. More
explicit are the attempts of the nursing profession to a) challenge medicine's
assertion that it controls access to patients and subordinates nursing in this
process and b) carve out areas of autonomous practice as part of the challenge.
The period of the late nineteen seventies until the early nineties is notable for
well-documented examples. There experiments of in-patient units where nurses
not doctors had admission rights (Pearson 1988). However, these were short-
lived experiments that floundered when junior doctors refused to provide medical
cover (Pembrey and Punton 1990). There were attempts at claiming a distinct
body of nursing knowledge through asserting nursing theory and nursing models
(Aggleton and Chalmers 1986). Porter (1995) noted that there was a complete
absence of reference to medicine in the literature on nursing models. It would
appear to provide another example of the nursing profession's ability to assert a
counter culture i.e. a nursing world devoid of medicine. The promotion of
nursing theories found physical form through: a) the introduction of problem
focused recording keeping systems known as "the nursing process" (Ashworth et
al. 1978, Dickinson 1982), b) the introduction of primary nursing (Pearson 1988)
and c) the publicising of 'named nurses' (Department of Health and the Welsh
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Office 1991) as responsible for each in-patient's nursing care. Commentators
and researchers have described the failures of these attempts. They identified a
range of causes including: the lack of perceived utility from some groups within
nursing (De La Cuesta 1982, Clark 1985), the powerlessness of the nurses to
implement change without the support of the medical profession (Keyser 1988),
the difficulties of maintaining these systems in the face of resource pressure
(Savage 1995) and the opposition of the medical profession (Mitchell 1984).
These examples are from the hospital sector where the majority of nurses are
employed. Consideration will now be given to health care settings outside the
hospital.
4.7. The Nurse- Doctor Relationship in Primary Care:
Accommodation, Counter Culture, Resistance and Challenge
Examination of the history of health care provision outside of the hospitals
provides a structurally different relationship between medicine and nursing.
There are currently three different groups of doctors who work outside the
hospitals without admission rights to hospital beds. The smallest group is the
public health doctors, who as medical officers of health before the 1974 NHS
reforms held a direct management function in the Local Authorities for all the
nurses working in primary care (Jefferies 1995). The 1991 NHS reforms
removed the vestiges of this relationship when public health medicine was
aligned to a commissioning function rather than a service providing function.
The second group is the doctors working in the child and school health services
and the family planning services. Up until the 1974, the medical officer of health
led these services (Ottewill and Wall 1991). Subsequently, consultants in
community paediatrics and sometimes consultants in community gynaecology
lead these services. The majority of the medical posts in these services are
sessional and predominantly filled by women (Elston 1993). The nurses and
health visitors rarely work to the immediate direction of a doctor. Health visitors
in particular have developed a counter culture in which their view of themselves
is autonomous of medical influence. However, in these services, most of the
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activities and most of the clinical standards of the nurses and health visitors are
agreed at a service level between the consultants and the managers. The use of
patient group directions as a mechanism to further enable nurses and health
visitors to dispense medication and give immunisations without the explicit
instruction of a doctor is one example where the instruction of the doctor is at a
service level rather than the patient level (The Prescription Only Medicines
(Human Use) Amendment Order 2003). The scope of the consultants in
community health services changed with the introduction of the revised GP
contract in 1990, in which GPs were given incentives to undertake child health
and family planning services (Department of Health and Welsh Office 1989).
The largest group of doctors are the general practitioners, who have independent
contractor status to the NHS. Following the introduction of the 1990 GP
contract, they became direct employers of significant numbers of practice nurses;
ten thousand whole time equivalents by the mid nineties i.e. over a third of the
nursing workforce in primary care (Drennan et al 2004). The activities of
practice nurses are undertaken at the instruction of the GP, both as a doctor and
as their employer (Atkin and Lunt 1995). It is clear that the close working
relationship in the practice has led some GPs to delegate areas of work that allow
the nurse greater independence such as monitoring of chronic diseases (Ross Ct al
1994), telephone triage (Richards et al 2002), first contact for patients with minor
self-limiting illness (Koperski, Rogers and Drennan 1997). The GPs regard these
as delegated responsibilities not independent nursing practice (Williams 2000).
The relationship between general practitioners and nurses and health visitors
employed in community health services has a chequered history, demonstrating
accommodation as well as resistance and challenge. Some of the tensions could
be viewed as a by-product of the historical divisions between public health
medicine and general practice (Lewis 1986) rather than challenges from nursing
and health visiting. The development of health visitors and nurses in public
health functions, mostly led by medical officers of health in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, gave these groups a different level of progress in the
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occupational strategy of dual closure to the hospital nurses.
	 This can be
demonstrated in their direct access to a client group and in their level of
education.
Health visitors obtain their client lists through the notification of births
(originally established with the Notification of Births (Extension) Act 1915),
through referral to each other when families move on and sometimes notification
from general practice when families register. School nurses obtain their clients
through the school roll. District nursing services have often allowed direct
access for the public rather than on the request of a doctor, although invariably
then alerting the GP to their work and requiring authorisation in any activities
involving medicines and most medical devices.
As an occupation, health visiting has had a different and faster route to
professionalisation than nurses and midwives. State registration was not
obtained until the 1946 National Health Service Act (McEwan 1959). However,
their education programmes, before and after state sanction, were located in
higher education institutions not schools of nursing (Ministry of Health et a!.
1956). In the nurse education reforms after the introduction of the Project 2000,
health visitors retained their differential position to registered nurses by
achieving degree level entry education to their register (United Kingdom Central
Council 1994). At this point, other groups of nurses working in primary care
shared degree level entry criteria. The culture of health visiting has been one of
an occupational role autonomous of doctors, focused on illness prevention and
public health rather than curative or palliative health care (Robinson 1982,
Appleby and Sayer 2001). Health visitors have actively avoided conflict with
GPs (Mayall and Foster 1989) and one consequence of this has been an almost
invisibility to GPs (Drennan 1986), which became extremely problematic when
GPs gained influence in commissioning services (Flynn et a! 1996).
Resistance and accommodation from nurses and health visitors to GP direction
has been evident in the oscillating history of their attachment to and separation
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from general practices. Despite national policies in the seventies to increase the
attachment of nurses and health visitors to GPs, there was actually a decrease
(Standing Medical Advisory Committee and Standing Nursing and Midwifery
Standing Committee 1981). The problems were listed in a Department of Health
review of community nursing services (Department of Health and Social Security
1986a). The recommendations from this review, while acknowledging the
importance of primary health care teams, promoted a comprehensive nursing
service organised around a local population, managed by community health
service managers and independent of general practice. It went so far as to
advocate written service level agreements between nurses and each general
practice (Department Of Health and Social Security 1986a Recommendation 8).
There followed a period where in many areas community nurses were re-
organised into geographically focused Neighbourhood Nursing Teams (Dailey
and Brown 1989), in the face of opposition from GPs (General Medical Services
Committee 1986). This model of organisation was swiftly dismantled as the
power of the GP in fundholding and commissioning became apparent (Jackson
1994). District nurses and health visitors were attached to GP practices in every
area of the UK, despite the problems it created in areas where small general
practices predominated rather than group practices (Drennan and Williams
2001).
The difficulties in working relationships between GPs, the community nurses and
health visitors have been recorded in numerous empirical studies on team work
in primary care (McIntosh and Dingwall 1978, Bond et al 1985, West and Slater
1996, Williams 2000). GPs are reported to view themselves as leaders of the
primary health care team (Hudson 2002), the decision maker who delegates work
to their nurses without the interference of nurse managers (Flynn et al 1996).
The community nurses desire a more collaborative team working relationship
with GPs but rarely perceive themselves as in a position to influence that
(Jefferies and Sachs 1983, Mayall and Foster 1989, Goodman 1998, Rowe 2002).
However, there have been a number of changes in recent years that have the
potential to substantially alter the relationship between GPs and nurses. Before
103
discussing these, there is one further element that needs consideration and that is
the internal organisation of nursing in primary care. As has been pointed out
earlier, relationships between doctors and nurses are structured and experienced
hierarchically. The next section considers the internal organisation of nurses as a
subordinate group before moving on to review late twentieth century shifts in the
relationship between medicine and nursing.
4.8. Internal Hierarchy in a Subordinate Occupation
Nursing as an occupation has always had a stratified internal organisation. So the
reality has been that doctors have passed on their instructions to senior nurses
who relayed them to more junior nurses. Nursing in primary care has had flatter
structures than the hospital setting. However, the growing acceptance of the
economies to be made through introducing fewer specialist primary care nurses
and more registered nurses and nursing assistants has created more hierarchical
nursing teams in primary care (NHS Management Executive/Value for Money
Unit 1992, Audit Commission 1999a).
Nurses managing nurses has been one strategy for resisting medicine. National
attempts to develop nursing management have always been met with a powerful
negative response from medicine as evidenced by responses to the Salmon
Report (Ministry of Health 1966) documented by Clark (1995) and the
Cumberledge Report (Department of Health 1986a), recorded by Ottewill and
Wall (1991). More recently general practitioners have demonstrated their ability
to resist nurse management: firstly, through their direct employment of practice
nurses without nursing management and secondly, during the creation of the
internal market. The exponential rise of the direct employment of clinical nurses
by GPs was first noted in the early nineties (Atkin and Lunt 1995) and has
continued to increase ever since (Drennan et al 2004). The implementation of
GP fund holding created an opportunity for GPs to question the value of paying
for nursing management overheads. In many areas this led to a drastic reduction
in nurse management posts and the introduction of what was described as self-
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managing nursing teams (Morgan 1996, Owen 1998, Goodman 2000). That the
clinical nurses did not resist these changes (see for example Bull 1998) indicates
the level of ambivalence felt towards nurse managers.
The strategy of nurses managing nurses is not one that all within nursing
subscribes to. There is certainly evidence of suspicion, critique and resistance to
nurse managers from clinical nurses (see for example, Bellaby and Oribar 1980,
Hennessy 1986, Forbes 1996). These provide examples supporting the
proposition that the subordinate group members treat those assimilating to the
dominant culture with suspicion. Interestingly, in all of these the dominant
culture being resisted is that of the bureaucrats not medicine. Rosemary White
argued from her historical analysis that nurse managers assimilated to the culture
of the managers and detached themselves from the culture of the two types of
clinical nurses (White 1985). Traynor (1999) undertook interviews with nurse
managers and community nurses in three geographical areas during this period.
He provided further empirical evidence that the nurse managers assimilated to a
dominant group but not that of medicine but of the managers. The clinical
nurses asserted that they had a greater moral authority based on their clinical
skills than the nurse managers. They actively criticised the language and values
of the nurse managers, seeing them as representatives of the business managers.
In this Traynor provided evidence that tension between clinical nurses and nurse
managers might not be the result of oppressed group behaviours but another
example of conflict between professional and bureaucrat.
The internal culture of nursing is often characterised as military like, with a
command and control attitude to the lower ranks, a socialisation process that
emphasises an unquestioning attitude, and a punitive response to actions outside
of the conmiands. Like much that is written about nursing the emphasis on its
homogeneity belies the heterogeneity. The experience of being a nurse can be
as characterised as above (see for example Salvage 1985). It may account in part
for the growth of unionisation in some sectors of nursing (see for example, Lewis
1976). Nurses in the UK, unlike medicine, have a strong history of trade
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unionism. The relationship between clinical nurses and nurse managers, when
viewed through this history, is of the division of interest between employee and
employer rather than members of the same occupational group (see for example
Hart 1994). Even the Royal College of Nursing, which never affiliated to the
Trade Union Council unlike other professional organisations such as the Health
Visitors Association (Health Visitors Association 1996), has clinical nurse
'stewards' to represent their members points of view to managers and at a local
level (Royal College of Nursing 2003). The level of unionisation could be seen
both as a continued response to a repressive culture or as evidence of a large
number of nurses who are not repressed.
Analysts have argued that the negative image of nurse managers as incompetent
and punitive has been a reflection of the gendered attitudes to women as
managers (Carpenter 1977, Halford 1997). The two major reviews of nursing
administration structures in the nineteen sixties; the Salmon Report (Ministry of
Health 1966) in the hospitals and the Mayston Report in the community
(Department of Health and Social Security Ct al 1969), heavily critiqued the
matron led nursing administration of the time and emphasised the need for
modem management and a linear, hierarchical structure. The implementation of
these reports created a short lived nursing hierarchy to match that of the NHS
administrators. These reports and others since about nursing in the UK have
argued for a greater availability of management skills education for ward sisters
and nurse managers, with seeming disregard to the scale of that already available.
The first specific management skills courses for ward sisters were established in
the 1940's (Lathlean 1988) and initiatives since the late eighties have increased
the availability of management education to nurse managers (Bryant 1990, NHS
Management Executive 1992, Woolnough et a! 2002). So while there is a
repeated characterisation of nurse managers as punitive and lacking in
management skills, the history of the management education programmes
available to them would suggest this is a stereotype used for devaluation. There
are many published descriptions of nurse managers who have created positive
clinical environments to work in and opportunities for shared decision making
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with staff (see for example Field 1984, Smith 1992, Savage 1995, Geoghegan
1995).
Roberts (1983) argued that nursing, as a subordinated group expressed horizontal
violence within the group rather than to the dominant group. Feminists have
proposed a "Queen Bee" syndrome in nursing; this argues that the most senior
nurse becomes preoccupied with the maintenance of her own position, rather
than the concerns of the worker bees, and actively minimizes any threat to her
status by other bees (Halsey 1978). It is has not been possible to find UK
empirical evidence that explicitly addresses the active minimisation of threat
from other nurses by the "Queen Bee". However, there is certainly substantial
evidence of denigration to more junior nurse members and bullying of nurses by
their managers (Pearce 2001) that could support both Robert's theories of
oppressed group behaviour and theories of a Queen Bee syndrome. However,
nursing is not alone in this as evidenced by recent studies demonstrating that the
widespread presence of bullying of doctors in training and as a pervasive
management style throughout the NHS (Quine 1999, Quine 2002).
Finally, it is necessary to briefly consider any evidence of suspicion or hostility
towards nurses who assimilate to medicine as the dominant group, rather than
management. One group who have experienced this, were the nurses educated at
degree level at the time before nursing education moved into Higher Education.
At this point only medicine enjoyed a university level education. The hostility
from many other nurses was well documented (Ring 2002). The shifts in work
roles that will be described in the next section between doctors and nurses and
the creation of nurse practitioner roles has certainly provoked debates that these
nurses are becoming physicians assistants rather than nurses (Castledine 1995).
However, it is not clear that there has been real hostility or suspicion in the face
of an inexorable central policy driven movement (Department of Health 1999c).
Having considered the empirical evidence of nursing's response to an
occupational subordinated position, this chapter will finish by considering the
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potential changes in the occupational relationships at the end of the twentieth
century.
4.9. Changes in the Relationship between Medicine and Nursing in
Health Care
The end of the twentieth century provided new opportunities for nursing to assert
its occupational powers and challenge medicine. The economic pressures,
increasing patient demand and medical workforce problems facing the National
Health Service prompted politicians and NIHS managers to promote the use of
nurses in roles previously only ascribed to medicine. In the hospital sector, the
need to reduce junior doctor hours precipitated major changes in the technical
activities nurses were expected to undertake (Greenhaigh and Co 1994,
Department of Health 1 999c). These changes have been accompanied by the
national development of a new senior clinical nursing post known as the nurse
consultant. The nurse consultant post has three strands of work, 50% clinical
care and the rest research and teaching (Department of Health 1 999d). It offers
a career route for a nurse that does not involve management responsibilities for
other nurses. A national evaluation has commenced but it is too soon to
comment on the impact on the relationship between medicine and nursing
(Guest et al 2001).
In primary health care specifically there have been some significant shifts in
roles undertaken by medicine and nursing in the past fifteen years. Key
differential roles between the occupations have been the medical roles of
diagnosis, requests for diagnostic procedures by other occupations and the
prescription of medicines (both prescription only medicines and medicines
financially subsidised by the NHS). The last fifteen years have seen shifts in
which nurses have started to be legitimised in undertaking these roles. The
development of nurse practitioners is one example (Touche Ross 1994,) where
nurses are expected to act autonomously in making clinical assessments, ordering
investigations, diagnosing complaints and initiating treatment. In primary care
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some GPs, faced with escalating workloads and problems in recruiting doctors,
also supported the development of nurse practitioners in their practices (Koperski
et al. 1997). In less than twenty years, the resistance to nurses working m general
practice identified by Bowling's study (Bowling 1981) changed to an acceptance
of the place of nurses (Royal College of General Practice 1996). The lone
experience of Barbara Stilwell as a nurse practitioner in general practice (Stilwell
1987) has slowly developed into more widespread development of such posts
(Chambers 1998). Another key medical role that has been extended to nurses is
the legal right to prescribe prescription only medicines. As a policy issue it first
found voice in the Cumberledge Report (Department of Health and Social
Security 1986a). However, it took over ten years before the legislation and
accompanying Department of Health policies allowed some nurses to prescribe
treatment from a formulary that included prescription only medicines without
recourse to a doctors instruction (Jones and Gough 1997).
The NETS policies of the labour government has encouraged and expanded the
provision of nurse only primary care services. The development of minor injuries
clinics, staffed only by nurses, began in the early nineties but accelerated with
the funding of NHS Walk In Centres, which are direct access primary health care
for those unable to register with GPs and NHS Direct, a direct access telephone
health help line staffed by nurses (Department of Health 1997). Personal
medical services (PMS) have been experiments under the Health Act 1997 Act to
provide medical services in different ways (The Personal Medical Services
National Evaluation Team 2000). This has provided the opportunity for salaried
GPs to be employed by Trusts to offer general medical services in under
doctored areas. It has also created situations of a significant change in the
relationship between nurses and doctors. There are examples where nurses have
become full financial partners in general practice for the first time (Department
of Health 1 997c, Wright 2004). There are also a handful of the PMS pilots led
by nurses who employ GPs to provide sessional clinics (Baranaik 1999). All of
these changes have occurred against a backdrop of significant changes in the
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demography of general practitioners. By the beginning of the twenty first century
women GPs were in the majority (Department of Health 2003).
This chapter has outlined the complex power relationships between the two
occupational groups that were offered a joint leadership role in the PCGs. It has
tried to demonstrate that the stereotypes built on ideal types within in hospital
setting belie the plurality of relationships derived from the heterogeneity of
health care setting and health care function and the multiple occupational
histories. The very different history of relationships in primary care from the
acute institutional setting set a very different backdrop against which to examine
empirically these relationships in the context of Primary Care Groups.
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Chapter 5: The Study Methods
5.1. Introduction
This chapter describes the methods used in this study. The initial part of the
chapter considers the research approach and the study design before reporting the
data collection and analytical methods. This section concludes with a critique of
the method. The chapter concludes with a description of the sample PCGs and
informants.
5.2. The Research Approach
This enquiry was concerned with contemporary social interactions and
relationships in the implementation of a state policy innovation. The research
approach drew on ideas of critical realism (Robson 1993). Robson drew on the
work of Roy Bhaskar (1986) and Rom Harre (1986) to synthesise his ideas.
Critical realism integrates both subjectivist and objectivist approaches to social
theory. The former emphasises that human action is meaningful and intentional,
and denies the existence of an external reality beyond the individual
interpretation. Objectivist approaches, emphasises the external reality of society,
tending to deny the causal role of agency by the actors. Critical realism argues
that social structure is at the same time the product, and also the medium, of
motivated human action. Therefore social reality incorporates individual, group,
institutional and societal levels. Knowledge is seen as "a social and historical
product that can be specific to a particular time, culture or situation" (Robson
2002 p34). The explanations are constructed in terms of how mechanisms, in
specific structural contexts, produce events or experiences. The research task is,
therefore, to obtain evidence about the existence of hypothesised mechanisms.
5.2.1 The Theoretical Context
This study drew on theories from sociological and political science concerned
with authority, leadership and the nature of power to inform its design and
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analytical framework, as discussed in chapter 3. Weberian theory on the sources
of authority for leadership suggested the potential for conflict between
professionals and managers (Parsons 1949). Alford (1975) proposed a further
refinement on this situation of potential conflict, through the use of political
theory on interest groups in public policy decision making. He discriminated
between dominant, challenging and repressed interest groups in health care
decision making. He argued that the "professional monopolists" dominated the
decision-making against the challenges of the "corporate rationalisers" and that
the voice and interests of the community was repressed.
Critiques of both Weberian based conflict theory and political theory in the
seventies and eighties argued that other factors such as social class and gender
needed to be incorporated in order to more completely understand the dynamics
of power in society (see, for example, Mitchell 1971). This challenge was
particular relevant in the present study as it has been argued that the relationship
between doctors and nurses is strongly influenced by the gendered nature of their
occupations (Davies 1995). However, the British primary health care has a more
female medical workforce profile and occupational boundaries unlike other parts
of the health care system (see chapter 4) that have the potential to alter some of
the power dynamics.
Previous studies of local NHS governing bodies have indicated variation in the
role and authority of different member groups (see chapter 2). A number of
studies reported that the medical membership has held a greater level of
influence than other member groups, while some studies have indicated that both
the medical members and the lead manager have been perceived as influential.
One description of the 40 GP commissioning pilots for Primary Care Groups
commented that the nurse members were viewed as less influential than medical
or managerial members (Regen et a! 1999).
The propositions informing the investigation are therefore derived from theories
of authority and power, the structured nature of occupational relationships and
the findings from empirical studies concerned with local decision-making bodies.
The propositions were that:
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. The doctors and nurses would not equally hold leadership roles. The
dominant structural interests expressed in the Board activity would be
medical and specific to the general practitioners
. There would be conflict between the professionals and the managers as to
the role of professional leadership in the activity of the PCG. This
conflict would be experienced differently for GPs and nurses
The increasing numbers of women GPs would mean that gendered
experiences of Board membership would be less clearly associated with
occupational groups
. The nurses would have a differential experience of leadership according
to a) their position in the hierarchy of the community health services or
general practice, and b) their clinical relationship to general practitioners
5.3. The Study Design
Study design has been categorised into two types: fixed and flexible (Robson
2002). In fixed designs the five study components of purpose, theory, research
questions, methods and sampling strategy are immutably specified before
commencement, for example in a randomised control trial. Flexible designs
allow for an iterative process between the five components so that the detailed
framework emerges during the study (Maxwell 1996). The flexible design
framework, informed by critical realism, acknowledges multiple realities,
through a focus on participants' views (Cresswell 1998). It also presents data
analysis at multiple levels of abstraction, moving from the individual to the
group level but retaining the concept that it is theory that it is central to
explaining reality (Robson 2002).
The flexible study design used in this investigation was multiple case studies.
Case study design " is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life
context using multiple sources of evidence" (Robson 1993 p 52). Case study
design is appropriate when the context is important to the phenomena under
investigation (Clyde Mitchell 1983). A single case study design was considered
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and rejected because this is argued to be most appropriate when the phenomena
have never been explored before, or a critical case can be identified for testing a
well formulated theory (Stake 1994). Neither of these criteria applied to the
present study. Yin (1994) argued that a multiple case study design was
appropriate where the researcher sought both replication of evidence to support
theoretical predictions and theoretically predicted contrasting evidence (Yin
1994). A multiple case study design was therefore appropriate, as some
theoretical predictions detailed above had been generated from previous
empirical studies.
Primary Care Groups are the real life context within which the roles of the
general practitioner and primary care nurse board members are enacted. Miles
and Huberman (1994) have pointed out that the phenomenon under study, i.e. the
case, always occurs in a specified social and physical setting and cannot be
separated. They argue that the term case study site would be preferable. The
case or phenomena under investigation is this study was the designation of a
leadership role for these clinical professionals. The case study site was chosen
as the primary unit for devising the sampling frame in order to ensure contextual
diversity in which to search for replication of observations and explore the
theoretical predictions. The sampling frame therefore included contexts that
demonstrated diversity in:
. Levels of socio-economic indicators of population deprivation, as a proxy
for differing types of demand on health services
. PCG level (as defined in government policy) as an indicator of different
levels of PCG Board responsibility within the local health economy
. Previous levels of GP fund holding and multi-funds, as a surrogate
indicator for different levels of expert knowledge and experience in
commissioning services amongst the GP community
. Method of recruiting nurse members to include a) eligibility criteria
excluding nurse managers and b) voting by peers and selection by senior
manager interview
A total of eight case study sites were decided upon as this number would cover
the requirements of the design and be feasible within the financial resources of
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the project. The sample had to be within two NHS Regions for resource reasons.
These merged to form one NHS Region during the period of the study.
5.3.1 Designing the Data Collection Methods
In choosing the data collection methods, consideration was given to the elements
that would contribute to the validity and reliability of the enquiry. There has
been much debate about whether these are appropriate terms to use in assessing
qualitative research (see for example Lincoln and Guba 1985). Robson (1993)
suggested that using the term "trustworthiness "in assessing an enquiry more
accurately reflected the approach of qualitative research. However Robson
(2002) like others has since shifted his view, swayed by the argument that to
dismiss validity and reliability completely only supports the view that such
research is therefore invalid and unreliable (Morse 1999). Robson (2002) argues
that these terms have been operationalised in the natural sciences in a rigid way
to support the ultimate test of validity through replication of findings by an
independent researcher. Investigators of social life have to operationalise these
terms in appropriate ways to the phenomena under scrutiny, rather than with the
expectation of being able to re-create the events for the purposes of replication.
Lincoln and Guba (1985) discuss possible threats to the validity of qualitative
research under three broad headings of reactivity, respondent bias and researcher
bias. Reactivity refers to the impact the actual presence of the researcher may
have on the social milieu under study, in particular people's behaviour.
Respondent bias refers to the spectrum of responses people may have to being
research objects. At one end of this spectrum people may purposively provide
inaccurate or incomplete information, at the other end people may try to provide
the data they believe the researcher is seeking. Researcher bias refers to the
assumptions or preconceptions a researcher may bring to the study. These may
shape decisions in the study design, behaviour in data collection and
interpretation in analysing the data.
Many commentators offer sets of strategies to address these threats (see for
example Miles and Huberman 1994, Maxwell 1996, Silverman 2000). The most
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common strategies include the maintenance of a research audit trail, prolonged
involvement in the research situation, triangulation and member checking
(Robson 2002). These will be discussed in turn. Contemporaneous records for
each element of the study provide a research audit trail. Contemporaneous
records, including a research diary, of all research activities were kept through
out this study and drawn upon in the written report.
It has been argued that prolonged involvement in a research situation will reduce
the level of reactivity to the researcher and reduce respondent bias as acceptance
and trust is developed, although researchers may find it difficult to maintain an
independent observer stance over a prolonged period (Silverman 2000). The
extent to which this strategy is used depends significantly on a) the research
approach, for example prolonged involvement is a defining characteristic of
ethnography, and b) the resources available to the researcher. In this instance,
the multiple case study design and limited resources, precluded prolonged
involvement.
Triangulation is the strategy that is most widely advocated to address threats to
validity from reactivity, respondent and researcher bias (Robson 2002). It
suggests that validity of evidence can be enhanced if the same evidence is
identified from different view points, hence the use of multiple perspectives,
data collection methods or researchers. Denzin (1988) has identified four types
of triangulation:
• Theory triangulation: the use of multiple theories or perspectives in a
study
• Methodological triangulation: using quantitative and qualitative
approaches to gather data in a study
• Data triangulation: multiple methods of data collection in a study
• Observer triangulation: the use of more than one researcher to gather
and analyse data
The multiple theoretical perspectives and methodological perspective, informing
the study, have been discussed above. The resources within the study limited
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the use of additional researchers. Multiple methods of data collection were
feasible and are integral to a case study methodology (Yin 1994). However, the
nature of critical realism is that it accepts that there may be more than one
perception of events and experiences. In studies concerning power relationships,
the accounts and sources may provide disputed and contradictory data rather than
validation. Bloor (1997) has provided an empirically based critique of the
concept of triangulation as a form of demonstrating validity. He points out that
logically one method will be superior to the others for answering the research
question. It is therefore illogical to refute the evidence from that method if it is
not corroborated by evidence from inferior methods. He has argued that data
collected by different methods differ in their form and specificity so that direct
comparison is problematic. He concludes that "methodological pluralism allows
new light to be shed on topics and allows different facets of problems to be
explored, so the mix of different methods has an interactive impact. However,
this mix of methods does not allow validity tests on findings." (Bloor 1997 p 41).
Member checking is term used whereby research subjects views are sought on
the veracity of the research data they provided or the research analysis. Robson
(2002) warned of some of the pitfalls in these techniques such as research
subjects seeking to subsequently change or suppress material. Bloor (1997)
argued that member checking is a social interaction, fraught with all the
problems and biases of the original data collection. It was therefore decided to
check for veracity of data collection and interpretation of individual experience
within each interview. This ensured that the process was contemporaneous with
the data collection and not affected by subsequent changes in the context. It also
placed no further time demands on informants who, by virtue of their occupation
and roles, had significant competing calls on their time.
With these points in mind, the following data collection methods were initially
considered and piloted in order to provide multiple sources of evidence for each
study area:
. Semi-structured interviews with multiple key informants in each study
area,
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• Observation of primary care group board meetings,
• Collection of documents produced by the Primary Care Group Board,
• Collection of documents related to the context of each Primary Care
Group,
Final decisions on the detail of the methods were deferred until the feasibility
was explored in the field.
5.3.2 Identifying the Case Study Sites
A database of the 66 PCGs in two NHS Regions was constructed using a
computer software package (SPSS) to assist in identifying the sample.
Information was obtained regarding:
• PCG levels, (NHS Executive 1999),
• Deprivation indicators for the relevant Health Authorities (Bardsley et al
1998),
• Information on the nurse member recruitment processes (Fletcher 1999)
• Information on previous levels of GP fund holding and multi-funds.
This last category of information was more difficult to obtain systematically.
Information was gathered verbally from an NHS regional officer who was asked
to identify areas with exceptionally high or low proportions of GP practices
working in this way.
The PCGs participating in other national evaluation studies were noted and then
excluded, as it was felt they were would be unreceptive to further approaches for
study. Details of these PCGs were obtained through contacting the evaluation
team (Malbon 1999). A list was generated from the database for each cell of the
sampling frame. Only their database identification number identified each PCG.
Identification numbers were picked at random for each cell to determine the
PCGs to be approached.
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5.3.3 Negotiating Access
The informants within the case study sites were all members of elite groups,
either as board members, senior executives in the NHS or professionals. Some of
the informants would be members of more than one elite group. Research into
elite groups is acknowledged to be very difficult because an elite group, by its
nature, establishes barriers that set its members apart from the rest of society
(Moyser & Wagstaffe 1987, Hertz and Imber 1995).
The recruitment of potential subjects in each PCG began by writing to the
chairperson. The chairperson was elected from the clinical membership and was
expected to be a GP. The letter explained the purpose of the study, the methods
to be used (face-to-face interviews), the commitment to ensuring confidentiality
and anonymity, and outlined the research experience of the investigator and
supervisors. The letter was sent first to eight PCG chairpersons and then
subsequently a further eight. Initial responses to this recruitment letter were very
negative and attempts to follow it up were frustrating and unsuccessful. Work
overload was the main reason cited for refusal to participate. No PCG
chairpersons were recruited at this point.
Consequently, the approach for negotiating access was reconsidered. Social
researchers reflecting on success in gaining access to people from elite groups
have emphasised the value of their personal contacts and personal introductions
from one elite member to another (Arthur 1987, Deem 1994, Ostrander 1995,
Hunter 1995). While the researcher had working relationships with PCG
members in one part of London, the sampling framework would have been
undermined by this approach. Hunter (1995) notes that academic researchers
may need to call on the "prestige of their academic status, their cultural capital,
to achieve greater symmetry in the power relationship" between elites and
researchers. The recruitment letter was redrafted in a way that called on that
prestige. The letter placed the study more visibly under the auspices of the
medical school, sited in a Russell group university, with the confirming signature
of a Professor of General Practice (see appendix 2). It emphasised that what was
sought was individual recruitment to the study, not recruitment of the Board as a
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whole. The chief executive and the chairperson were now approached
concurrently, in order to improve the chances of a positive response. Potential
subjects were also given the option for the interviews to be conducted by
telephone.
The new recruitment letter was sent out to the chief executive and chairperson of
a further eight randomly selected group of PCGs and received immediate
positive responses. In all of this sample either the chairperson or chief executive
agreed to participate. It is impossible to determine whether this was the result of
the call on the medical school prestige, the inclusion of the chief executives in
the first approach or the additional time since the PCGs had been launched.
Once the chairperson or the chief executive had agreed to participate, recruitment
of other participants commenced. The data collection design employed a
methodology from political science and organisational development known as
stakeholder analysis. This openly acknowledges that there may be varied
perceptions of a phenomenon by different interest groups, who also hold diverse
levels of power and influence. Groups with an interest (i.e. a stake) in the
phenomenon under study were identified and from this the key informant
sampling template devised for each case study site:
1. Within the Board: a nurse member, a GP member, a lay member and
the chief executive member
2. Outside the Board: the health authority chief executive, the
community trust chief executive, a primary care nurse linked to the
Board nurse through a local nurse Forum, and a GP member of the
Local Medical Committee.
PCG Board members' names and membership categories were available on the
English PCG Database (NHS Executive 1999). Identification of the chief
executives and lay members from the database was straight forward as there was
only one person in that category. The first name listed for the nurse membership
was selected unless information from the PCG administrative base indicated this
person was not available at present through illness, or other reasons. GP
members were approached when the Chairperson declined to participate or never
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responded. Initially, GPs whose names were listed first on the national database
were approached. However, it became clear that GPs selected in this way were
extremely difficult to recruit and this method was reviewed. It was decided to
approach those GPs who had a designated role that was identifiable on the
database. This role was the lead for clinical governance. As a last resort when
these GPs either declined or failed to respond in the PCG, the personal assistant
to the chief executive andlor the chairperson was asked to identify a GP they
thought was the most likely to agree to participate. The personal assistant's view
was sought on the basis that they knew the Board members but would not have a
view on their role in the Board.
Outside the Board, senior manager informants' contact details were obtained
from national publications (Institute of Health Service Management 1999, 2000)
and later from the NHS Regional office web pages (NHS Executive London
Regional Office 2000). The clinical professionals outside the Board were more
problematic to identify and recruit. The Board nurse member identified primary
care nurses who were members of local nurse forums. In one area, this type of
forum or network did not exist and the nurse board member tried to identify a
local colleague who might be willing to be interviewed, but they all declined. A
number of areas only had ad hoc forums and the membership fluctuated. In three
instances, the nurse Board members passed on recruitment letters that resulted in
a non-response. In five areas, they asked two or three members whether they
would be willing to participate and then having gained consent passed these
details on.
Recruiting Local Medical Committee (LMC) members was extremely
problematic. Two approaches were taken. In one area individuals, whose
membership and contact details were available in the public domain on the
World Wide Web, were contacted directly. In the other areas the secretary of the
LMC provided contact details of Committee members who held named positions.
These were approached first by letter, and then by telephone. All of those
approached declined to be involved.
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5.4. Ethical Practice
The key principles in the ethical practice of social science research (Social
Research Association 1999) were utilised in the study design. The first principle
is linked to the integrity of the research protocol, ensuring it is worthwhile and
the techniques appropriate and feasible. The second principle is concerned with
entering moral relationships with the research participants. The research
protocol was developed over a number of months. During this period, elements
such as the value of the question and the feasibility of subject recruitment were
tested with academics and NHS personnel. Each element was considered in
supervisory sessions that included two supervisors. The protocol was peer
reviewed (including ethical review) and approved within the North Central
London Research Consortium. It fulfilled the research governance requirements
in the NHS and was registered on the national NHS research database. It also
received ethical review within the academic department where the M.Pbil./PhD.
was registered.
The invitation to participate letter (Appendix 2), developed as part of the
research protocol, detailed the purpose of the research, the methods to be used,
the procedures, the anticipated use of the study findings, the identity of the
investigator and supervisors, and the degree of anonymity and confidentiality.
Agreement to the interview was considered as consent. The aide memoire for the
interview repeated the information in the letter as well as seeking explicit consent
for recording of the interview. Mechanisms, such as the use of identification
codes, were established for ensuring that confidentiality was maintained in the
storing and analysing of the data. All data collected have been stored in locked
filing cabinets.
5.5. The Data Collection
The following section describes the data collection processes undertaken in
relation to the interviews, first of all, then in relation to the observation of Board
meetings and finally, the PCG documents.
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5.5.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
The enquiry was underpinned by an assumption that reality is not objectively
separate from the experience and interpretation of people. In this, the enquiry
adopts a broadly interpretative perspective, agreeing that; " reality is socially
constructed and interpreted through the actors, and is based on the definitions
people attach to it" (Sarantakos l998p 36). Consequently, the interview method
was chosen in order to access to those interpretations, beliefs and attitudes.
Qualitative interviewing begins with the assumption that the perspective of
others is meaningful, knowable and able to be made explicit." (Patton 1990 p
278). Commentators warn of the limitations of interviews through interviewee
lack of knowledge, recall error, personal bias or reaction to the interviewer.
Interviewing methodologies range from the highly structured to the very informal
based on non-directive techniques. Pawson and Tilley (1977) argue that in theory
driven research the questioning should be channelled in a way that allows these
theories to be responded to. The interviews in this study were therefore semi-
structured, allowing flexibility in pursuing issues raised during the responses but
ensuring that particular enquiries were responded to.
Researchers have noted that elites, by their very nature, are used to being in
control. Consequently retaining control of interviews to cover the issues of
interest to the researcher can be problematic (Moyser & Wagstaffe 1987, Hirsch
1995). Ostrander (1995) offered a number of tactics to deal with this problem.
These included having a visible, type-written schedule of questions to refer back
to when the respondent has shifted the focus, and taking notes rather than audio-
tape recording so that not taking notes visibly alerts the respondent to the fact
that they are not saying anything of interest to the researcher. She also addressed
the issue of asking threatening questions of elites and offered three strategies.
The first is to learn the language of the elite enough to be able to proffer the
question in terms that are more acceptable. The second is to acknowledge that
this is a situation outside of normal social etiquette. The last is to offer the elite
the opportunity "to respond directly to criticisms that others may have made
about their actions" (Ostrander 1995 p147).
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To support the interviewer an aide memoire was prepared for interviewing each
sub-group of the key informants (see appendix 3). The aide memoire had three
purposes: be a visible reminder for the interviewer and the interviewed of the
process of the interview, to offer prompts to key themes and potentially
threatening questions, and to ensure specific information for the study area
database was collected. The potentially threatening questions on power
relationships between the different interest groups were couched in terms of
asking for responses to the headlines from the nursing and medical press, as well
as responses to the descriptive phrase in the policy documents of "doctors and
nurses in the driving seat". Three pilot face-to-face interviews were undertaken
with a GP Board member, a Nurse Board member and a Director of a
Community Trust from outside the sample PCGs. The question areas were tested
and the wording subsequently refined. The pilot interview with the GP Board
member was the shortest. The GP had clearly allocated less time than originally
agreed, as he was called to another meeting in the practice.
Researchers have emphasised the importance of being knowledgeable about the
issues or milieu that the elite group is operating in (Heclo and Wildavsky 1984,
Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987, Strong and Robinson 1988, Ball 1994, Hirsch
1995). Hunter describes the balancing act this requires,
To show that one lacks knowledge is of course, the raison d'etre for
doing the research in the first place and is often the basis for convincing
informants that they should take the time to inform you of what they
know. However to be too ignorant of the setting and current affairs may
convince elites that you are too unconcerned or uninterested to have done
your homework for them to waste their time with you" (Hunter 1995
p164).
It is also clear that some researchers have gained access to elite groups by virtue
of their expert knowledge of the policy issues (Klein 1983, Kogan 1994).
Preparation for undertaking the interviews therefore included intensive and
continued reading of the current Department of Health publications, the medical,
nursing and management press as well as daily newspapers and relevant parts of
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Hansard.	 It also included informal discussions with GPs and nurses
participating in the establishment of PCGs, local to the researcher's academic
base. In addition, the researcher attended conferences and seminars organized at
a national and regional level on developing PCGs. These included:
• A series of five seminars on primary care group management and public
health issues hosted by the Kings Fund, London 1999/2000,
• Four seminars given by GP PCG Board members and policy analysts in
the Department of General Practice in the Royal Free and University
College London Medical School and the Public Policy Unit of University
College London 2000
• North London NHSE Regional Office sponsored conference for nurse
Board members in April 2000
• A Community Practitioner and Health Visitor Association (CPHVA)
networking event for nurse Board members held in London, in May 2000
and a seminar held by nurse board members at a national CPHAVA
conference in Bournemouth in October 2000.
At a local level the researcher attended PCG networking events that were open
to all primary care practitioners in the area of her academic base. These were
held five times between Summer 2000 and Spring 2002.
5.5.2 Interviewing by Telephone
The original intention was to have all interviews as face-to-face encounters. The
pilot interviews were face to face although the GP Board member initially
suggested a telephone interview. Following the initial negative responses to the
requests to join the study, an interview over the telephone was offered.
The use of the telephone in conducting interviews has gained increasing support
from the research community as well as health and social care providers in the
last decade. Market research surveys by telephone are well established,
particularly in countries where there is widespread access to low cost telephone.
There are many examples of the telephone interview being used successfully in
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different types of academic research studies. These include: epidemiological
studies (Siemaitycki 1979), patient surveys on use and attitudes to health care
services (Thompson and Nussbaum 2000, Cockbum J Ct al 1992), qualitative
studies of health professionals views (Ziebland et al 1998), and qualitative
studies of peoples' experiences of ill-health (Bedell 2000).
The advantages of this method have mostly been described in terms of the cost
effectiveness in comparison to face to face interviewing and the efficiency it
provides in improving response rates. Frey (1989) suggests that telephone
interviewing also eliminates the non-verbal effects of the interviewer that may
encourage particular types of responses. Conversely, one particularly
disadvantage has been identified in that all the non-verbal cues that happen in
face to face encounters are missed. From their work replicating telephone
interviews with older adults by face-to-face interviews Herzog and Rodgers
(1988) suggest that, while there may be less extensive responses to open ended
questions via a telephone interview, as interviewers become more experienced in
using the method such effects are lessened. The increased use of telephone
technology in clinical interactions has produced a number of studies that have
compared favourably the reliability of information given by patients over the
telephone with that obtained face to face on sensitive issues (Rohde et al 1997).
5.5.3 Timing of Interview Requests
It became apparent that the timing of the request was an important factor in
gaining agreement for interviews. This timing was not just in terms of the
intensity of potential informant's work life and the cyclical nature of the work
surges of the PCG (see Table 1) but also in terms of individuals' readiness to
share their perceptions with others. It appeared that people became more
responsive to the interview request, the longer the PCGs existed. In addition,
some individuals who were leaving their roles associated with the iPCG were
more willing to share their views than when they were still in those roles. These
could be described as "exit" interviews. Other researchers have noted the value
of elite informants who have recently left office (Ham 1981, Heclo and Widaisky
1984). Kogan (1971) and Raab (1984) set out to only interview senior civil
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servants who had retired or moved on in their careers in recognition of the
difficulty of gaining access to elite policy makers.
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Table 1: Time line of key policy events concerned with PCGs
Date	 Event and Policy Document	 Details
1997	 _____________________________ __________________________________
April	 The NHS (Primary Care Act)
	 Introduction of flexibility in primary
1997	 medical services (PMS) and salaried
_________ _____________________ GPs
May	 Labour government voted into
____________ power 	 __________________________________
May	 Changing the Internal Market	 GP fund holding suspended
____________ (Department of Health 199Th)	 __________________________________
June	 GP commissioning group NHS
	 GPs commissioning group pilots
executive (Department of Health 	 initiative launched
____________ 1997a) 	 ____________________________________
December	 The New NHS, Modem and 	 White Paper Proposal for Primary Care
Dependable: Cm 3807
	 Groups and Trusts
____________ (Department of Health 1997)
	 ____________________________________
1998	 _____________________________ __________________________________
February	 Better Health and Better Health 	 Health Authorities instructed to develop
Care (Department of Health 	 partnerships to agree the local
19980	 configurations of Primary Care Groups
___________ ___________________________ by July 1998
February	 Our Healthier Nation	 Public health white paper
____________ (Department of Health 1998g)
	 ____________________________________
March	 NHS Direct Launched 	 Three pilot 24 hour advice lines were
___________ ___________________________ staffed by nurse
March	 Guidance Notes for GP	 Pilot GP commissioning groups due to
Commissioning Groups
	 go live on April 1998 instructed to take
____________ (Department of Health 1 998h)
	 account of guidance for PCGs
April	 Establishing Primary Care Groups Guidance on the arrangements necessary
(Department of Health 1 998b)
	 for PCGs to become operational from
___________ ___________________________ April 1999
I April	 A First Class Service: Quality in Detailed framework for clinical
the New NHS Department of 	 governance activities across the
____________ Health. (1998e)
	 NHS
May	 BMA publicly demands majority Anon. Health Service Journal
____________ control over PCG Boards	 14th May 1998 page 7
August	 The New NHS Modern and	 This detailed the membership of the
Dependable: Developing Primary PCG Board and the timetable for
Care Groups (Department of
	 establishing the primary care boards by
___________ Health 1998c)	 3l' October 1998.
September	 The new NHS Modem and
	 Initial guidance on Primary Care Group's
Dependable Primary Care Group governing arrangements and
Remuneration (Department of
	 remuneration for non-executive Board
____________ Health 1 998d) 	 members
October	 Shadow PCGs commenced (population
____________ _____________________________ ranged from 43,000 to 277,000)
September	 Modemising Health and Social
	 The first jomt national prionties
Services; National Priorities	 guidance for health and social services.
Guidance 1999 00 & 2001 02
	 It specifies that the first health
(Department of Health 1998i)
	
	 improvement plans and draft service and
financial frameworks must be in place
___________ ___________________________ by April 1999.
Personal Medical Service Pilots	 Applications invited for second wave
Second Wave. (Department of
	 PMS pilots
____________ Health 1998j),	 ____________________________________
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Date	 Event and Policy Document	 Details
October	 Health Improvement programme: Detailed guidance for developmg health
Planning for better health and
	 improvement programmes to be agreed
better health care (Department of by April 1999, also states that first draft
Health 1998k)	 of service and financial frameworks for
the NHS between NHS trust, and
primary care groups should be drafted by
___________ ___________________________ mid-January 1999.
December	 The New NHS Modern and
	 Detailed Guidance on how PCGs should
Dependable, Primary Care 	 manage their financial and operational
Groups Delivering the agenda
	 responsibilities, particular related to
(Department of Health 1998) financial risk management, prescribing
management issues, financial incentive
schemes and financial monitoring. The
primary care group boards should have
identified primary care group
chairpersons and begun to recruit staff.
Services departments before going live
__________ ________________________ in April 1999.
December	 Governing Arrangements for
	 Specified the governing arrangements
Primary Care Groups 	 and authority of the PCG Boards
_____________ (Department of Health I 998a)
	 ______________________________________
1999	 _____________________________ __________________________________
JanuaryThe Health Bill published	 __________________________________
February	 Second Wave PMS Pilots
announced
February	 Corporate Governance 	 Governing principles of Primary Care
____________ (Department of Health. 1999e).
	 Groups announced
Primary Care Trusts: Application Detailed discrete phases leading to PCT
Process. (Department of Health. 	 s becoming operational 1 4 2000.
____________ 1999f)
	 __________________________________
February	 House of Commons Select	 This reviewed the early stages of the
Committee on Health Second	 establishment of PCGs and highlighted
Report: Primary Care Groups	 potential obstacles to their long-term
(House of Commons Select	 success.
___________ Committee on Health 1999)
	 __________________________________
April___________________________ 481 PCGs go "live"
September	 Primary Care Trusts (Department These HSCs set out guidance on the
of Health. 1999,1 999i)	 consultation Health Authorities had to
undertake on proposals to establish
Primary Care Trust then detailed
information on the constitutions.
December	 Modemising Health and Social 	 Targets for NHS and social care
Services: National Priorities	 agencies to address on public health,
Guidance 2000 01, 2002 03	 improving acute sector waiting times,
(Department of Health I 999g)
	 modernising primary care, implementing
mental health services framework,
improving services to older people,
improving services to children,
addressing quality issues, staff
employment and the introduction of
___________ ___________________________ information technology strategy.
December	 Primary Care Groups: taking the Guidance for PCGs on moving to PCTs
next steps (Department of Health. status
1999h)
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Date	 Event and Policy Document
	 Details
2000	 ________________________________ ______________________________________
Apnl	 Press announcement (Department 17 (out of 481 PCGs) first wave PCTs
____________ of Health 2000) 	 go live (average population 135,000)
The NHS Plan: a Plan for
	 White Paper on Health Service Reform
Investment a Plan for Reform.
____________ (Department of Health. 2000 a)
	 __________________________________
October	 23 second wave of PCTs launched
___________ ___________________________ (Peckham and Exworthy 2003)
2001	 ______________________________ ____________________________________
April	 Shifting the Balance of Power:
	 124 further PCTs formed (leaving 237
Securing Delivery (Department of PCGs)
____________ Health 2001) 	 ____________________________________
September	 Shifting the Balance of Power:
	 Planned reconfiguration of 95 Health
Creating Strategic Health
	 Authorities into 28 Strategic Health
Authorities (Department of Health Authorities from April 2004
____________ 2001 c)
	 ____________________________________
Care Trusts (Department of
	 Guidance on the establishment of Health
____________ Health 200ld)	 and Social Care Trusts
2002	 ________________________________ _____________________________________
April	 All but one PCG became a PCT
___________ ___________________________ (Peckham and Exworthy 2003)
Delivering the NHS Plan	 Third White Paper on NHS Reforms.
(Department of Health. 2002a).
	
	 Abolition of Regional Offices of NHS
Executive and creation of Health and
_____________ _________________________________ Social Care Direclorates
2003	 ________________________________ _____________________________________
AprilAll PCGs now PCTs	 ______________________________
Abolition of Health and Social
_______________ Care Directorates
The first attempts at recruiting informants were made between October 1999 and
January 2000: all those approached during this period refused. The first
acceptance was received in March 2000. Interviews were conducted from then
until the last one in February 2002. The last two interviews were with chief
executives of PCGs who had just moved to new posts. In total, forty-one
interviews were undertaken. Fifteen were conducted by telephone and twenty-
six were face to face.
During each interview, the veracity in data and interpretation was checked at a
number of points:
Interviewer: The issues that you picked out that were problematic were;
first of all the unreal timescales for implementation and secondly, the
lack of understanding on the part of general practitioners about human
resource management such as equal opportunities. Is that right?
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Informant: Yes, Yes. (Informant 31 text unit 90 —91)
All interviews were recorded and transcribed in order to minimise inaccuracies
from interviewer recall. The tapes were subsequently deleted. Each transcript
had an identification number only. In the two interviews where the recording
equipment failed the interviewer made bullet point notes in the interview but
immediately after leaving the interviewer used a dictaphone to recount the
interview in as much detail as possible and then transcribed this tape.
5.5.4.Observation of Primary Care Group Board Meetings
Observation of Board meetings was initially considered as a data collection
method to support triangulation of data collected through the interviews.
Observation is a direct technique for gathering data with the potential to offer
behavioural and linguistic evidence in answering research questions. Methods
of observation that can be used range from total immersion in the field as a
participant observer through to structured detached observation using coding
schemes to quantify behaviours (Silverman 2000). Commentators tend to point
to two main limitations of the method in general. The first being the "Hawthorne
Effect" that is people changing their behaviours in response to being chosen and
observed (Nason and Golding 1998). The second limitation is that the methods
are time consuming and resource intensive. With this in mind, a decision was
made to pilot non-participant observation of the Board meetings of the Primary
Care Groups. All the Primary Care Group Boards had at least hi-monthly public
meetings. They usually also had a meeting in the intervening period which was
not open to the public. Initial approaches to chairpersons and chief executives to
discuss the feasibility of observing the non-public meetings were met with
negative responses. They considered these meetings as important "private"
spaces for the members to initially learn to work together and deal with sensitive
issues.
Four public meetings of different Boards were observed to consider what data
could be collected through observation and what value it might add to the study.
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In all four, the Board members were clearly very aware of the public as an
audience. They were arranged at horseshoe shaped tables, at one end of a room,
so that they could face the public who were sitting in rows of chairs at the open
end of the horseshoe. Proceedings were conducted along formal lines with very
little discussion. The main speaker was the chairperson, who announced items
and then the chief executive followed by reporting progress in that item or
announcing a decision or recommendation made by a sub-group of the Board.
Members of the Board would also report to the Board on sub-group activity such
as on clinical governance. Occasionally, other members would ask for clarity on
a particular item, but clearly most of the debate or discussion between members
had already happened elsewhere. Reflecting on this experience, it appeared that
these meetings were a "performance", almost a ceremonial occasion, with
prescribed roles and behaviours by members in front of an audience. It appeared
that observation of public Board meetings would add little to the information that
was recorded in the minutes of the Board. It was considered that the investment
of significant amounts of time in observing these public meetings would not
yield commensurate levels of data. It was therefore decided not to pursue this
line of data collection. The interviews with Board members later in the study
revealed that most of the Boards had mechanisms for discussing potentially
difficult issues prior to the public meeting. This supported the decision not to
pursue this method of data collection.
5.5.5 Collection of Data in Documents
"For case studies the most important use of documents is to corroborate and
augment evidence from other sources" (Yin, 1994 p 81). Yin (1994) appears to
advocate a trawling approach to the collection of documents, although May
(1997) has pointed out that the use of documents in social research is one of the
least explained techniques in the literature on social science methodology.
Internal documents produced by a public body such as a PCG may or may not be
available to the public in the UK. The minutes of the Boards were to be publicly
available documents (Department of Health 1998c). The PCG Board minutes
were viewed as an important source of evidence. The minutes of the different
Boards in the study took slightly different formats, however, they were all
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subject to the Board members contemporaneously agreeing them as an accurate
record of the proceedings. Ham (1981) noted that in his study of he Leeds
Regional Health Board one member refused to participate in interviews,, arguing
that the minutes reported all that could be said about the Board activity and
relationships. Ham reported that no major issues or different relationships were
revealed through the interviews that were not recorded in the Board minutes.
For each PCG, the public minutes of Board meetings over twelve calendar
months were collected. Although these were public documents, the
administrators in two of the PCGs were very unwilling to share these documents
but eventually did. They had clearly never been required to circulate Board
minutes beyond the Board members and the Health Authority. Six PCGs
supplied electronic versions of the minutes: one of these had posted aM minutes
on their web site. Two of the PCGs supplied minutes in paper format oilly.
Documentary evidence to assist in contextual description for each study area was
collected as available on field visits, both from individuals and from sources such
as public libraries and Health Authorities. Types of documents collected in this
way included: annual reports for Health Authorities, Trusts, Public Heth, health
improvement plans, Local Authority strategic plan and Trust and PCG
newsletters. These documents were indexed on the word processing fimction of
the computer. The variety in availability, format, and content between the
different Health Authority Areas and PCGs made these very difficult to utilise in
a systematic way. The Health Authority Reports provided the most consistent
information on population and finance between the PCGs. Some PCG
newsletters provided detailed information about the activities of the PCGs, others
provided very brief information of Board activities together with profiles of
services or individuals in the PCG area. Two PCGs did not produce newsletters.
However, the material had value in developing the researcher's local knowledge
to assist in the interviews and as it helped identify key characteristics of the
population and local health economy.
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5.6. Data Analysis Methods
A template approach was taken to the analysis of interview and document data
(Crabtree and Miller 1992). The initial key codes were derived from the
theoretical propositions and used to provide the template for the first level
analysis (Ritchie and Spencer 1994). This did not preclude the addition of new
coding if the data suggested issues or themes other than the a priori template, but
served to help focus the coding effort. Robson (2002) warns that researchers
tend to ignore information that conflicts with hypotheses already held and
emphasise information that confirms them. The search for the negative case is
one strategy for supporting the validity in analysis (Lincoln and Guba 1985). The
coding template (Appendix 4) therefore specifically included the converse of the
theoretical propositions. The computer software package N5 was used to assist
in the coding and retrieval of material from the semi-structured interviews. The
use of the software meant that the data could be interrogated repeatedly and
systematically through the multiple theoretical propositions.
The Board minutes were analysed for both the process and the content. It should
be noted that the different styles of reporting minutes in the PCGs made some
aspects of the analysis problematic, for example, some PCG minutes did not
always report individual contributions whereas others reported individual
contributions in great detail. Sections of the coding template used for the semi
structured interviews, together with additional descriptive process categories,
formed a second coding template (Table 2). The minutes of the PCG Boards
were analysed against the template and additional categories were added when
new themes emerged. This analysis was conducted on paper as not all the
minutes had been received in electronic format. An example of a summary
analysis through the template is given for one PCG in Appendix 5.
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Table 2: The coding template for the documentary analysis
Element	 Key aspects
Presentation and detail of the Whether speakers were identified
minutes	 Whether reports on particular items were summarised
_______________________ or appended
Attendance patterns 	 Categonsation by membership group and presence of
representatives from other organisations.
_________________________ Frequency of individual attendance
Agenda	 Set pattern or changing pattern. Frequency and
pattern of item appearance
Frequency of public exclusion for confidential
____________________________ business
Decision making	 Frequency of reported decision making,
________________________ Method of decision making e.g. formal voting
Non public decision making Reference to, frequency of, purpose of other types of
meetings	 meetings of Board members
Conflict of interests	 Reference to and resolution of conflicts of interest
Sub Committees 	 Number and purpose
_______________________ Frequency of reporting at the Board
Finance and Commissioning Type and frequency of issues
PCG specific new service




Clinical governance	 Types of activity reported, reporting of success,
___________________________ problems and issues to be addressed
Health Improvement Plan
	 Type of activity and reporting of success , problems
___________________________ and issues to be addressed
Relationships with other
	 Type of organisations, frequency of discussion of
health and social care	 interaction, positive or negative relationship reported
organisations___________________________________________________
Clinical Board member
	 Involvement of clinical members in agenda items by
involvement	 professional group, by agenda item and frequency of
_________________________ reporting
Community and lay member Reported involvement of lay members and other
involvement	 representatives of the community
5.7. Critique of methods
The methods used in this study had a number of weaknesses. These included:
the limited recruitment of informants outside the Board particularly GPs, the
limited recruitment of nurse members at different levels in their organisation, the
differential level of the data obtained through the use of interviews by telephone,
and the multiple case study design within limited research resources.
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Recruitment of intended informants from the different groupings in all case study
sites was not fully achieved. Two chief executives, a GP, three nurses outside the
Board and all 8 GPs outside the Board were not recruited as intended.
However, analysis of the interviews from Board member informants revealed
that the last interviews, across the groupings, were not adding new issues
although they were adding some new illustrations. The last interviews with
chief executives were undertaken at a point where either the PCG was about to
change to a PCT or the person had just left the PCG. These interviews provided
in depth, detailed data, which would probably not have been the case if these
individuals had been interviewed earlier. The depth of these interviews ensured
that 'saturation' (Robson 2002) was reached in fewer interviews than if a larger
number had been conducted at an earlier time point. The study demonstrated
the problems of timing data collection in an environment where public policy is
in constant evolution.
The limited recruitment of professional informants outside of the Board,
especially GPs, was a weakness. On reflection, the proposed mechanisms to
identify individual clinical informants were based on several optimistic
assumptions. These assumptions were : that there was a pooi of clinicians in the
PCG, who were interested and knowledge about the Board and board member
activities, that these clinicians would be easily identifiable through their
participation in other organised activities, and that it would be possible to locate
individuals who would see enough value in the research to offer their time to
participate. All of these assumptions were flawed and needed to be tested more
fully before the informant template was finalised. In retrospect, different
approaches should also have been tried. One approach could have been through
attendance at local PCG sector meetings for professional members in order to
identify clinicians interested and knowledge about the Board activities. Another
might have been to describe the research in terms of interest in a specific Board
activity, such clinical governance, through which clinical leadership would be
explored. This might have made the research appear more relevant to clinicians
and increased recruitment.
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The limited recruitment of nurse members at different levels in their employing
organisation was a problem in then trying to address the proposition which
suggested those in managerial positions would have a different experience of
leadership on the Board. In retrospect, the sample size of the nurse members
was too small to gain enough informants with characteristics that covered all the
dimensions of interest. However, even if the sample had been increased and
managerial nurse members sought this might have proved problematic because
nationally only 7% of nurse members were also managers (Cook 2000).
Some interviews by telephone were very difficult to conduct and may not have
produced the same level of detailed response as a face-to-face interview.
Robson (2002) has suggested that the absence of non-verbal clues in telephone
interviews curtails the ability of the interviewer to interpret the responses. Non-
verbal information was not collected as part of the data of interviews, however,
the researcher was conscious of having to listen extremely carefully to the tone
of the voice in order to identify nuances such as irony that would have been
accompanied by physical clues. The telephone explicitly places distance
between people in communication. The inability to receive non-verbal
information as signals to the areas that animated the interviewee meant it was
often difficult to identify the issues that needed to be explored. For some
telephone interviewees who offered detailed, reflective answers without
prompting, this was not an issue. However, some interviewees responded briefly
and without embellishment. It was difficult to develop a greater rapport with
these interviewees so that they would become more discursive, in the absence of
eye contact and non-verbal communication. This was a weakness in some data
collection episodes. In retrospect, a more detailed prompt sheet, with
supplementary questions to explicitly deal with short, factual answers may have
assisted with this problem.
The use of a multiple case study design by a single researcher meant that
resource limitations were significant considerations in the decisions about data
collection methods. The method provided data from individuals, from
stakeholder groups and from the publicly agreed decision making and activity,
but there was no data collection from the many and varied informal events and
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interactions in which Board members participated in decision-making. In order
to have captured more of this type of data, a different design would have been
required in which the researcher became immersed in PCG Board activity over a
period of months or years, as a non-participant or participant observer. This
type of design has significant resource implications. Within the resource limits
of this study it would have meant studying only one PCG, however, to have used
data from only one PCG would have weakened the evidence to support
generalisability at a theoretical level. In retrospect, a design that included a
period of immersion in more than one PCG could have strengthened the study.
Additional funding might have been sought more vigorously, although at the
time it was difficult to see where to apply as both the Department of Health and
the Kings Fund had committed funds to a national evaluation.
5.8. The Sample PCG Boards
This section describes the PCGs and their Boards involved in this study. An
individual description of each of the eight Boards and their membership is not
given as to do so would make the individuals identifiable. For the purposes of
this study, the PCGs are grouped in order to demonstrate the spectrum of
populations served and the PCGs internal characteristics. Each Board had to
address the same central policy directives outlined in Table I (section 5.5.3).
5.8.1 The PCG PopuLations
Members participated in the research from eight Boards, which were purposively
chosen to ensure diversity across a range of geographical, demographic and
organisational characteristics.
The eight PCGs were spread across Greater London, both north and south of the
Thames (Table 3). They were in four of the fourteen Health Authorities present
in London in 1999, although this changed in 2001 with some mergers of
organisations. All the Health Authorities were dissolved in March 2002. Two
PCGs were coterminous with Community Health Service Trusts. Six were one
of a number of PCGs within the geographical provision of Community Health
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Service Trusts. Two PCGs were coterminous with the boundaries of Local
Authority: the others were one of several within a Local Authority.




	 One of several PCGs in theGeographical relationship 	
with a single Community	 boundaries of a Communitywith Community Health
	 Health Services Trust
	 Health Services TrustService Trust
_____________________ 2 PCGs
	 6 PCGs
Coterminus boundaries	 One of several PCGs in the
Geographical relationship 	 with a single Local	 boundaries of a Local
with Local Authorities 	 Authority	 Authority
_____________________ 2 PCGs
	 6 PCGs
Table 3: The geographical range of the PCGs in the study
The Eight PCGs served varying sized populations. They were chosen to ensure
diversity in socio-economic factors. Four served populations of under 100,000,
two between 100,000 and 149,000 and two over 150, 000 (Table 4). This range
reflected the national picture (Bojke et al 2001). Three PCGs were within inner
London. Two of these had populations characterised by very high levels of
deprivation with Under Privileged Area Scores (Bardsley & Flately 1998) of
over 50. The Under Privileged Area (UPA) score is a composite of census
variables selected to indicate need for primary care (Jarman 1983). The England
and Wales value is zero, the higher the value the greater the deprivation and the
need. These PCGs had standardised mortality rates and morbidity rates well
above the national averages.
Three PCGs were in outer London and had UPA scores of between 15 and 30.
Two of these had populations characterised by significant ethnic diversity. The
remaining two PCGs were on the outskirts of London, bordering on farmland.
These PCGs had populations characterised by affluence and were commuter
suburbs for Central London and the City. The IJPA scores for these areas were
less than minus 5. These PCGs had correspondingly very low rates of mortality
and morbidity compared to national averages.
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Characteristic	 Range
Population range	 <100,000	 100,001-149,00	 150,000
_______________ 4 PCGs
	 2 PCGs	 2 PCGs
Outer London	 Outer London,	 Inner London
suburbs borderingType of urban setting
on farmland
_______________ 2 PCGs
	 4 PCGs	 2 PCGs
UPAScore	 <-5	 15-30	 >50
(England value =0)
	
2 PCGs	 4 PCGs	 2 PCGs
Table 4: The range of urban and population characteristics of the PCGs in the
study
5.8.2 PCGs and Commissioning
The eight PCGs were in areas where there were different levels of previous
involvement of GPs in commissioning and fundholding (Table 5). Six PCGs had
between 40 and 60 GPs working in their area. The remaining two PCGs had
between 60 and 80 GPs in their area. Four were in areas where over 75% of the
GP practices had been fundholding or were part of larger multi-funds (i.e. where
groups of small practices commissioned services together) prior to the
establishment of the PCGs. Two of the PCGs were in areas where 50% per cent
of the GP practices had been fundholding. The remaining two PCGs were in
areas where 15% per cent or less of the GP practices were fundholders. This
range reflects the diversity of GP involvement in commissioning prior to the
introduction of the PCGs (Mays and Dixon 1996).
Characteristic__________________________________________




PCG	 PCGs I 2 PCGs
>75%	 IAbout5O°o 1<15%Percentage of practices that were previously
	 j	 I
fund holding or multi-funds 	 I	 I
_______________________________ 4 PCGs I 2 PCGs	 I 2 PCGs
Table 5: GP presence and prior involvement in fund holding or multi-funds.
All eight of the PCGs were established at level two, i.e. to have responsibilities
for some aspects of commissioning health, on 1st April 1999. Levels of PCGs are
described in detail in chapter 2 section 5 Half of them had dissolved by April
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2001 to become part of a new PCT. The remainder dissolved in April 2002 to
form new PCTs.
5.8.3 Establishing the PCGs and their Boards
Two PCG Boards had been operating in a shadow form earlier than the date set
in the national guidance as a direct result of prior GP commissioning groups.
Two PCG Boards were established in shadow form slightly later than the central
government required date. Four PCG Boards did not have chief executives
appointed and in post by April 1999. Three chief executives took up post
between two and eight months after the April 1999 start date. Four PCG Boards
had established, identifiable office premises for their administrative staff by
April 1999. The other four took anything up to six months to establish premises.
The number of administrative staff to the PCGs changed over their life span. In
the first twelve months, the sample PCGs had administrative support that ranged
two to twenty staff member.
Two PCG Boards did not recruit their full complement of non—executive
members until after the official date of going "live" in April 1999. In all of the
Boards the professional non-executive members were appointed before the lay
member and the social service representative. The GP members in all Boards
were elected through Local Medical Committee conducted elections. Six of the
PCGs experienced changes in the GP Board membership in the first two years.
In each Health Authority and for some individual PCGs, there were prior agreed
eligibility criteria for nurse membership places. All stated that the nurse member
had to be involved in clinical practice but the interpretation of that phrase varied
in different areas. In two PCGs, nurse managers were specifically excluded
from seeking Board places. In two other PCGs, one nurse place was specifically
reserved for nurse managers. In two PCGs, one place was reserved for practice
nurses and the other for nurses employed by the Community Trust. In four
PCGs, the nurse members nominated themselves and were directly elected by
their peers. In the other four, a panel of Health Authority and Community Trust
managers interviewed applicants to determine which nurses were suitable
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candidates. The selected nurses then went forward to election by their peers.
There is no available information to indicate whether this reflects the national
diversity in processes. Two of the PCGs saw changes in the nurse membership in
the first two years.
Each of the sample PCGs had a non-executive membership composed of seven
GP members, two nurse members (in one PCG a job share resulted in an
additional nurse), a lay member, a social services representative and a Health
Authority non-executive. All the chairpersons were GPs, as was the case in the
majority of PCGs across the country (Peckham and Exworthy 2003). Seven of
these were male and one female. Five of the eight PCGs had female chief
executives. A count of chair persons and chief executives in the 60 London
PCGs in 2000, named on a Department of Health website (NHS Executive 1999)
revealed that 74% of chair persons were male while 52% of chief executives
were female.
5.8.4 The PCG Agenda
The activities of all the PCGs in the first two years were characterised by
attention to a very detailed agenda set by central Government (Table 1, section
5.5.3). This focused on strategic and operational planning for financial
governance, clinical governance, health improvement and the devolution of
responsibility for commissioning community and acute sector health services.
The guidance gave prescriptive annual tasks, for example, developing a Primary
Care Investment Plan (PCIP) that included establishing requirements for GMS
infrastructure support, financial incentive schemes for general practices for
meeting targets, setting and managing indicative practice prescribing budgets,
and establishing a prescribing incentive scheme for all general practices,
(Department of Health HSC 1998). Family health service expenditure accounts
for 24% of the annual NHS expenditure (36,50O million): within that 5000 is
spent on pharmaceutical services and 32% on general medical services
(Department of Health 19981). By 2000 detailed guidance was produced by
central government on establishing PCTs (Table 1 section 5.5.3). In 2001, the
minutes of the PCGs in the study demonstrated the attendance of the PCGs to the
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central government directives. The most frequently minuted items were, in
descending order:
. Finance
• The under spending of the General Medical Services budget
• The over spending of the prescribing budget
• The projected or actual overspending in the acute sector commissioning
• The development of the PCTs
• The establishment or changes in other local organisations e.g. Health
Authority mergers, establishment of Health and Local Authority
Partnership Boards
Clinical governance was not a regular minuted item for all the Boards. While
some Boards had a regular agenda item on clinical governance, others did not.
References to the Health Improvement Plans were rarely minuted. It was
noticeable that the inner city PCGs frequently discussed the problems of closed
GP lists and the associated difficulties in recruitment and retention of GPs and
nurses.
5.9. The Sample of Informants
The study design sought eight types of informant for each PCG (section 5.3.3).
The Health Authority and Community Trust manager interviewees could provide
information linked to two PCGs. Consequently for the eight PCGs studied 56
informants were sought. In the event 41 informants were recruited and
interviewed (Table 6). The difficulty and consequences of recruiting the
anticipated sample iare discussed in section 5.3.3 and in the critique of the
methodology section 5.7. Informants were recruited for all eight PCGs. Six
types of informant were recruited for seven PCGs and seven types for one PCG
(table 7).
The breakdown between informant groups shows that 73% of informants were
female (Table 6), although the greater number of male GP and Health Authority
senior manager informants reflects the higher numbers in these occupational
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groups in the NHS (Department of Health, 2003). A similar number of
interviews were conducted face to face as over the telephone (Table 6). The
PCG nurse members were the groups most likely to agree to face-to-face
interviews.
Number	 Sex	 Interview
_______________________ interviewed ________ ________ 	 Method
Type of Informant	 Male	 Female Telephone Face to
__________________________ _____________ _________ ________ ____________ face
PCG chief executives 	 6	 2	 4	 5	 1
PCG GP members	 7	 5	 2	 5	 2
PCG nurse members	 8	 0	 8	 1	 7
PCG lay members	 7	 2	 5	 3	 4
Health Authority Chief	 3	 1	 3	 1Executives or Directors
Community Trust Chief 	 3	 4	 0Executives or Directors	 _____________
Clinical nurses involved in
a reference group to the	 5	 1	 4	 1	 4
nurse members
Local Medical Committee 0
	 0
members
Total	 41	 15	 26	 22	 19
Table O: The sample of informants by type, gender and interview method
PCG
1	 2	 13	 14	 Is	 16	 17	 8
Board members	 4	 3	 4	 4	 3	 3	 4	 4
interviewed_______ _____ ______	 ______ ______ ______
Others interviewed	 3	 3	 2	 2	 3	 3	 2	 2
Total informants 	 7	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6
recruited per PCG out
of a possible 8 types of
informant
Table 7: Number of Informants for each PCG.
There was a marked contrast between the lengths of time that GP and lay
informants had spent working or living in a PCG area compared to that of the
managers (Table 8). General practitioners financially invest in their practice or
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practice partnership, including premises (Peckham and Exworthy 2003) and
consequently demonstrate significant occupational stability.
Number Number of years in the areainterviewed
Type of Informant	 __________ Under 5	 6-10	 Over 10
PCG Chief Executives	 6	 6	 _________ __________
Health Authority Chief 	 4	 3	 1
Executives or Directors 	 ___________
Community Trust Chief 	 4	 1	 3
Executivesor Directors 	 ___________ ___________ _________ ___________
Clinical nurses involved in a
	 5	 3	 2
reference group to the nurse
members___________ ___________ _________ ___________
PCG nurse members	 8	 2	 6
PCG lay members	 7	 __________ ________	 7
PCG GP members	 7	 7
Table 8: Length of time informants had worked or lived in the area
Three of the seven lay members had occupational backgrounds in public sector
management. Two of these in addition had experience of Board membership of
local health organisations of over 15 years. The division in occupational
background between the different groups of managers was also marked (Table
9). Most of the PCG chief executives had only worked in health service
management concerned with general practice. The other managers had only
worked in the hospital and community health services element of the NHS.
None of the PCG chief executives had health professional backgrounds, while a
number of the managers in the Health Authority and Trusts had nursing or
medical backgrounds. Data on this issue were not found in any other studies or
nationally.
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________________	 Occupational Background of Managers __________________
	
NHS HCHS*	 Health professional 	 NHS GMS** management
Management (with and	 then NHS HSCS	 (with and without
without experience outside management	 experience outside the
_______________________ the health service)	 ______________________ health service)
PCG Chief	 1	 6Executives
Health Authority
Chief Executives	 2	 2
orDirectors	 ______________________ __________________ ______________________
Community Trust
Chief Executives	 1	 3
or Directors
Table 9: Occupational backgrounds of the manager informants
*Hospitl and Community Health Services ** General Medical Services
The nurses also had varied occupational backgrounds. Four were health visitors;
one of these was also a part-time lecturer. One was a district nurse who was also
a nurse practitioner and had been a school nurse in the past. One was a practice
nurse. Two were specialist nurses and nurse practitioners, both currently
managing the establishment of new nurse-led services in primary care. Their
occupational variety reflected the unpublished information supplied by Health
Authorities to the Department of Health (Cook 2000). At the time they put
themselves forward to be Board nurses none of them had been involved in
commissioning services. One was a professional organisation local steward
representing members in local negotiations with managers.
All the GPs in the sample had previously been directly involved in
commissioning services either as lead fundholding partners in their practices,
leading members of multi-funds or part of GP commissioning groups in Health
Authorities. Only one had no previous involvement in the Local Medical
Committee.
Having established both the methodology and the detailed information on the
sample, the next chapters will discuss the findings of research.
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Chapter 6: Clinical Board Members Roles in the Early Phase of
the PCGs
6.1. Introduction
This chapter considers the roles of the GP and nurse members in the early stages
of the PCG. It explores first of all their motivation before reflecting on their
perception of the key influences on their activities in this period. It concludes
with an exploration of how the context of the PCG affected the types of roles
within the Board.
6.2. Motivation and Expectations: the GPs
All the GP members, without exception, stated that their prime motivation was
to continue their involvement in commissioning health services. They had all
previously been involved either in fundholding, multi-funds or GP
commissioning groups:
"I think it was probably because of my experience in fund holding and
being involved in setting up ** Fund-holding Forum, a group of fund
holders who worked together. In [name of area] we 'ye got quite a lot of
small practices who were fund holders with relatively little clout and we
learnt to work together. Then we could change things. When PCGs came
along, that group led locally to then set up the PCG ". PCG GP member
19, text units 4-19
None of them expressed any self-doubts about putting themselves forward to
undertake this role.
	 Some cited their previous experiences as part of the
rationale:
"And the next question is "why did I think I could do that? [be a board
member] ", because I was lead partner for fund holding and I'd had
experience on the LMC." PCG GP member 21, text units 19 —22.
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Four of the GP members had been very instrumental in the actual formation of
the PCG and its Board:
"When the fund holding finished I had some time left, which I used to
spare for fund holding. And I as an ordinary ground level GP, I wrote a
letter to all the [area] GPs that I would be interested to know how many
would like to share with me the views of the new PCG. And it started
from there. I organised one meeting. I had about 4 or 5 doctors came
out of 60 and then everybody wanted the following meeting, following
meeting and by the time I reached my 5th and final meeting about 80
people ". PCG GP member 26, text unit 6
The GP members were clear not only that they wanted to continue their
involvement in commissioning but also that they wanted to pursue the same
commissioning objectives. They wanted to assert the interests of primary care
and general practice against secondary care services in the commissioning
process. They often described this in terms of improved health services for their
patients. They emphasised that their motivation was to improve financial flows
into primary care services:
"So I was concerned about protecting primary care, getting appropriate
resources, educating managers about primary care and resisting
secondary care eating all the budget." PCG GP member 2, text units 12-
14
This was confirmed by more than one PCG chief executive, who reported that
the GP motivation was to act in overtly political ways to ensure a greater
proportion of health service funds were directed into general practice.
All the GP members provided additional motivating factors. Mostly these were
in terms of ensuring their own interests, either as general practitioners or their
practice, were represented on the Board. Sometimes this was reported as a
distrust of the other GPs in the area:
"There are several answers to that. The most important answer being
because I believed that it would give me an opportunity to benefit the
health care for my patients. Subsidiary answers are because I didn 't like
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the quality of the other people who volunteered - that's it". PCG GP
member 21, text unit 7-17
In addition, some OP members reported very personal motivation:
"I was interested in becoming a PCG member, I suppose, partly to give a
bit of variety, something dfferent to do apart from visiting patients."
PCG GP member 29, text unit 4-7
The GP members therefore came to the Board with a range of motivations but
mainly with a clear expectation of continuing previous commissioning activity
focused on increasing finance towards primary care in general and improving the
responsiveness of the secondary care sector to the needs identified in primary
care.
6.3. Motivation and Expectations: the Nurses
The nurses reported a different set of motivating factors to become a PCG Board
member. The primary motivation reported was to seize a rare opportunity for
clinical nurses to be involved in decision-making:
"Igot carried along as being one of the primary people who was saying,
'this is an opportunity, let's get in there and grasp it' ". PCG nurse
member 40, text unit 32-35
The nurse members believed they could offer two things to the Board decision-
making: firstly, their own clinical experience and secondly, the views of the
large body of nurses that was derived from their clinical experience. They
reported that their clinical experience gave them important knowledge of the
health problems and patient experiences of the local population. Some of them
described themselves as almost acting as proxies on behalf of the users and
patients:
"And I have always felt strongly that nurses know so much about what is
happening to patients in the community, but they never really ever voice
what is going on. And so I stood for election and got in." PCG nurse
member 4, text unit 49-51
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Some of the nurse members reported that they expected to represent the interests
as well as the views of sub-groups within primary care nursing:
"I had this naive idea that, 'isn't it great. I'll be there representing
nursing views on the board'. And f there 's something important for
health visiting I?! be there, fighting, flying the flag, and ?f there's
something important for district nursing, I'll go out and speak to them
about it and make sure I 'm representing their views." PCG nurse
member 8, text units 77-81
Only one reported that she put herself forward with the encouragement of a more
senior nurse. Two nurses reported that they had volunteered to be part of
"pilot" primary care commissioning groups established in 1998 and were
encouraged by that experience to continue their involvement. Four of the nurse
members reported instrumental roles in organising local primary care nurses to
address the implications of the national guidance of establishing PCGs.
Nearly all the nurses Board members described their decision to put themselves
forward in terms of the absence of others willing to do so. Three nurses
explicitly stated that they did not think they had the right qualities or abilities to
undertake the role but volunteered, as there appeared to be no one else willing:
No, I suppose I was fairly clear that I didn't really think that I had the
right qualities, but I'm the kind ofperson that does their best and in the
absence of any others then I was up for it." PCG nurse member 40, text
unit 3 8-39
In contrast to the GPs, some of the nurse members expressed a high degree of
self-doubt about their capabilities. They also went through a significantly
different experience in order to be appointed a Board member.
150
6.4. Selection processes for Board Membership
All the GP members were elected by their peer GPs through LMC conducted
elections. The GP members indicated that the process of elections was a familiar
part of the culture of general practice as each LMC was fonned in this way.
The nurses had no single local representative body equivalent to the LMC. The
situation was therefore completely novel for them. They reported a different
selection process in each of the PCG areas. In some areas, the senior nurse
managers in the Community Trusts and Health Authorities were reported to be
very proactive in engaging clinical nurses to develop that selection process:
"Our Director of Nursing, she was very far sighted and she got an
interest group going, because she realised that it was going to be a big
culture change for nurses. So she held a meeting every couple of weeks.
Very much to bring us up to speed with all the latest documents of what
was going on, how are we going to implement this? What were we going
to do about nurse representation? What were the implications for
nursing? " PCG nurse member 4 text unit 10- 14
This senior manager encouragement was not present in all areas. In two PCGs
the nurse members reported that the managers in the Trust and Health Authority
did not provide any active encouragement in organising processes for nurse
membership of the Boards. In these areas, it was left to the front line clinical
nurses to take the initiative and create the selection process:
"The dfficult part at that particular time was that it was almost left to
me, to organise the whole thing, left to me by the Trust. I had to go and
get all the names and I had to talk to the LMC about managing the ballot
and it was really quite dffi cult........I think because at that point the
particular Chief Executive [of the Community Trust] did not agree with
the idea of PCGs and therefore, there wasn't really very much interest ".
PCG nurse member 32, Text units 44 —52
As a result each area (variously Health Authority Areas or the PCG areas within
that) developed different eligibility criteria for candidates. In the two PCGs
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where the clinical nurses were left to develop the selection process only clinical
nurses were eligible to stand and there was a straightforward election process. In
the other areas, places were reserved for nurse manager candidates or candidates
working in specific occupations such as practice nursing. In these areas, there
were written statements about Board membership accompanied by core
competency person specifications that the nurse had to demonstrate. The
selection process included an interview held by senior managers from the
Community Trust and Health Authority. In three areas the processes included an
interview to assess suitability to stand for election, followed by the election by
peers:
It was the process of selection and election. So there were certain
criteria that we had to fulfil initially and an interview. If there were more
than one person for each area then you'd be elected on. And we had two
for each PCG. We decided to have one from Community and one from
somewhere else." PCG nurse member 33, Text unit 28-30
The processes of the elections were varied. The LMC, the Health Authority or
the Electoral Reform Society conducted the nurse member election.
The experience of selection for many of the nurses was markedly different from
the GP Board members' experience. The GPs engaged in a familiar peer
determined and conducted process. The majority of the nurses Board members
had experienced a more bureaucratically controlled process in which health
service managers played significant roles.
6.5. The Early Experience of Board Participation: the GPs
All the GPs Board members reported that the establishment and development of
the PCGs was much slower than they had anticipated. Most of them described a
sense of frustration at the slow pace the bureaucratic procedures created. The
senior managers in the Community Trusts working with PCGs also noted the
slowness in the development of the PCGs:
"I suppose how much of what I'm going to say [about working with the
PCGs] is to do with my individual disposition and the way I drive things
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and how much it is to do with the under-resourcing of the PCG, I don't
know. The one reflection I would make is that things grind very slowly.
Community Trust Director of Operations 5, text unit 20-25
The PCGs certainly varied in the time it took to recruit chief executives. A
minority of PCGs appointed chief executives while in their shadow form, but
most took up to six months to make this appointment and two nearer eighteen
months. GP and lay informants in three Boards reported GP members resigning
from the Board because of their frustration at the slowness of decision making
and the lack of visible change.
"One member has already resigned as a result of it. A fund holder who
felt that you could do something with fund holding, then you could do it
tomorrow or the day afterwards. And this [the PCG] is months later of
unfilled promise". PCG GP member 9, text units 105- 108
A PCG Chief Executive also described GP expectations across the PCG area of
relatively quick, visible changes in finance to primary care and secondary care
commissioning that he felt were unrealistic of a new organisation. Two of the
Directors within Community Trusts talked about the unrealistic, as they saw it,
expectations of the Board GPs that the PCG would swiftly tackle ongoing and
intractable problems in primary care such as the difficulties of recruiting and
retaining nurses.
The GP members had clear expectations of repeating experiences from previous
commissioning activities. For some, this was tempered with scepticism about
the ability of NHS bodies to be effective:
"I have to say I am cynical by nature, but it [the PCG activity] has been
no worse than I expected it........It has been much more bureaucratic
[than fundholding], everything has been involved in procedure. We have
very little involvement in discussion of clinical issues. There has been
endless waiting for authorisation from above." PCG GP member 2, text
units 17-23
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Some of the GP members were more positive about the experience and reported
progress in some primary care developments. However, all of them reported that
their involvement in the commissioning of services, particularly acute services,
was less than they had hoped for:
"Oh, I think it 's probably been more enjoyable than I thought it would
be, and I think the developments in primary care have been better than I
thought they'd be. But at commissioning level I would say there has been
very little development ". PCG GP member 29, text units 20-22
All the GP members agreed that the time commitment required to actively
participate in Board business was much greater than they had expected. Some
of them pointed out they worked much longer hours for the Board than they
were financially reimbursed for. Informants from two Boards reported more GP
resignations specifically because the level of time commitment required was
greater than anticipated. In some Boards, particularly those with few PCG staff,
the Board members appeared to take on a very operational role in comparison to
those in PCGs that employed more staff. Some of the GP members, who held
lead responsibilities for core activities such as clinical governance, described
investing significant amounts of additional time in making these Board work
streams successful.
"At the height of it, I've been doing 10-15 hours a week making the
clinical governance work, which as you know is well beyond the
remuneration". PCG GP member 21, text units 117-8
The lay members also observed the significant time commitment the active GPs
made to the PCG work, and speculated how long they could sustain that and
their practice commitments:
"I'm worried about our GPs who are killing themselves doing a full time
clinical job in their practices and are spending a horrendous amount of
time, especially on clinical governance and education as it happens".
Lay PCG member 25, text units 434-436
The GP members described how they had to create time to not only attend
meetings but also to undertake the other PCG supplementary activities. A lay
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member observed that she often received copies of emails from GP members
sent at one o'clock in the morning. All the GPs commented that the time
requirement placed an added strain on their clinical practice. This was a
particular issue in GP partnerships:
"Iprobably spend on average easily a day a week on PCG work and I'm
not a Chair on the PCG. So fyou do it properly there 's an awful lot of
work we need to do - meetings, daytime and evening meetings, just
reading up all the stuff It gets incredibly tiring. It's a real time pressure
- I dropped one session a week from my surgery to do it, but I'm still
effectively full time, I'm still doing 9 sessions, plus all that ". PCG GP
member 29, text units 219-223
6.6. The Early Experience of Board Participation: the Nurses
The nurses came to the Board with expectations of the nature of their
participation and the work of the Board that were vaguer than the GPs. All the
nurse members described having to learn a great deal at speed in the first year, to
a degree that they had not anticipated. For all of them, the level of financial and
business management was new:
"There was a huge learning curve to begin with. I'm very au fait like
with services and disciplines and practices and all the rest. But what I
didn't realise until I started on the Board was how little I knew about the
financing. And so there was a huge learning curve". PCG Nurse
member 17, text units 80-87
In addition, the focus of the PCG Board activity on general practice meant those
nurses who had not worked in general practice had to learn about aspects of the
NHS that they had not been previously aware of:
To begin with it was a lot of me struggling with an area of knowledge
that wasn't mine at all, very strategic, looking at issues around business
plans, and budgeting. And then the focus being on the GPs, premises
and, you know, their prescribing and their red book, and stuff I really
didn't know anything about. So it's taken me a long time to actually feel
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that I can understand what the meetings are about and what we are
discussing". PCG nurse member 8, text units 20-26
Some of the lay members, who had not previously been involved in any aspect
of the health service, echoed the nurses in describing the scale of new knowledge
they had to assimilate in the first year of the Board. Both they and the nurse
members talked about a new language of abbreviations and acronyms they had
to learn. The only nurse member who did not describe having to learn significant
amounts of new knowledge had been managing a service for GPs and was
currently undertaking a management role in establishing another new major out
of hours service.
The nurse members, like the GPs, had not expected the time commitment
required to be an active PCG member to be as much as it became:
"The hours were much more than anticipated. I have now started logging
what I do and I think its at least a day and a half a week - consistently
and that's not enough because I haven't been doing all the reading".
PCG nurse member 15, text units 528- 535.
None of the nurse members reported that the work of the Board had been slow or
frustrating in this period, unlike the doctors and some of the lay members. In
contrast, most of the nurse members described the first twelve months as
difficult for them. The difficulties the nurses described were not only their lack
of knowledge about the issues under discussion but also actually working on the
Board with GPs. The nurses in half the PCGs described how the GP members
had previously been working together: either in some form of multi-fund, or GP
commissioning group or an earlier version of the PCG. This meant they had
established relationships with each other and did not particularly welcome
additional people into that process:
"It was really hard. They [the GPs] met more frequently and they had
been for a long time. And of course, when we came into the PCG, there
had already been a PCG development group with mostly doctors and so
you came in at the beginning feeling that there was a whole lot of stuff
156
that you had totally missed out on, that they had worked it all out
between them ". PCG nurse member 40, text units 195-200
The relationships between the doctor and nurse members will be explored in
more detail in chapter nine. Suffice to say at this point that the nurse members
recognised that they did not have the knowledge or networks that the prior
commissioning groups and the LMC gave the GP members. This was not an
aspect of the Board that they had anticipated.
6.7. The Early Experience of Board Participation: the Roles of Non-
Executive and Executive Members
The work of most of the PCGs, following their launch, was concerned with the
establishment of organisational structures and processes. The differing lengths
of time this took in the PCGs was outlined in section 5.8.3. This is of note at this
point because the individual PCG context directly influenced perceptions of
Board membership and non-executive Board roles. The presence of a PCG
chief executive early on and early agreement on devolving Health Authority
resources to PCGs meant there were executive and operational personnel. Board
members in these circumstances could develop strategic decision-making roles.
This was not the case in all the PCGs. Two Health Authorities were reported to
view the PCGs very negatively and obstruct their development:
"This Health Authority has been especially bad in both the sense of the
management allowance [to the PCG], which is one of the lowest in the
country, and equally in terms of releasing people from the Health
Authority to work out into the PCGs. That's started to change. But they
were hanging on to everything they possibly could and they 're still
tending to do that". PCG lay member 14, text units 391- 396
This contrasted with the relationships for PCGs in the other Health Authorities
and the consequent effect on resources and infrastructure available to the Board:
"I put into operation a structure, thanlçfully with the support of the
Director of Business and Finance in the Health Authority and therefore
got the resources, very much similar to what PCTs are expected to have
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now. So HR [human resources], Finance, IT, all the usual things you
have in an organisation were there from day one, at least in theory."
PCG Chief Executive 39, text units 120-122
In the Boards with little or no resources either the clinical Board members
undertook executive roles, as described by some of the GP members in section
6.5, and active decision making roles or the PCG work did not progress:
"Well, other Boards that I have been on, you felt that the Executive have
really laid down the agenda and we have all listened and perhaps
commented and questioned. But in fact this [the PCG Board] has been
quite upside down, because we haven't had an Executive. It was nearly a
year that we did not have anybody. But almost nothing happened till
April this year in our group. ft just did not get off the ground at all. It
was dreadful really, just a secretary to take the minutes. " PCG lay
member 23, text units 100-102
Where the PCG Board members had taken more active roles in decision making
early on, some reported a shift to a much more passive role in decision making
as the chief executive role developed:
We, like many Boards, had a period at the beginning when we had no
Chief Executive and virtually no staff And although that was dJJicult, it
meant that the Board had to do a lot of this itself And I think that was
very empowering. What has gone on since is, as the Chief Executive
appointed all his staff so more and more business has been pulled away
from the Board. There have been several occasions when we have had
the sense that they are running ahead of any decisions made by the
Board." PCG lay member 14, text units 441 —452
The degree to which individual Board members embraced executive or non-
executive roles was to some extent influenced by their expectations and prior
experiences of Board level work. For some non-executives, prior experience as
a member of some sort of governance committee ensured a greater
understanding of the difference between executive and non-executive roles.
However, it was repeatedly commented upon by the lay members, the chief
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executives in the PCGs and the Health Authorities how little prior experience
most of the GPs and nurses had in Boards or Committees:
"Most of them [the GPs] had no experience of corporate work at all. No
experience of sitting on governance, Health Governance bodies, I
suppose that's what you'd call a PCG to some extent.......So a lot fell to
me to help setting up the constitution and setting up the rules of conflict
of interest and all that kind ofstuff" PCG lay member 25 text units 22-
23
A few informants pointed out that some of the GP members were very
experienced committee members of LMCs, institutions related to medical
education, and the medical Royal Colleges. However, this did not seem to
impact on the overall perception of the GP as inexperienced Board members.
The GP members did not perceive themselves as inexperienced or in need of
help in developing their understanding of their role. The nurse members on the
other hand were not reported to be members of other types of committees. They
frequently referred to educational opportunities offered to them to develop their
understanding of the Board role. The Regional Health Authority or sometimes
the Health Authority commissioned these development opportunities for nurses
from management consultants or Universities:
"We [the two Board nurses] are also doing, the London Region, it think it
was, put on a PCG Nurse development course which includes some
learning sets. And we are both taking part in that and it has been very
interesting, facilitated by some very high powered influential people ".
PCG nurse member 3 Text units 2 19-222
The PCG chief executives all referred to investment in organisational
development activities within the PCG aimed at the non-executive members.
The activities were described in terms of both improving their knowledge about
the role of a non-executive board member and also improving relationships
between members of the Board. Most of the nurse and lay members referred to
these activities as a positive development opportunity. In complete contrast
none of the GP members refer to any of these activities at all. Others noted that
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the GP members were very negative about activities for organisational
development:
"A lot of early meetings were for bonding and something GPs are not
very fond of is meetings for bonding. They will look at their watches and
think my time might be better spent elsewhere." PCG lay member 23, text
units 141-143
6.8. Differences between GPs and Nurses as Clinical Leaders in the
Early Phase
Even at the early stage of the PCG there were notable differences between the
GP and nurse members. GPs and nurses were given authority to hold their
positions by the NHS bureaucracy but the types of authority they commanded at
the local level were very different. The GPs came to the Boards not just with
the authority to be in a leadership role through a democratic peer election i.e.
"rational—legal" process in Weber's terms but with personal belief in their own
authority to undertake the role. The nurse members ostensibly came to the
leadership role with the authority of a democratic peer election, however most of
them experienced a process that was controlled by more senior members of the
local office of the NHS bureaucracy. Potentially this gave those who had been
through 'selection' and 'election' processes, two types of rational-legal
authority. Those nurses, who had only been elected, acquired only one source of
authority. However, few of the nurse members had much belief in their own
authority to undertake a leadership role.
The GP members came to the Boards with the strategic intentions of improving
the share of finance to primary health care and improving the quality of acute
services: in this they were challenging the dominant interests of the hospital
sector. Alford (1975), writing in an American context, grouped all doctors
within one dominant interest group, the professional monopolists. However,
these primary care doctors, who were operating within a state funded health care
system, presented a picture of a divided medical profession. They presented
themselves as challenging the dominant group, which was formed of the hospital
consultants supported by the NHS managers. The nurse members, however,
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became Board members with the primary intention of having a place on the
Board. They had no strategic intention beyond having their voice heard. A
finding echoed in the few published personal accounts of PCG membership in
other parts of England (see for example Smith 2000) and in a survey of nurse
members in the first year by the national tracker study (Dowswell Ct a! 2002).
The nurse members did not articulate any goal beyond this or any aim that was
shared across their occupational group. Alford (1975) ignored nurses and other
groups of health care staff in his analysis of interest groups in health policy, a
perspective repeated by those who have used his framework in empirical studies
of Boards in the UK. The presence of the nurse Board members in itself had the
potential to create a challenging interest group. However, it appeared that they
were behaving much more like a repressed interest group as described by Alford
(1975), anxious to take advantage of the local opportunity to influence local
decision making.
The GP and nurse members joined the Boards motivated by a range of factors.
This belies Ranadé's (1986) typology, which attributes only one motivating
factor to each Board member. The evidence of early and frequent resignations,
particularly amongst the GP members would suggest that the multiplicity of
motivating factors were subject to an individual and practice cost benefit
analysis in a way that Ranadé does not identify through her typology.
Undoubtedly the GP members shared a strategic motivation that the nurse
members did not demonstrate. Ranadé's typology predicts that members, who
are identifiable by their strategic motivation, are likely to be amongst the most
influential members. Using this typology it would indicate that GP members
were likely to be more influential than the nurse members. However, there are
structural elements that were significant in the early days and suggest that types
of motivation alone is too limited a predictor. The GPs came with three
structural elements of support that the nurse members did not have:
. Knowledge of the financial mechanisms in the NHS,
• Experience of local level commissioning,
• The existence of a peer network.
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This chapter has examined evidence from the establishment phase of the PCGs
that supports the thesis proposition (section 5.2.1) that the nurse members had a
different experience of the leadership role and were less influential than the GP
members. The next chapter considers the roles that the GP and nurse members
undertook in more detail.
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Chapter 7: GP and Nurse Members in Leadership Roles
7.1. Introduction
The policy guidance gave two specific leadership roles to clinical members of
the Board. The first was that the chair should be elected from the GPs and the
second, that the clinical governance agenda should have a named clinician lead.
All the PCGs in this study had OP chairpersons. Nurse members shared the
clinical governance lead with a GP member in six PCGs, as they did in the
majority of PCGs across the country. In addition, the term 'lead role' was used
with the Boards to denote leadership responsibilities for a discrete area of PCG
activity. PCG Board members volunteered or were nominated to act as 'leads'
for particular PCG activities or work streams, to which the Board as a group then
agreed. This chapter examines the leadership roles of the GP and nurse
members, concluding with an examination of the sources of authority for those
roles.
7.2. The GP Members' Roles
All of the GP members reported that their roles were named positions of
leadership. These were named positions on the Board e.g. chairman or vice
chairman, andlor leadership roles on sub committees e.g. chair of the finance
committee. Some of this was a function of the study recruitment strategy,
revised after having difficulties in finding GP members willing to participate.
However, the GP members described multiple lead responsibilities. All of their
areas of lead responsibilities had financial implications for the PCG or a specific
budget e.g. information technology development in general practices:
I have got several roles on the PCG Board. I'm Vice Chair, I'm IT
lead, I'm finance lead and for the moment I'm setting up a project to
looking at how we set up an Ethics Committee. I also oversee the out of
area treatment panel." PCG GP member 19, text units 30- 33
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The PCG Board Minutes provided additional evidence that it was only the GP
members who held lead roles with responsibilities for financial issues. GP
members were recorded as leading or chairing sub-groups with financial
implications in all the PCGs. These sub-groups, which were responsible for
issues with financial implications for the PCG, were discussed and recorded at
every Board meeting of the PCGs. Those Minutes that recorded action points
from agenda items always reported that it was the chief executive, a PCG
manager or a GP member who would act on that item. The smaller executive
groups that developed in some PCGs were reported to comprise of the chief
executive and GP members only. The GP members were therefore visibly in
leadership roles at every meeting.
The PCG Board Minutes recorded that GP members were participating in varied
ways including raising questions, providing information, proposing ideas and
actions and stating their opinions on agenda items. The GP members described
their own roles in ways that indicated they were influential not just through
named lead roles but through leading the direction of ideas in the Board:
"My role? I'll have a bash at it: as an instigator of ideas, a workhorse
because of the lack of infrastructure of the PCG, an innovator. That's
probably about the best of it. And I've tried to be supportive to both the
Chief Executive and the Chair ". PCG GP member 21, text units 26-
29
The GPs members described success in the PCG both in terms of specific
financed developments in general practice but also in terms of the influence they,
as individuals, had had on particular projects or commissioning activities.
7.2.1. Non-active GP Members
Informants in each PCG supported the observation that GP members held
multiple lead roles but were clear it was only a portion of them that were
working like that that:
"We have a policy and finance group, and I'm on that one, and one of the
nurses, 3 doctors and the Chief Executive. And that works really well,
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because again we 'ye got the enthusiastic doctors who are on that group,
who really do a lot of work - one of the them is a clinical governance
lead, one's a proftssional development education training lead and so
on." Lay member 25, text units 157-163
Managers, lay members and nurses described a group of GPs on each PCG
Board who did not actively participate. They reported that some GP members
rarely spoke at meetings, rarely participated in sub—groups and often did not
attend meetings:
"Some of the GPs are so quiet and they don't always turn up. So there's
possibly only really 3 or 4 very vocal, you know, dominant, that's possibly
the wrong word, fairly forward GPs. The others don't get involved in a
lot of stuff They don't really speak around the table". PCG nurse
member 15, text units 197 —201
Some managers, external to the PCG, reported that they worked with PCGs in
which only the GP chairperson appeared to be active. The level of GP non-
attendance was corroborated by the analysis of the Board minutes (Table 10). In
one PCG, there were three examples of meetings that did not have a quorum
through lack of GP members' attendance. The consequence was that no
decisions could be taken at these Board meetings.
PCG	 Maximum number of GPs 	 Minimum number of GPs









Table 10: Attendance at Board meetings by GPs (out of 7-9 GP members)
reported in PCG Board Minutes
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7.3. The Nurse Members' Roles
In contrast to the GP members, none of the nurse members held the named
leadership positions on the Board itself, although some were named as sole or
joint lead for a particular PCG responsibility. One nurse member was the sole
named lead for clinical governance, which was unusual nationally. Another was
a joint lead for clinical governance. A third nurse member reported a joint lead
role for the Health Improvement Programme. The other nurse members reported
that they had lead responsibilities for areas that were not core PCG functions.
These areas did not have significant financial implications for the PCG or
budgets e.g. Caldicott guardianship. Some were participants in sub-committees
that had significant financial responsibilities such as prescribing. However, the
nurse members reported that they were mostly in sub groups linked to clinical
governance, user involvement and education. Nurses were not reported to be
part of the inner executive groups that developed in some PCGs. The sub-
groups that the nurse members were involved in were infrequently recorded in
the Board Minutes. Even clinical governance activities were not recorded in all
Board meetings.
Most of the nurse members reported themselves confused as to what their role
was as a board member, particularly in the initial period. Some of the nurse
members became clearer with time and articulated a corporate role in the Board
business that was of equal standing to other members:
"I have a special interest in nursing obviously but I am there as a full
Board member without any question. With equal voting rights, with equal
rights to decision making as every other Board member. And I take my
full responsibility for the clinical lead, which I have got, which is the
cancer lead. I take full responsibility for my input into the other sub
groups and things like clinical governance and the issues around that,
that are frequently not nursing related at all." PCG nurse member 17,
text units 207-212
Even with the passage of time, other nurse members reported their role was not
one of direct leadership or influence. In general, they seemed to be saying that
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their role was as a conduit for other peoples' views and facilitating a wider
perspective into PCG work. However, there were some nurse members who
could not articulate their role or their contribution on the Board. They obviously
did not view the role as one of leadership:
"The more I'm talking to you the more I feel as though I don 't really
know what the role is. I think that's quite common, it's a new job, isn 't
it?" PCG nurse member 18, text units 170-171
The variety of perceptions of role was reflected in the nurse members' views of
success in the PCG. Most of them described success in terms of their
involvement in increasing communication between the Board and the wider
PCG. Only two discussed their influence in gaining financial resources for
nursing posts and practice nurse education. In two instances, informants in the
same PCG attributed successful leadership activities chaired by nurse members
to other people. In the first instance, a lay member attributed the success of a
clinical governance programme to the driving force of two GPs, despite the fact
that the nurse member was sole lead. In the second, the PCG chief executive
accredited all the achievements in the developing Health Improvement
Programme to her PCG project manager, despite the nurse member having
described in great detail her successful strategies as co-lead member for this
programme.
The Minutes provided further evidence of both the variation in roles and
dissonance in accounts from different sources. The Minutes recorded that there
was always at least one nurse member present at every meeting. However, the
Minutes for three Boards, for the entire year, did not record any contribution
from nurses. Only in one Board was one of the nurse members reported
speaking at every Board meeting. Even the nurses who held named lead
responsibilities for clinical governance were not reported in their Board minutes.
One of the nurse provided some additional evidence of the silence of some nurse
members:
"We have got a brilliant lay member, absolutely fantastic who 's got a lot
of management skills and who really knows how to speak and is
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wonderful. And I take great heart in that. She is worth four of us, who sit
there and say nothing". PCG nurse member 17, text units 178 -180
The Board Minutes reported that the nurse members mainly asked questions.
Unlike the GP members, they were not recorded as suggesting ideas or stating
their opinion. Although the Minutes were presented in a variety of ways, all of
them recorded the views or activities of named GP members at each meeting. It
is not possible to judge whether the Minute writer was responding to an
underlying assumption of the cultural authority of the GPs or whether this was
the reality in each meeting. The impression, however ,was made that nurse
members were not visibly leading or influencing anything. Even when the nurse
members considered their role was to put forward the views of others, there was
no recorded evidence of that activity.
7.4. Perceptions of the Leadership Roles held by Clinical Members
All informants were asked to comment on the statement in the PCG guidance
that; "Doctors and nurses are in the driving seat of the PCGs". The managers
and lay members were unanimous in their views that the GP members held
influential leadership roles in the work of the PCG but that the nurse members
did not. Table Eleven summarises these views overall but each informant group
added some qualifications. These are discussed below, first, in relation to the GP
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7.4.1 The GP Members as Leaders
The managers within the Health Authorities viewed the GP members as the most
influential in leading the work of the PCG. Community Trust managers agreed
with this view but qualified it by observing that in their experience of working
with a number of PCGs some but not all GPs were influential. The PCG chief
executives agreed that the GPs held leadership roles in the PCGs but qualified
this in two ways. Firstly, they noted that there was a national agenda handed
down that limited the opportunity for local leadership. Secondly, they argued that
they, the managers, jointly held a leadership role with the doctors:
"The managers and the doctors drive things. The nurses don 't
contribute. "PCG Chief Executive 36, text units 122.
Some of the PCG chief executives argued that they were instrumental in ensuring
that the GP members undertook leadership roles. They argued that their skill as
chief executive was to ensure that the GPs were actively engaged in the work of
the Board. Some of them seemed to imply that they worked to ensure the
impression was held by the GPs that they were very influential. One chief
executive described some very different methods of working in other local PCGs
that illustrated the difference between the active and inactive GP members:
"When I talk to some of my colleagues, as Chief Executives, they see
themselves as driving things. There are other PCGs even within this
borough, where the GPs have very, very little input into decisions and are
presented with papers that are written by the Chief Executive, or Chief
executives and chairs, and basically just sort of seen through." PCG
Chief Executive 6, text units 86-100
Despite this view, the PCG managers corroborated that some GP members
demonstrated leadership through ideas as well as holding named positions:
I've got quite a lot of experience and have a very experienced
commissioning manager but the GPs have come up with new ideas, which
I don 't think we would have come up with ". PCG Chief Executive 13,
text units 72-75
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The GP members reflected these views to some extent. Those, who were
chairpersons or vice chairpersons, were unequivocal about the leadership role the
GPs performed in the PCG. They particularly pointed to their role in leading the
infrastructure developments to support general practice clinical activities, in
clinical governance activities and commissioning services responsive to general
practice clinical concerns. The other GP members however qualified the extent
of their leadership role. They argued that the work of the PCG was directed by a
central government agenda, pushed forward by the local managers. They
contended that there was little opportunity for any local leadership role:
"No, we've not been in the driving seat. It's this way. Those that can
read the papers pull the shots. A huge effort goes into making managers
do what the central government want them to do. They can 't focus on
local innovation because they are running around in circles doing things
that are being directed from above." PCG GP member 2, text units 33-
39
Some of the GP members observed that while they might be influential in the
decision-making about the PCG activities, the reality was that their PCGs had
few resources to act on those decisions, thus negating a leadership role. Most of
the GP members felt there was an therefore an illusion of leadership:
"Yes, I suppose it is [an experience of doctors being in the driving seat]
except the driving seat has no wheel and no pedals." PCG GP member 9,
text units 112-113
The GP members tended to respond to this area of questioning from the
perspective of the GPs only, although the question was about doctors and nurses.
7.4.2. The Nurse Members as Leaders
In contrast to their views that the GP members were influential, the PCG chief
executives, the managers and the lay members observed that the nurses were not
influential in driving the work of the PCGs:
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"I would have said that it's not very evident that nurses are in the
driving seat, I think that they play generally a much lower key role,
"Health Authority Chief Executive 20, text units 85-87
Informants from different backgrounds, including some GP members, observed
that the nurse members tended to only be interested in PCG business concerned
with their own clinical work area and professional activities. Some of the
managers noted that the nurse members took little active interest in PCG issues
that were outside of that.
Managers from the Community Trusts were quite critical of what they saw as a
lack of any behaviour in nurse members that demonstrated leadership. A
community trust manager declared that even those with joint clinical governance
leads were not leading anything. Rather they were acting more like
"administrative assistants" in data collection for the PCG chief executive or the
lead GP. A different Community Trust manager provided additional evidence
for the lack of contribution by the nurse members at Board meetings:
"I talk to them [the Board nurses], and I say, '[you 're not going to speak
at the meeting, why are you there? I mean, yes, they can get it from
your facial expression. But you have a unique contribution to make and
unless you open your mouth and the words come out, nobody's going to
have the benefit of your wisdom'. And they say, 'yes, we know what
you're saying, and we are trying'." Community Trust Director 5, text
units 390-397
Some of the informants reported that there was an underlying confusion about
the role of the nurse Board members. They observed that the confusion resulted
in nurse Board members themselves taking up very different types of roles within
the Board. They also noted that GP Board members and some PCG managers
believed the Community Trust employed nurses to be representatives of the
Community Trust. This was thought by some managers to further aggravate the
difficulties of the nurse members in finding a role within the Board:
"I think what has been a problem is that nurse representative are
employed within the Community Trust. And there are occasions when
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criticism about Trust services is directed at them. And that's quite
inappropriate really. I think the GPs forget that the nurses are there as
nurses, not the Community Trust. You just have to stop them and say "I
don't think this is actually for either of our nurse members to be
answering, its for the Trust". PCG Chief Executive 13, text units 176-
188
Some of the managers implied the nurse members were reactive to what was
presented to them, rather than proactive with a longer-term view of how primary
care could be improved. However, as one Trust manager pointed out the nurse
members were expected to be clinical nurses and then viewed negatively when
that was the perspective they brought to the Board:
"I think the community nurses struggle because it 's not a role they've
historically been used to. From operational to strategic suddenly
overnight hasn't been easy for some. Some have actually lapped it up.
And what some have brought [is] a fresh breath of inspiration by talking
about, 'Well, I don't know what strategy means, but I'll tell you what my
patients need'. It's a real Godsend, really, so I suppose you can 't have it
both ways". Community Trust Chief Executive 12, text units 140-146
The GP members did not place themselves in juxtaposition to the nurses in
answering these questions. Like the Board Minutes, they tended to not mention
the nurse members. The GP members only discussed the role of the nurse
members when asked directly, not when asked about the role of doctors and
nurses. When the GP Board did comment on the nurse members' contribution,
they were positive:
"We have two nurse members, one of whom is the lead in education and
training the other's a joint clinical governance lead. They make a
valuable input. "PCG GP member 19, text units 144-146
When the nurse members were directly asked, "Were the doctors and nurses in
the driving seat of the PCG?" they invariably responded yes. This was despite the
fact that some of the nurse members had reported themselves quite confused
about their role. The nurses tended to not place qualifications on these answers,
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although those that did reflected the views of the GPs in that PCG i.e. that the
resources were too small to act on the decisions, and that the agenda from central
government was the real driver (Table 11). Most of the nurse members argued
that there was no difference between their roles and that of the GPs on the
Boards. However, some qualified that by noting that there were aspects of the
Board business of more interest to each group with consequent different levels of
activity:
"No, there 's no difference in our [doctors and nurses] roles. Only in that
they can argue stronger for issues that they feel are for them. Anyway,
then we can argue stronger for our issues." PCG nurse member 8, text
units 233-234
The nurse members' presentation of themselves provides another example of
dissonance in accounts between groups of informants about the nurses' role.
7.5. Sources of Authority for GP and Nurse Leadership Roles
The authority for the leadership role of doctors and nurses Board members came
ostensibly from national policy statements. However, as has been demonstrated
above, the policy statement did not translate into local reality. In order to
understand the different experiences, the different sources for authority at the
local level will now be examined.
7.5.1 Representation of Other Clinicians as a Source of Authority
One potential source of authority for the clinical Board members was that
bestowed by their peers through a democratic election to the position as detailed
in section 6.4. The non-clinical members viewed the GPs, in particular, as
representatives of their peers. The GP members did not volunteer that view of
themselves and in fact two categorically refuted it, arguing that was the role of
the LMC:
"I told the Chairman [of the LMC] at the time, he's finished his term
now, I told him 'your view is dfferent than mine'. I told him, 'f I have
any problems in the surgery or as a GP then I will give you a ring and
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ask for your help. But my PCG role is different; I have the responsibility
for the community as a whole But it was not very well received," PCG
GP member 26, text unit 68-69
None of the GP members described themselves as having a constituency of other
GPs to refer to. Instead, some of them argued that it was important to have GPs
on the Board with different types of experience such as a single-handed
practitioner, or belonging to a minority ethnic group or practising in a particular
location. The GP members' view seemed to be that the election process gave
them the authority from their peers to take their place on the Board, it was not
however the source of their authority while participating in Board activities.
In contrast, the nurse members discussed representation of other nurses much
more frequently as a source of authority, although in contradictory terms. They
all argued that they were not representing nurses on the Board but that they were
providing a nursing view on issues:
"As far as I was concerned I was representing a nursing view relating to
patient care and not representing nurses and I had to get that very clear
in my mind." PCG nurse member 32, text unit 186- 188
However, they all described actively developing infrastructures to seek the views
of other nurses in order to represent them to the Board. Most of the nurse
members held open meetings for the nurses working in the PCG. In two PCGs,
the nurse members had also established a formal advisory group of nurses from
different services to help inform their views. The practice nurse member met
with a group of other practice nurses to share and discuss the Board activities.
Two nurse members were clear that they only felt able to put forward views that
had the authority of support from other nurses:
"You have to take the personal element out and you have to make sure
that you are backed up by other people before you speak. You are not
there for individual hobby horses which is why I quite like having a nurse
forum because they bring things up and I can take those to the Board."
PCG nurse member 4, text unit 552-555
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While other Board members recognised that the nurse members were actively
networking with other nurses, it was viewed as a liaison activity not one that
strengthened the nurses' leadership authority:
They 'ye [the nursel worked within their particular remit and set up
nursing liaison meetings which has been more than the GPs have done in
terms of communication with their particular constituency." PCG GP
member 21, text units 202-204
Authority bestowed by peers did not aid nurses to be seen in leadership roles and
was not regarded by GPs as important. The authority derived from expert
knowledge will now be considered.
7.5.2 Expert Knowledge as a Source of Authority
The expert knowledge referred to by informants fell into three types: medical
knowledge, knowledge of the patient experience and knowledge of the business
aspects of health care services. These will be examined in turn.
7.5.2.1. Expert Medical Knowledge
Informants disputed the extent to which the GP members derived authority from
the use of expert medical knowledge. Some informants acknowledged that the
GP members' knowledge and experience of providing medical care within a
local health and social care system was a source of authority that no other
member group had:
"It 'S an absolute eye opener to have the GPs there. To hear how
unhappy the local GPs are, for example with the Mental Health services,
of trying to get support for their patients and referrals for their patients.
You sit there and you really do know you 'ye got the GPs talking to you
about this." PCG lay member 23, text units 195-199.
These informants pointed to particular PCG responsibilities, such as the PCG
role in managing the medicines budget, where the authority of the GP members
was acknowledged as based on expert medical knowledge:
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"Their [the GPs] clinical stuff on prescribing is excellent and they really
take it very seriously and they look in detail at the costs and benefits of
particular drugs and I'm really impressed by the way they do that. They
issue guidance round all the constituent practices, it 's excellent." PCG
lay member 25, text units 302-305
Some nurse members also had knowledge and expertise in prescribing
medicines, which they discussed using within PCG sub-committees. No other
informant discussed their contribution in this arena.
A few informants argued that some GP members drew significant authority for
their leadership roles not just from their clinical knowledge but their detailed
knowledge of the operational systems across all NHS health care and local
authority social care:
"So, you know, f you're looking at the chair, the clinical governance
lead GP, those two individuals and also the vice Chairman, the quality is
incredible. Their knowledge of the NHS, their knowledge of the gaps in
the NHS, their knowledge of how to interplay with Social Services, it's
very much the expert voice ". PCG Chief Executive 6, text units 166-169
In contrast, other informants challenged the use and value of the GPs medical
knowledge in the Board business. Non-clinician informants noted that the Board
discussions rarely touched technical depths that needed medical knowledge and
expertise:
Well, they [GPs] have clinical expertise obviously, but the times when
the level of discussion of clinical issues are such that I struggled to
follow, has been almost non existent, inevitably because that not what
you're doing." PCG lay member 14, text units 322- 325
Non-clinicians pointed out that the GP members' expert knowledge was often
based on very individualised experiences. Consequently, informants were critical
of the individual patient focus of the GPs rather than the population perspective
required for Board work. Their medical experience was therefore accorded less
authority in these situations:
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"So, f that morning they've had a bad experience - it could be anything,
a referral to hospital that's taken three months - than that is the vision
that they bring with them to the Board. It 's not, 'one patient 's wait 's too
long it's 'all patient waiting lists are too long ' So it's very directly
affected by immediate events, and they don't always stop and analyse the
bigger picture." PCG chief executive 6, text units 49- 52
7.5.2.2. Knowledge of the Patient Experience and Health Care Needs
A further disputed aspect of expert knowledge was the authority drawn from
knowledge of the patients' experiences. The GP members pointed to their
everyday clinical interactions with patients as a source of their expertise. They
also argued that their long term commitment and involvement with their practice
population gave them an added expertise in understanding of health needs in the
PCG, in a way that no other group had:
"The other thing is that we as GPs in the main have worked here for
many years and know our practice populations to a dfferent degree. So
that we have seen generations of a family and understand the impact of a
variety of issues for them." PCG GP member 2, text units 79-8 1
Some lay members and managers disputed the extent to which GP members were
able to bring all the service users perspectives to the discussions:
"They [the GPs] don't know about the community much. They don't work
with groups. Perhaps their life has been all face to face, one to one work
And they hold very strongly to the idea that, because of that, they know
what the needs of the community are. And to find out the needs in some
other way seems to them less strong' PCG lay member 34, text units
182 —186.
The nurse members disputed whether the GPs held sole authority through
knowledge of the patient health needs. They argued that nurse members held
knowledge of the patient experience and health needs at least equal to the GP:
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We are meeting patients on a daily basis and see the practical issues
that need overcoming, so I think it's been helpful in the Board". PCG
nurse member 19, text units 79-80
Many of the nurse members were in fact resident and users of services in their
PCG area. None of the GP members implied they were local residents to the
PCG. Despite the nurses' repeated claim for the value of their knowledge, no
other informants mentioned that the nurse members held any form of expert
knowledge either clinical or operational.
7.5.2.3. Knowledge of the Business Aspects of Health Care Provision
The nurse members argued that the difference between themselves and the GPs
was the level of knowledge about commissioning and financial business
management:
"I haven't got that command of the money [i.e. the financial systems] and
I have felt that a disadvantage. And they [the GPs] have that and they
had the fund-holding background as well." PCG nurse member 17, text
units 169- 171.
However, the manager informants disputed GP assumptions of expertise and
therefore authority in all business aspects of primary care. They argued that this
was their area of expertise:
Well, I think the issues have been to do with [GPs as] expert in what!
Certainly in providing the services on the ground, they are experts in that
in their area and certainly in some clinical issues, however, issues like
premises development, they certainly are not expert. A GP may only have
that experience once in a working life-time." Health Authority Director
11, text units 59 —63
The one area of business expertise sought from the nurse members was in the
employment of nurses. However, as mentioned earlier (section 7.3) this was an
expertise the frontline nurse members rarely had.
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The extent of the GP authority to lead in the PCG, based on expert knowledge
was therefore challenged by other member groups on the Board. However, they
were not challenging that the doctors were in lead roles, albeit seen as a shared
lead role by some. The source of authority that the GP members had that no
other group had was their membership of the medical profession and it is this
aspect that will now be discussed.
7.5.3. Membership of the Medical Profession as a Source of Authority
The source of authority that set the GPs apart from other Board members was
their membership of the medical profession, a membership based on expert
knowledge and exclusive rights for many activities. The nature of this authority
had a number of facets, not all of them easily discernible.
7.5.3.1. Cultural Authority
Cultural authority was derived from the social mores of doctors holding higher
status and consequently more authority than other members. In the main, it
formed an almost un- discussed backdrop to the relationships on the Board:
"I was the last one in and Ijoined them in November before we went live
in the April. I've learnt a lot about medical people since then, lets say.
When you are a patient, and I have been a patient of many services, you
tend to look up to the doctor and things like that and you feel more on a
level with the nurses". PCG lay member 1, text units 135- 139
Informants did refer to it obliquely in describing GP members' assumption of
status through behaving in arrogant ways to the other Board members, and in not
letting them speak or not listening to them when they did. GPs were described as
behaving in very egocentric ways that demonstrated their individual status.
Examples were given from many PCGs where every GP was reported to speak
on an item even though they were repeating what other GPs had just said. Other
examples described GP members arriving late at meetings and then interrupting
and hijacking the agenda to discuss their burning issue. However, the underlying
cultural authority of doctors was hard to discern in the empirical data, perhaps
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because many of the informants had long experience of working with doctors and
took it for granted:
"I've spent many years working with GPs. So for those people coming in
from the outside, I guess it would come as quite a shock to work with
people who can be prima-donna-ish at times. And you can understand
why it happens, you know, 'I'll make you better, so I've got this level of
importance'. And you know, the patients are always very grateful and
that does encourage people to behave, you know, as a prima-donna when
things don't go their way." PCG Chief Executive 6, text units 235- 249
The assumption of expert knowledge by the doctors, irrespective of the topic, as
described in section 7.3.2 provides other examples of the expectation of cultural
authority. Despite the fact the managers, the lay members and the nurse members
disputed the claim to expert knowledge in these areas, the implication was that it
was the status of the person who claimed expert knowledge that bestowed
authority rather than the knowledge per Se:
"And the nurses do have this dfJIculty in being able to communicate
their views, over and above GPs." PCG Chief Executive 6, text units 73
7.5.3.2. Authority with Peers
The PCGs had no direct bureaucratic authority over the GPs located within their
geographical areas because the contractual relationship between GPs and the
NHS was negotiated at a national level. In contrast the PCG did have the
authority to directly influence acute and community Trust services and their staff
through the commissioning local service and financial framework agreements
(SAFF5). Nevertheless, items concerned with general practice dominated the
PCG priorities and agenda (section 5.10). Most informants were clear that the
GPs had a unique leadership role, which was to influence other doctors
particularly other GPs. The GP members were seen to have the authority of peer
status through their membership of the medical profession in general and the
occupation of general practice specifically. This belief in the weight of authority
through a peer relationship contrasted with the PCGs' lack of bureaucratic
181
authority to dictate the behaviour of GPs. The GPs themselves were aware of the
value of clinician-to-clinician discussion:
We are looking at stuff that is done in secondary care. So we [the GPs]
are looking at quality issues. It 's always been the Health Authority's
way of doing things as a block contract. 'Here's the money do what you
like with it, as long as you stay in budget, we don't really care' sort of
attitude. We [GPs on the Board] are much more keen on, obviously
keeping in budget, but actually looking at the quality issues involved in
what the hospitals are doing. So we 'ye been talking to the consultants
about the real detailed clinical issues." PCG GP member 29, 74-8 1
The extent to which GPs successfully managed to influence hospital consultants
during the lifetime of the PCGs was very variable. Most of the PCGs repeatedly
recorded in their Board Minutes the difficulties in getting hospital consultants to
address the problems expressed by GPs. This suggested that the consultants did
not necessarily recognise the GPs as peers or that medical peers did not normally
have this type of authority. One nurse member recounted episodes that
illustrated this issue:
"We had quite a lot of meetings with consultants at the [name of hospital]
which was very amusing. Because they would be invited and when they
wanted something they would come along. And they'd sit there, you could
see them thinking, 'I don't know what I'm doing here because they felt
so important ". PCG nurse member 32, text units 578-583
Most of the GPs, the lay members and the managers internal and external to the
Board commented repeatedly on the value of the GP members in addressing and
potentially influencing their peer GPs:
"We've certainly seen the value in clinicians [GPs] talking to clinicians
[GPs]. Talking about service development, about delivery of care, and
in trying to encourage change. They're very good at being able to talk
the same language ". PCG Chief Executive 6, text unit 270-272
Informants presumed that GP peer level conversations gave the issue under
discussion credibility. They also categorically stated GPs would respond to peer
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GPs about issues that they would refuse to discuss with managers or simply
ignore:
"In fact the GP members have been working doing that [promoting the
use of protocols and audit on coronary heart disease to GPsJ and felt that
they had to do it, because the practices will take it better from another
GP than they would from management ". PCG Lay member 23, text unit
109-111
However, the extent to which the GP members saw themselves as either wanting
to influence or having the authority to influence the behaviour of their peer GPs
in PCG practice was disputed. One nurse member commented that her
promotion of clinical governance in the local general practices was successful
because the GPs in the PCG practices did not view it as unwarranted interference
from other GPs. Certainly, there were a number of testimonies to the challenges
faced by the GP members in trying to influence GPs in PCG practices on issues
related to clinical practice:
"I think they [the GP members] got some stick from their colleagues
about various things, particularly around prescribing I think.........I
went to afew of their meetings with local GPs - they got some stick The
first thing the clinical governance group did was an infection control
audit and they got a lot of stick about that. The issue around sterilizers
and equipment costs and how to replace out dated equipment and whose
going to pay for it and so on and so forth. I don't think they have a
particularly easy ride with their peers." PCG Lay member 34, text units
365- 374
Similar difficulties were reported when GP members promoted changes to the
contractual relationship between GPs and the NHS:
Nearly all our practices have gone on to PMS [primary medical
services] this year. So that was actually very interesting, because there
was lots of anxiety about the contract. So that was quite rocky actually
for the GP members, who drove that through with their colleagues
really". Chief Executive PCG 38, text units 309-3 14
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One PCG chief executive was very clear that the GP members in her experience
actively avoided having to confront their peer GPs in PCG practices about any
issues, but particularly related to poor clinical practice. She was adamant that in
her experience the GP members defended the rights of general practitioners to
remain independent of collective and peer influence:
"There were GP members, who were LMC members, who did not want
to deal with the quality issues in primary care and poorly performing
GPs. And that was because they had been involved in defending those
same crap GPs to the end just because they were GPs and nothing else."
PCG Chief Executive 39, text units 57-60
No informant discussed a leadership role for nurse members in influencing
nurses or general practitioners working in the PCG area.
7.6. Anatomy of the Leadership Roles of GP and Nurse Members
The empirical evidence supports the study proposition (section 5.2.1) that only
the GP members would be viewed as influential in leading the work of the PCG.
The GP members agreed that they were in leadership roles, particularly those in
named positions on the Board. However, they were also aware that their
leadership role was constrained and to some extent illusory because the NHS
corporate body dictated the agenda and its out-posted officials determined the
priorities. In identifying this issue, they revealed a multiplicity of tensions:
• Between central and local policy decision making in a state financed
service (Hill 1997)
• Between professionals and managers in bureaucratic organisations as
suggested within theories of conflict (Parsons 1954)
• Between dominant and challenging interest groups in the decision
making process (Alford 1975)
Unlike other studies exploring doctor -manager relations in decision-making, this
study focused solely on GPs who worked in independent businesses, semi-
detached from the corporate NHS. Informants provided examples of GP Board
members who remained semi-detached from the PCG, not engaging or interested
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in a leadership role and therefore not experiencing all of these tensions. They
exhibited the behaviours identified by Ashburner (1993a) and described by
Ranadé as 'back bench' board members (Ranadé 1986). Backbenchers were
reported to only engage in the topic areas concerned with their own interests and
for the most part kept a watching brief over those interests in the Board. This
study did not interview any GP Board members who were not active and further
investigation would be needed to test whether that was how they saw their role in
the PCGs.
In contrast the nurse members were not viewed as leaders although they
themselves declared they had an equal leadership role with the doctors. They
provided contradictory and sometimes confused views. While some of the nurse
members could articulate a corporate role on the Board, most had difficulty
reporting a role in which they led or significantly influenced ideas and decisions.
Even when they did claim influential roles, these were attributed elsewhere by
other informants.
Parsons suggested that the professionals drew their source of authority from their
specialised, expert knowledge, not their place in a bureaucratic hierarchy
(Parsons 1954). Informants supplied some examples of where the GP members
were drawing on expert medical knowledge. However, the medical claim to be
sole holders of knowledge was challenged by other groups. The experience of
the nurse members was that it was not the knowledge but the status of the
'knowledge holder' that gave authority. The nurse members were further
challenged in their claims of expert knowledge, in that other Board members
expected them to be expert in the employment, services and management of a
nursing workforce. By virtue of their position in the bureaucracy of a
Community Trust or in general practice, this was knowledge they did not have.
While other Board members laid claim to aspects of the GPs knowledge, only the
GPs held the cultural authority that membership of the medical profession gave
them. Medical profession membership provided them with another potential
form of authority: that of the authority of a peer relationship to other members of
the medical profession. Managers and lay members viewed this as the most
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significant element of the leadership role of the GPs in the PCGs. The GP
members themselves had mixed and ambivalent views about the extent to which
they wanted to use that authority to influence other doctors or promote the
interests of the corporate NHS agenda. There were obviously those who were
keen to use it when it chimed with general practice interests to try and influence
hospital medical practices.
Some GP members were engaging with issues from the corporate NHS agenda.
In this they displayed characteristics of "boundary spanners" between general
practice and NHS corporate managers i.e. pivotal actors in the management of
inter-organisational relationships who operate as cultural brokers between
different groups (Williams 2002). However, the extent to which they were
prepared to use their peer authority with other GPs in promoting the NHS
management agenda was questionable. Observations were made that the GP
members were working with practices interested in change not those reluctant to
change. The example of the practice nurse Board member leading on issues of
clinical governance suggests that there was reluctance for GPs to allow other
GPs' influence in their practice. This issue was identified previously when the
Medical Audit Advisory Groups had to use facilitators other than GPs to try to
establish elements of quality assurance in local practices (Humphrey and Berrow
1993). There was also evidence in this study that GP members actively opposed
any engagement designed to influence other GPs or make judgements on their
professional practice. Meads has suggested that GPs in some PCGs acted
primarily as a defence union (Meads et al 2000). In one PCG in this study the
GP members used their peer relationship not to promote the corporate NHS
agenda but to display peer solidarity and block it. The evidence in this chapter
provides an insight into aspects of the relationships between doctors and
managers, and between dominant and challenging interest groups. These will be
explored further in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8: Challenges to the Leadership Roles for GP members
8.1. Introduction
The GPs had structured support for their leadership role in the PCGs. The
central policy gave them the majority of places, the named leadership positions
and the development of primary care as a prime objective. However, as the
previous chapter demonstrated, the GPs members argued that facets of the
leadership role were illusory and other informants described an ambivalence to a
leadership role amongst the GPs . This chapter explores these complexities in
more detail, examining first of all the relationship between the GPs and then
between GPs and managers.
8.2. Relationships between General Practitioners
Informants from all PCGs reported that the influential role of some Board GPs
did not go unchallenged by other Board GPs or GPs in the wider PCG. GP
members themselves reflected on their own occupational culture and pointed out
that each GP was likely to hold different opinions from the next. They tended to
describe this as resulting in spirited discussions. The other informants reported
witnessing very acrimonious disagreements between GPs, to the point of
physical exchange on one occasion:
"Well, there have been those meetings [non public Board meetings]
where the boys 'ye [GP members] really gone for each other. There was
one [meeting] where two of them were squaring up to throw punches
even. Yeah, really! " PCG nurse Member, 3, text units 5 60-563
One male GP member noted that the female GP chairperson had reduced the
amount of open conflict between GPs on the Board in comparison to the all male
local LMC. Half the Boards had no women GPs as members and they were in the
minority on the others.
187
There appeared to be three sources of tensions. The first source stemmed from
differing political attitudes to the N}iS. The second source derived from different
attitudes to a population perspective as opposed to a GP practice perspective.
The third source lay in the competing business interests between individual
general practices.
8.2.1 Past Involvement in Commissioning as a Source of Tension
PCGs were instigated following a period of experimentation with greater GP
involvement in commissioning both with and without fundholding mechanisms.
The use, or not, of these mechanisms was often portrayed by informants as an
ideological decision about the concept of an internal market in a public service.
The result was that different groups of GPs were involved in different forms of
commissioning that stemmed to some extent from their political beliefs. The
advent of the PCGs meant that GPs from these former factions came together in
often uneasy groupings:
"There was a fund holding [GP] consortium and a commissioning group
of non fund-holders [GPs], two distinct groups which joined together [to
form the PCG], so there was certainly degrees of suspicion between the
d/jerent groups at the start, but I think those have gradually been
resolved." PCG GP member 29, text units 116-120
The situation was not helped by the fact that one of early tasks of the PCG was to
disaggregate services purchased previously only by fundholding GPs, such as
practice counsellors, and broaden the access to these for other practice
populations.
We managed to inherit physiotherapists from fund holding and then
extend it to be available to eveiybody ". PCG GP member 19, text unit
156
Many fundholding practices saw reductions in levels of access to these types of
services for their particular practice patients. Informants reported a variable
impact on general practitioner relationships following this process.
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8.2.2 Population Perspectives as a Source of Tension
General practice has an occupational culture that concerns itself only with the
individual practice and the patients registered to that practice. General
practitioners traditionally have had no inclination to concern themselves with any
other practice or patients. This aspect of its culture is derived directly from the
fact that each practice is a stand-alone business. Some GP members noted that
during the period prior to the inception of the PCG there had begun to be small
changes to this culture. The concept of practices working collaboratively to
provide out of hours services and in multi-funds meant that looking outward
from a practice was not such an alien concept. However, some GP members had
shifted further in their willingness to engage with a wider population and service
needs than many of their peers and indeed practice partners. The GP members
pointed to the resulting tensions:
"I felt personally that I am there as the Chairman of the Board and I am
responsible for all the residents of the geographical area and responsible
for the entire population of the area. I had been working like that. So I
had some problems there as well from the LMC, as nobody wanted to
accept my way of thinking". PCG GP member 26, text units 44-52
This different orientation was reported to cause tensions not just with the wider
community of GPs but also with partners in a practice:
There was a schism between the perception of the medical world that I
have and the perception that my partners have. And that brings friction
into the practice without a doubt. I would have a view of something which
is totally foreign to them at various times." PCG GP member, 9, text
units 174-179,
This GP member noted that his involvement in the PCG had also helped his
practice partners become more outward looking from the practice than
previously. Others noted, however, that a PCG population wide perspective
could increase antipathy between practices as it often revealed the level of
inequity of resources between practices such as Health Authority subsidised
practice staff and Community Trust attached nursing staff.
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8.23 The Business of General Practice as a Source of Tension
General practices in each PCG, as independent businesses, were in competition
with each other for patient registration and other financial and service support
opportunities from the wider NHS. Some informants noted that Board GPs were
viewed by other GPs in the PCG practices as gaining advantage as a direct result
of their position. They were not viewed as altruistic representatives of general
practice but as there to further their own practice interests to the detriment of
other practices:
"Ipicked up a lot ofanxiety from GPs in other practices, who are not on
the Board, about the role of the Board. 'And what are these people doing
there and were they just feathering their own nests?' and so on." PCG
lay Board member 14, text units 2 89-292
Indeed, some of the GP members were clear that their original motivation to be
Board members was both to help improve primary health care in the widest sense
and also ensure their own practice did not miss any opportunity:
" I think both myself and my partners felt that there ought to be
representation of the practice there. And the practice is a relatively large
one and so it is our duty in a way." PCG GP member 9, text units 14- 16
One Health Authority Director highlighted the problem of how GP members
were viewed as benefiting by other GPs. But he also noted that the GP members
came from practices that were more willing to volunteer for new developments
compared to others. The potential for conflicts of interest were significant as the
GP members were being asked to make decisions about the allocation of public
funds in which they sometimes had a vested interest. These decisions ranged
from finance for new developments specifically in general practices, the
allocation of the ancillary staff budget to general practices, the provision of
therapy and nursing services to general practice and primary care, and to
decisions about practice vacancies. One lay member observed how unaware the
GPs members had been of their own potential conflicts of interest:
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When a single handed practice became vacant, we were asked to
recommend what should happen to that practice. Either recruit a single
hander, or have it taken over by a neighbouring practice or whatever.
And I said, four of you here have got conflicts of interest. You might
want to take it over. You might want to prevent somebody else from
taking it over. You might not want a competent single hander because
that might draw patients away from you. So none ofyou lot can vote, it's
left to the non-clinical people to decide'. And that was quite interesting, I
think it was the first time they had come across in governance terms the
real signflcance of conflicts of interests". PCG lay member 25, text
units 208-219
Two of the PCG chief executives indicated that principles for dealing with GP
members' conflicts of interest in particular Board decisions had been established
in prior organisations such as multi-funds. These principles, they stated, had
been carried forward into the PCG. However, it was not clear how long it took
other PCGs to clarify their principles for dealing with conflicts of interests.
Analysis of the Board minutes found only one example in which a potential
conflict of interests of GP members was recorded. In this, GP members were
excluded from a decision on allocating additional project funds to general
practices.
The relationship of the GP members with the LMC highlighted another aspect of
this conflict of interest. Informants in some PCGs reported that the LMC were
very concerned that the Board members did not usurp their role of representing
general practitioners and their interests with the wider health service. In one
area, it was reported that the GP members had come into conflict with the LMC
for not ensuring wider consultation with GPs on PCG decisions. One GP
member reported that the LMC had a very particular view of whose interests the
Board GPs should represent, which he did not necessarily agree with:
"The LMC has been in existence for 89 years, and since the LMC started
they always had the role as the GPs voice. They felt that the GPs elected
for the PCGs should be more interested in GPs than anything else. In
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other words, 'f there is anything that could be found in favour of GPs
you should fight the Board and get it That was not my concept [of my
role] ". PCG GP member 26, text unit 67
In all the PCGs, some GP members were reported to also be LMC members.
One lay member speculated on the extent of the influence of the LMC in the
PCG through the GPs with a seat in both places:
"There are a group of people at the heart of this LMC who were very
instrumental in setting up the PCGs in this area. And it means that there
is very rarely an issue where the PCG and the LMC are in conflict. I have
never understood how far it means that it 's all fixed beforehand. I mean,
how far the real agenda is set in the LMC and is represented by these
particular GPs as they function in the PCG". PCG lay Board member
14, text units 505-5 16
These types of tensions were not described between the nurses on the Board or
with nurses outside the Board. All the nurses were employees; no reference was
made to any nurse as a partner in a general practice business, or the relationship
between them, the PCG and the nursing unions.
8.3. Relationships between General Practitioners and Managers
While there was tension between some GPs and a questioning of the role of GP
members as leaders, this was insignificant in comparison to the level of tensions
in the relationship with managers.
There was evidence of a generalised animosity from the GPs towards managers.
Informants reported that GPs tended to have an underlying negative attitude
towards NHS management:
"I think amongst GPs it's a certain kind of distrust is too strong, underlying
thing about management generally. Its not actually about the staff in the
Trust, they get on well with the actual staff I think it's more about a
management thing. I think there 's probably distrust of Health Authority staff
as well." PCG lay member 23, text units 398-401
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There appeared to be a difference in the type of relationship between the GPs and
the PCG managers and those with other NHS managers. This section considers
first of all the relationship with the managers in the Health Authorities and the
Community Trusts and then those with the managers in the PCGs themselves.
8.3.1 The Relationships between GPs and Managers in Health Authorities
and Community Trusts
The greatest negativity, and on occasion hostility, from the GPs was reserved for
managers in the Health Authorities. Board GPs in all four Health Authorities
described health authority managers in pejorative tones, using words like;
authoritarian", "hierarchical", "autocratic" and "obstructive". They also used
language illustrative of conflict such as 'wrestle' and 'battle' to describe their
relationships with the Health Authority and its managers. A Director in one
Health noted the antipathy to the Health Authority:
"The GPs certainly came on the [PCG] Board with the expectation that
they were the knowledge holders and should develop primary care both
at the micro level and at a more macro level of across the board. There
was a point where they really were very unhappy that the Health
Authority should have any interest or involvement in primary care
development. It was really contentious." Health Authority Director 11,
text units 70- 78
Many of the GP members attributed the PCG's slow progress and the lack of
visible success directly to the Health Authority's bureaucratic behaviours:
Unfortunately, our Health Authority is a very hierarchical body which
has constantly I think, interfered and slowed down the development of the
PCGs in a rather negative way". PCG GP member 9, text units 31-34
The bureaucratic nature of the NHS was a source of deep antipathy for the GP
members. However, the senior managers in the Health Authority portrayed
themselves as behaving in a rational manner and saw the problems arising
within and between the PCGs:
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"It took some months for us to agree how to devolve the Health Authority
staff and funding to the PCGs. And we had a particular problem here
because we have got X PCGs and we couldn't divide people in X way.
And so it took time for the PCGs to agree to work with each other on a
Borough basis and as soon as they got to that point then we were able to
devolve to each PCG". Health Authority Chief Executive 20, text units
16-2 1
Some of the GP members' hostility to the Health Authority managers was a
result of their recognition that they were dealing with bureaucrats in the lower
echelons of the NHS while decisions were made in the higher echelons:
When we were in the multi-fund we were autonomous, with decisions
straight from ministerial level. Now it is all incredibly bureaucratic,
filtered through the different levels of the NHS. We do not see the minister
directly. So everything has to dribble from the bureaucratic lead and we
wait with baited breath for it to dribble its way down to the local Health
Authority, who sit there waiting for edicts from on high." PCG GP
member 2, text units 25 —29
The antipathy to working with the lower levels of the NHS was demonstrated in
other PCGs where the GP chairperson led members to try and out-manoeuvre the
Health Authority by lobbying local MPs and making direct contact with the NHS
Executive:
"We [the PCG] are constantly having to write to John Denham [Health
Minister at the time] and they [the Health Authority] are constantly
writing to John Denham and we both get letters back saying different
things. So an example of that is that we are going into Trust status. We
had thought the government would not countenance a Trust of more than
about 300,000. Now we are being told by the Health Authority, actually
you have got it all wrong and they can produce a letter, which says, 'the
government probably will let us do that'. And we can produce a letter
which says, ' the government officers say you can't do that'." PCG
nurse member 4, text units 322 -330
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In another PCG, the Minutes of each meeting during 2001 documented in detail
GP members' concern and then stronger negative feelings at, first of all, the
Health Authority's slowness in making decisions about devolving budgets and
staff to the PCG and then, changing that decision to reduced amounts.
Despite the Health Authority Directors presentation of themselves as acting in a
logical and rationale manner, informants from the PCGs could give a number of
examples that indicated a general reluctance to support the PCGs:
"We have not had support from the Health Authority at all. And I think it
was summed up when a senior person from the Health Authority came to
speak to us at our last Board. And he was saying they would not support
our move to go from PCG to Trust status because, 'it's going to fail'.
And 'why do you say it is going to fail?' we asked. ' Well, you are going
to fail because we don't support you '!" PCG lay member 23, text units
362-366
Some of the GP members also described the managers of the Community Trusts
in pejorative terms. They were less combative in their language than about the
Health Authority managers but many of them used negative terms such as
"unresponsive", "incompetent" and "awful". These GP members described the
Community Trust managers as members of large bureaucracies that were
inflexible to the needs of the general practices and their patients:
"Negotiations with the Community Trust over an integrated nurse team
pilot is another example. Again the problem is the bureaucracy, it's
NeanderthaL The Community Trust, it's a huge organisation and you
shift the rudder and you don 't get any change in direction for a long
time". PCG GP member 9, text units 147-165
The Community Trusts managers reported that many GP members treated them
with suspicion, anticipating that the Community Trust was attempting to
influence or run the PCG. Community Trust managers recounted that their offers
of resources, premises and to attend PCG meetings had been refused and
examples of the rejection of such offers were found documented in Board
Minutes.
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Some informants presented the hostility to managers in both organisations as the
residue from a long history of poor relationships with successive managers and a
history of lack of investment in primary care development. One PCG chief
executive reported GP members contrasting their long term investment in a local
practice against the short term commitment with no results by successive
managers:
"The thing that doctors find, you must have heard them saying this, they
bring a continuity of experience. They will have been there for years and
years some of them. What they don't like is the constant organisational
change for which they see no benefit. It destroys the relationship. They
have a constant throughput of new people who come asking the same
questions again and again and deliver nothing and move on. And that's
their experience of health service management." PCG Chief Executive
38, text units 268 -277
One lay member observed that the GP members perceived Health Authority
managers to repeatedly block their clinical autonomy through denial of access to
finance:
"The GPs see the Health Authority managers as obstructive. They have
worked together before a lot, haven't they? So they do have those
barriers, that feeling that they [the GPs] are there doing all this work and
that they are constantly being frustrated in what they are doing by
managers saying "no we can't pay you for that" or "you cannot do that'
and 'you must not use that drug' and 'we are not going to authorise that'
or 'we are not going to commission this". PCG lay member 23, text
units 414 - 420
However, it is not clear whether these tensions became outright conflict through
the work of the Board. Only two documented examples of resistance to the
Health Authority were found. One PCG Board recorded in its Minutes their
refusal to agree to a Health Authority decision prohibiting the prescription of
particular expensive medications. Another PCG documented their decision not
to contribute further to the development of a Health Improvement Plan because
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there were no resources allocated to achieving the plan. In two of these PCGs,
informants reported that the PCG had demanded and been given, despite
resistance, symbolically important Community Trust buildings as their
Headquarters.
There were certainly no examples of managers initiating or describing
themselves in particularly adversarial terms towards the GPs. The Health
Authority managers tended to describe the GPs in terms of one group amongst
many to work with. Two of the Health Authority managers described the
establishment of GP led PCGs as part of a longer term, non-adversarial,
government policy to change how primary care services were delivered. In
particular, they interpreted the GP involvement in the PCGs as a mechanism to
reduce the resistance to the incorporation of general practitioners in the wider
NHS:
This and the PCTs has been about buying off the GPs and keeping
them on board, because actually we do need to get GPs in ten years time
into a dfferent place. " Health Authority Chief Executive 30, text units
246-248:
Similarly the Community Trust managers described themselves as actively
placating the GPs in order to be able to collaborate:
But in one PCG [of four covered by the Community Trust], the
associate director has managed to befriend them. But I think maybe
because she adopts a non-threatening stance. And she doesn't challenge
them when they represent a different recall of incidence or events ".
Community Trust Chief Executive 5, text units 309- 314.
This is not to say that managers did not reciprocate some of the animosity
expressed by the GPs:
"Those managers [in the Health Authority] were dismissive and rude
about the behaviour and attitudes and style of GPs, particularly the
people who were on the Board at the time ". PCG Chief Executive 39,
text units 313 —315
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8.3.2. Relationships between the GPs and PCG Managers
In contrast to their attitude to the Health Authority and Community Trust
managers, the GP members' attitude towards the PCG chief executives was very
positive:
Our chief executive is excellent. We could not have a better person -
with his help and guidance and with the full support of the Board, Ifeel
that we have done a good job". PCG GP member 26, text unit 28
They saw these managers as 'their' managers who helped them implement their
decisions. The GP members described the good relations with their chief
executives as deriving explicitly from them not having Health Authority
management backgrounds:
"Working with our chief executive hasn 't been a problem. He 'd been
involved in fund holding and overseen lots offunds. So he 'd been used to
dealing with clinicians and working with them in a setting, which was led
by clinicians again in a direct way. He hasn 't got a health authority
background." PCG GP member 19, text units 131 —134.
The separation the GP members saw between the wider NHS and the PCGs was
underlined b,' one GP member who described their chief executive, having
worked briefly in a NHSE Regional Office, as "leaving the NHS" to return to
work in primary care. The PCG chief executives agreed that it was their
backgrounds in working with general practitioners that made the GP members
view them differently to other managers:
"They [the GPs] saw me as one of them because I came from a Primary
Care background as a general practice manager. I understood their
issues, I'd been around for a long time and I definitely hadn 't been a
NHS career manager". PCG Chief Executive 39, text units 90- 93.
The PCG chief executives described themselves as actively working to ensure
they had co-operative relationships with their GP members, particularly the
chairperson. They pointed out that their skill was to manage the Board so that
conflicts did not occur either with themselves or the Health Authority. One
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example given was by the PCG chief executive who was unable to engage the
GP members in addressing poorly performing GPs in the PCG. Rather than
engage in open conflict, she worked with public health doctors outside of the
PCG to address the issues. She then reported to the Board the PCG success in
improving local GP practice provision. Interestingly the presentation of this
success was such that the lay member of that PCG attributed the success to the
GP members:
"I think the [Board] GPs were really serious. Interestingly, they saw it
[the PCG] as a way of dealing with these issues that people have known
were aroundfor a long while. There was one particular practice that the
public was complaining about for many years. And they just moved in
and they had eveiybody in, the tax inspectors, the health and safety
inspectors they just brought in the lot and the place has been
transformed. It 's extraordinary. But they weren 't afraid to tackle that. I
was pleased with the way that they were willing to get their hands dirty ".
PCG lay member 34, text units 262- 271
8.4. The Sources of Tension between GPs and Managers
The GPs and the managers attributed the origin of uneasy relations between the
two groups in very different ways but both found the source in the occupational
culture of the other. This section will consider the issues first from the GPs'
perspective and then from the managers.
8.4.1 The GPs' Perspective on the Sources of Tension
The GP members contended that orientation of managers was the source of the
tension. They contrasted their own concern with the needs of local patients to
the managers' concern with the needs of the NHS as an organisation. They
pointed to their long-term commitment to a practice population as of greater
worth than the short term commitment of the managers to an area. They saw their
interest in patient level clinical issues as of greater local importance than the
managers' focus on the interests of the NHS corporate bureaucracy. One GP
member illustrated this in an example over cervical cytology screening rates:
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"So what they [the Health Authority managers] are doing is saying is
'well the easiest way of increasing the figures is by looking at list
inflation and fyou can get ghost [i.e. still on the practice list of patients
but has moved away or died] women off the list, then we increase the
target figure for the Department of Health and we are seen as being OK
But the clinical view is that is a waste of time. We should be looking at:
what is the local death rate? What is the local rate of colposcopies? How
are we going to reduce those? And not how are we going to fred some
government department by producing an art JIcial increase in the
figures." PCG GP member 9, text units 50-65
The GP members repeatedly argued that the managers were concerned with
addressing the policy imperatives from higher in the bureaucracy, including re-
organising the lower levels of the bureaucracy, and this left no space to address
local issues:
"A huge effort goes into making managers do what the central
government want them to do. They are exhausted. They can 't focus on
local innovation because they are running around in circles doing things
that are being directed from above". PCG GP member 2, text 34-38
The GP members described the managers as interested in the process of
bureaucracy, and contrasted this with their own action and outcome orientation.
Lay members and GPs from every PCG reported that Board GPs had resigned
because of the lack of tangible progress in the PCG. Some Board GPs presented
themselves and their work on the PCGs as the only element that had made any
difference in contrast to the managerial processes:
"Ifyou said to me "what has the patient actually noticed, because of the
PCG?" Absolutely nothing! I've been able get some resources into the
practices with a couple of schemes for governance, but that's only
because I've worked hard within our PCG. The other PCGs haven't
managed to get anything through the Health Authority. " PCG GP
member 21, text units 74-79
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Most of the GP members described success in terms of achieving funding for
specific developments in general practice such as a funded general practitioner
and practice staff education programme, improved IT connections for general
practice, levelling up of practice staff funding between practices.
8.4.2 The Managers' Perception on the Source of Tension
The managers, like the GPs, pointed to the differences in occupational cultures as
the major source of tension. They observed, however, that the GPs exhibited not
one but two occupational cultures: 1) that of general practice as a small
independent business and 2) that of the profession of medicine.
8.4.2.1. The Occupational Culture of General Practice as Independent
Contractor
The culture of general practice as an independent business was the element that
the managers argued gave rise to the greatest tension. They commented that it
set the general practitioners apart from the NHS managers, and for that matter,
from the majority of professionals delivering services within the NHS. The
managers argued that the GPs brought their occupational independence into the
PCG work and refused to concede that it was part of the large corporate
bureaucracy:
"Within the PCGs, the GPs debate for a month whether they are going to
accept the policy handed down from the centre or not. And this is just
wasting time, because at the end of the day they have no choice. The GPs
challenge that view and don't necessarily accept that they are part of the
NHS as a whole ".
	 Health Authority Director 11, text units 78- 87
The managers were united in contrasting the GPs as involved in small
businesses with themselves as involved in a large business. Managers pointed out
that general practice as a business rarely employed managers as executives. This
lack of comprehension created initial tension in those PCGs with management
teams and certainly underscored hostilities to the Health Authority:
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GPs are small organisations, very small organisations. They have to
run it as a small business. But in terms of the NHS, it's organ isational
cultures and structures, they are generally quite a long way away from
that larger organisational disczpline ". PCG Chief Executive 38, text
units 57-67
The PCG chief executives argued that many Health Authority managers held
themselves to have the moral high ground because they saw the GPs as
motivated only by their own income, not the needs of the patients:
You had NHS managers, who as soon as you mentioned GPs and
money in the same breath, smirked. What that showed was that they were
salaried, they didn't understand the way the GPs constantly emphasised
reimbursement and money. And that was because they didn't understand
the GPs were running a business ' PCG Chief Executive 39, text units
338
The GPs themselves were aware that their business culture set them apart
although it was not the culture they chose to highlight in the interviews:
"The GP Chair of our PCG was the one GP wheeled out to talk to
prospective lay members. And the very first thing she said is, 'None of
you will know this but GPs are small businessmen running their
businesses in competition with each other And I kind of looked and I
think we all did and that was a tiny taste of what was to come in terms of
a kind of commercial culture that I still find mind boggling". PCG lay
member 14, text units 95-101
One lay member observed that the GPs had a frame of reference that was more
akin to that of "accountants and lawyers not other proftssionals working in the
public service" PCG Lay member 14, text units 119-122.
Managers argued that a direct consequence of the business culture was that GPs
viewed each issue in terms of their own practice first and foremost:
"I think there's still very much a tendency for GP members, who are
effectively small businessmen, to view everything that you present from a
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point of view of how does it effect me. So the decision is driven, not by
the policy itself but by the effect and impact it will have on them as a
business person." PCG Chief Executive 6, text units 18-22.
Managers pointed out that the independent nature of each practice meant that
many GP members found it completely alien to develop a collective sense of
responsibility for primary care services. PCG chief executives pointed to
examples of GP members disowning any involvement in Board decisions when
challenged by other GPs in the PCGs.
8.4.2.2. The Occupational Culture of Medicine
The managers argued that decision making processes were completely different
between managers and GPs and this led to significant friction. Their occupational
culture was for maximum consultation and involvement, usually through written
papers, before group decision making. This was a practice that many of the GPs
found problematic:
"Doctors are used to being quite autonomous in their decision making
process and so on. They are used to taking the can for everything, being
the last resort in terms of responsibility and they do feel that very
strongly. And how ever much people say,' no, its a team decision now
they don't believe it. That's not what they have been brought up with and
they don't believe it". PCG Chief Executive 38, Text 437-442
Conversely, the action orientated attitude of medicine challenged the managers:
"GPs are not very keen on talking about things. They are very keen on
actually doing service development. So that has been a bit of a cultural
challenge to stop talking about things and get on and deliver."
Community Trust Chief Executive 12, text units 50-54
GPs did not necessarily see the need to establish the Board as a co-operative
decision making group, whereas managers emphasised this as an important first
task. The medium for transfer of information for managers was written reports
and memoranda: the GPs preferred oral methods. One of the GP members
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recognised this difference between the occupational groups arguing, " he who
reads the papers calls the shots". Attention to the process of decision making
meant that the managers had formal, but unwritten, rules of behaviour in
meetings that the GPs were considered to not comply with. They pointed to
infringements such as: the GP chairperson failed to control the other GP
members' contributions, the GP members ignored the chairperson and the
agenda, and that they broke into separate, simultaneous discussions and
interrupted other speakers.
"The GPs don 't know about the way of chairing meetings and knowing
what level of detail to allow the discussion to get into before you tiy and
draw it to a close. I suppose managers take that for grante4 they are not
skills you fall into naturally". Health Authority Chief Executive 20, text
units 172-174
In contrast, most of the GP members drew attention to the skill of the GP
chairperson of their Board in facilitating involvement from all Board members.
8.4.2.3. Racism in the Tensions between Managers and GPs
One further issue was mentioned by only two managers but is worthy of note.
They argued that racism played a significant role in the attitudes of some white
NETS managers towards GPs from black or minority ethnic groups. They both
noted that GPs from black and minority ethnic groups were often grouped in
particular geographical areas and were often over represented in running single
handed practices. One argued that the disdain that NHS managers expressed
for GPs was particularly reserved for those from black and minority ethnic
groups, although she also highlighted issues related to the professional
hierarchies in medicine:
"The [Health Authority] managers found it very frustrating to be along
side GPs because they did not act like managers. And it brought up into
quite stark relief the fact that it was still inbred, certainly in this part of
the world, quite strong feelings about, which I would go as far as to say,
some people were racially motivated and in it was a kind of class thing.
They thought that the people who make the decisions are not the people
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at the bottom pecking order of the health professional hierarchy. So more
sway was given to a very senior consultant in neuro-surgery, whereas,
the GP was not seen to have that kind of standing ". PCG Chief
Executive 39, text units 39-42
The issue of race overlapped with issues of antipathy to single handed general
practices expressed in the NHS Plan. A number of the Board GPs commented
on what they believed was an unwarranted wholesale criticism of single-handed
practice. One manager reported that many GPs from minority ethnic groups had
argued that the plans to reduce single GP practices with General Medical Service
contracts was a form of institutional racism:
X PCG, it's a deprived population, very high ethnic mix, 70% single
handed practitioners, they have poor facilities to work with. Compared
to the other PCGs they feel like a poor relation not having money, feeling
like they've never really been supported to change things in the past by
the Health Authority. And now they are arguing that the National Plan is
racist, because its talking about a big percentage of single handed
practitioners being in PMS contracts. And they are saying, 'lots of Asian
doctors are single handed practitioners in cities. It 's racist, they are
targeting us in particular'. So I think they feel the establishment is
constantly getting at them ". Community Trust Director 20, text units
175-18 1
The GP participation in PCG Boards brought involvement from some groups in
the medical profession that were not usually so visible in decision making
bodies. A lay member specifically commented that after years of sitting on
different types of committees concerned with health in her Borough, the PCG
was the first where the membership represented to some extent the local
population both in sex and ethnicity:
"Its the only health body I've been on that wasn't totally dominated by
white men. Ifound that very refreshing it was like walking into a normal
(PCG area) gathering. ." PCG Lay member 34, 234-236
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8.5. The Role of the PCG Chief Executives
The PCG chief executives tended to report themselves as managing the fracture
lines between the occupational cultures of the GPs and the NHS managers so that
they could work to the imperatives of both groups. One PCG chief executive
argued that there was no culture clash between the Board GPs and the Health
Authority managers because both she and her managers actively worked to
ensure it could not happen. Another argued that she ensured that she adapted to
the culture of the GPs so there was minimal use of written papers at the Board.
Interestingly, the Board Minutes of this Chief Executive's PCG demonstrated
that there were supplementary papers and reports to nearly every agenda item.
Perhaps this demonstrated a public presentation of events to the Health Authority
rather than the actual activities of Board participants or perhaps the reality was
different from her recall. Some PCG Chief Executives indicated that trying to
manage the cultural gulf between the two groups could be difficult and they were
often accused of having divided loyalties. They reported pejorative comments
made to them by individual GPs in "turning into a Health Authority manager"
and conversely having their "knuckles rapped by the Health Authority when the
GPs were taking issues outside the Health Authority "i.e. outside the formal lines
of the bureaucracy. Where the interviews with PCG Chief Executives were close
to the establishment of the PCT, they contrasted their own attitudes to working
with the GPs with the incoming Chief Executives. These were all from
Community Trust or Health Authority backgrounds and were observed to bring a
different attitude to the GPs with them:
Whereas, the new Chief Executive of the PCT has come from a Trust
and is much more confrontational with the GPs than I was. I can see it's
going to be a real struggle. The GPs are already giving her hell." PCG
Chief Executive 36, text units 130-13 1
Some of the GPs members also referred to the change of culture that the PCTs
would bring. Few of them were positive and saw it as part of their continuing
struggle against the corporate NHS:
Well, the PCT is back to the old Health Authority days isn 't it? Where
you have one doctor who is paid an annual wage to sit quietly in the
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corner and not say anything. It is very dfjIcult fyou are one against the
managers. They can ignore you or ask you to be quiet. Or say that, 'this
project has taken ten months to work up. So now you as an individual are
ruining it'." PCG OP member 35, text units 96- 101.
8.6. Leadership in Collaboration or Conflict
The evidence demonstrates that there were ongoing tensions between the
managers and the GPs, rather than conflict per se as suggested in the study
proposition (section 5.2.1). While there was little evidence of outright conflict,
difficult relationships provided a backdrop to the dynamics of leadership in the
PCG. The tensions had different manifestations with managers in the various
sections of the local NHS bureaucracy. The neo-Weberian theories of
bureaucracies argue that conflict arises between professionals and managers
because they draw on different sources of authority. The evidence would suggest
in this chapter that the friction came from multiple sources rather than one
source. The GPs claimed expert knowledge and membership of the medical
profession as one source of authority. They also claimed expert knowledge in
running a health care business. The managers derived their authority by virtue
of their position and its attendant budget in the local sections of the corporate
NHS. They too claimed expert knowledge in running a health care business.
While the managers could contest authority based on knowledge, they could not
contest the cultural authority derived from medical profession membership, nor
could they contest the occupational autonomy of general practice as an
independent business. Consequently, there was an underlying friction in the
relationship but the managers actively avoided overt conflict. In this they
mirrored the behaviours of hospital general managers to hospital doctors
observed by Harrison Ct al (Harrison et al 1992). As Pettigrew et al (1992)
noted from their analysis of managers and medical consultants, it was the
managers who worked to maintain fragile relationships between themselves and
the GPs.
The GP members had no such qualms about openly reporting their negative
attitude to the local managers of the corporate NHS. They also recognised that
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they had shifted from holding a purely general practitioner perspective so that
they formed a bridge between general practice and the NHS corporate managers.
They did not see themselves as in conflict with the PCG chief executives.
Likewise the PCG chief executives were acting as bridges between the
imperatives of the corporate NHS and the imperatives of the GPs. The PCG
managers resembled one group of managers that Pettigrew et al (1992) observed
in their study of strategic change who experienced a lower level of conflict with
the medical staff than other managers. Pettigrew et al described these as "semi-
immersed" in the world of the clinicians and noted they had previously been
administrators.
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Chapter 9: Challen2es to the Leadership Roles for Nurse
Members
9.1. Introduction
Earlier chapters described the lack of perceived influence the nurse members had
in the work of the Board, despite having named leadership roles. This chapter
explores the relationship between the nurse members and others to understand
this apparent contradiction. It considers first of all the relationship with their
peers, then with the managers and finally, with the doctors.
9.2. The Relationship between Nurses
The relationship with other nurses in the PCG was complex. The nurse members
came from a range of occupational roles and, unlike the GP members, did not
have an existing method of networking with all the nurses in the PCG. Only one
as a local union representative appeared to be part of an established local
network. The nurse members emphasised their expectation of representing
nursing views on the Board. However, they reported limited visible interest from
the other nurses in the PCG to express their views to Board members: Only three
nurse members cited examples of direct approaches from nurses in the PCG to
ask them to raise their problems on the Board.
"There is a distinct lack of nursing presence at the open meetings and
the stakeholder meetings and even as observers at the Board". PCG
nurse member 17, text 301-303
Their relationship with the nurses in their own service was important to them not
just to gain views but to function as a Board member. They described a variety
of relationships with their work place nurse colleagues that ranged from outright
hostility to very practical support. In the most supportive relationships, team
colleagues reorganised or took on work in order to help release the nurse member
for Board meetings:
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"I'm supposed to do four and half days a week and haifa day PCG, but it
doesn't work like that. It 's only through the good support of my
colleagues that I'm able to get time back for anything. The only way it
works is through your colleagues picking up for you all the time".
PCG nurse member 8, text units 410- 421
Some nurse members described support from colleagues as long as they only
conducted Board activities outside working hours and did not try to re-negotiate
work time commitments. Others described a lack of support from work
colleagues to the point of friction. This was not the result of any perceived
advantage gained from Board membership but rather a negative view of the
impact on the workload for team colleagues:
"I think originally there was some opposition from fellow members of
staff a resentment really. They think 'oh no it 's one less person to man
the pumps, or to cover There was not an awful lot of team spirit where I
was based. Andlthought, 'oh, no what have Idone ere?'because there
was quite a lot of antagonism. " PCG nurse member 4, text units 443 -
450
Most of the nurse members emphasised the importance of their relationship with
the other nurse member and with nurse members in other local PCGs. In some of
the Health Authority areas, the nurse members from all the PCGs formed a
network. Those nurse members who experienced a period of time as the sole
nurse on the Board reported that this was particularly hard:
"So then I was doing it on my own for quite a long time and it was very
difficult. I wasn't sure whether I wanted to continue with it quite
honestly." PCG nurse member 40, text units 122-125
However, relationships between nurse members could also be problematic. One
nurse member reported that friction between PCGs in the negotiations for the
new PCTs were reflected in the relations between nurse members from different
PCGs. There were also examples of tension caused by the nurse members being
managers:
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"It hasn't felt supportive from other Board nurses necessarily, it almost
felt a bit competitive to be honest, which I felt a bit surprised about that.
Maybe it was a bit naive of me. Certain Board nurses who are managers
want to take over and get their agenda dealt with." PCG nurse member
18, text units 378- 385
The GP members did not discuss their relationship with each other in such terms,
although there was some close working with others through the LMC and in the
core executive groups. Unlike the OP members, no one commented that the
nurse members might have conflicts of interests on Board decisions, even those
members who were directly employed by general practices.
9.3. Relationships between Nurses Members and Managers
In contrast to the GP members, the nurse members did not immediately relate a
generalised antipathy to managers in the way that the doctors were reported to
do, but that did not mean their relationships were harmonious either. This
section will consider first of all the relationships with managers in the Health
Authority and PCGs, then with the Community Trust managers.
9.3.1 The Relationship between the Nurses and Managers in the Health
Authorities and PCGs.
The Health Authority Managers mentioned the nurse members in passing and
made observations about their involvement in the PCG but there was no sense
that they had any particular relationship with or interest in them. In a reciprocal
fashion the nurse members hardly mentioned the Health Authority Managers, but
when they did it, it tended to be in negative tones. This was usually when they
were relating issues of conflict between the PCG Board and the Health
Authority, such as over future configurations for the new PCTs. They rarely
discussed contact with the lead nurse in the Health Authority.
The nurse members had mixed views about their relationship with the PCG chief
executives. Some of them referred to an element of tension in their relationship,
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describing them as "ex-health authority staff who try and dominate things" PCG
Board nurse 18. They recounted situations where they were having difficulties
persuading the chief executive that they had opinions of value based on their
clinical expertise:
"The fight Ifelt I was having with the chief executive was all about trying
to bring supervision into clinical governance, in terms of practice nurse
development. That's something that Ifeel strongly about, in my specialist
nurse role, I know it works, you know. But that issue was always a
problem. The chief executive didn 't want to hear me". PCG nurse
member 8, text units 346- 9.
Similarly another nurse member had taken to writing to the PCG chief executive
to request that items were placed on the Board agenda because her verbal
requests were ignored.
However, nurse members also described some PCG chief executives as
supportive and 'nice' to them. They found the administrative staff, in those
PCGs that had them, also supportive to the point where one nurse member
described how they were synthesising documents for her into one page briefing
sheets.
The PCG chief executives tended to focus their interview responses on the
doctors: their relationships with the nurses were of the second order. They
appeared to range from indifference to benign support to covert conflict. Those
that were indifferent viewed the nurse members as inadequate in their knowledge
of the wider operational and management processes of the N}{S and therefore of
little consequence:
The lay member was much more effective than the nurses. Using
election rather than selection meant that the nurses weren 't up to being
Board members. They didn 't participate effectively, they didn 't seem to
understand complex issues, and they didn 't understand that the overall
issue was about how to get money and how it was distributed across the
area". PCG Chief Executive 36, text units 146 —149
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The PCG chief executives tended to sound most positive about the relationship
when describing nurse members engaged in clinical governance tasks with the
PCG general practices. Those chief executives presenting a benign relationship
described how they enabled the nurses to participate as Board members.
Sometimes the tone of this 'support' verged on patronising:
"I have to work very hard at times to give the nurses a voice. Literally by
sometimes intervening during the discussion by the GPs and just saying,
"Right, we need to find out what the nurses think". And on the odd
occasion when the nurses have been shouted down, in actually
deliberately making a point and saying "You know, nurse X has raised a
very good point and I think we ought to discuss that." PCG Chief
Executive 6, text units 64- 72
In some of the PCGs, support from the chief executives was noticeably lacking
as they failed to ensure that the nurse members had the infrastructure to enable
them to function as a Board member. Many of the nurse members worked in
open plan offices where they shared telephones and the fax machine and did not
have workplace access to email. In one Health Authority, it took all the PCG
Board nurses lobbying together for some months before the PCG chief
executives addressed their lack of access to email.
There was ambivalence in some of the PCG chief executives attitudes to the
nurse members. On the one hand they described helping them to participate in
the Board, on the other they questioned their role as a Board member. One
viewpoint was that as front-line nurses employed in a bureaucratic service, their
participation on a Board was inappropriate for their status in the bureaucracy:
"My own view is the nurses who are actually employees of the
Community Trust that's potentially problematic. Because we then get
people, working in a directly managed organ isation, representing an
interest and [they] may not always be representing it in a way that their
professional managers would want. "PCG Chief Executive 38, text units
144 -146.
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The chief executives demonstrated their ambivalence by consulting with the
nurses' managers in the Community Trusts rather than the nurses. In this they
were contesting the authority of the nurses Board members. As time progressed
the PCG managers and the Community Trust Managers developed more visible
ways of collaboration, thereby diminishing the contribution of the nurse
members:
"The chief executive was coming to the board and letting us know that
they've already had discussions in the Trust with, and then you hear their
names. And it's actually the Director of Services they've been speaking
to, who in turn has spoken to my manager's manager and it's all at that
level". PCG nurse member 8, text units 152-156
On occasion, some of the PCG chief executives reported that they had acted in
ways to ensure the nurse members remembered their place in the wider Trust
bureaucracy:
Early on the nurse was a) sometimes getting involved in things that were
inappropriate and b) that there was a danger of confused messages to
nursing staff because it was coming from a very particular angle and
was not being informed or directed by the appropriate line management.
It 's been worked through partly, because the nurse manager is now part
of the PCG team, and partly by meetings where some of it is thrashed out.
On one or two occasions when things were going on inappropriately, it
was handled where, with the permission of the chair, it went through to
the line manager rather than the PCG". PCG Chief Executive 38, text
units 148-153
The PCG Chief Executives did not see the nurses as having authority
legitimatised either by their profession, their expert knowledge or their position
in a bureaucracy. Challenge from the nurses to the PCG managers was therefore
poorly received:
"I said, 'Do you mean to tell me you are actually taking money from the
nursing staffing budget because you have over spent on IT?' It was
couched in very complicated terminology but that is what they were
doing. I think it 's - what do they call it - the 'savvy' of NHS managers,
214
which Ipossibly haven't got. At times, I don't mind not having it. I think
it's good to say, 'What do you actually mean? 'Although I can see it does
annoy them every time I do it " PCG nurse member 15, text units 475-
483
The reported support from PCG managers for the nurse members was in fact a
thin veneer.
9.3.3 The Relationship between the Nurse Members and the Community
Trust Managers
The majority of the nurse members in the study PCGs were employees of a
Community Trust. The relationship between these nurse members and the tiers
of Community Trust managers was complex. The Trust manager informants had
mixed views about the nurse members that ranged from indifferent to critical.
Some reported themselves to have very little contact while others reported that
they actively tried to help address the information gaps that they perceived in the
nurse members. Most of the Trust managers reported that they viewed the
majority of nurse members as resistant to change, with a more limited view of
the NHS modernisation agenda than themselves.
The nurse members also reported a range of views about the Trust managers
from appreciative to critical. They did not express indifference to the
managers, rather the Trust managers loomed large throughout the interviews.
The nurse members reported a spectrum of attitudes from the Trust managers
towards themselves from indifference to attempts to control their views and
behaviour. Some observed that the senior Trust managers did not believe clinical
nurses should be Board members. The nurse members described a lack of
support from their employing managers in passing on information and helping to
organise staff cover so that they could attend Board activities. Most of the nurse
members depicted their managers as actively trying to prevent them participating
through withholding the finance for locum staff replacement costs:
"No one in the Community Trust gave us any cover, any admin' support,
or any anything. Then to put the boot in, they took the money. Yes, they
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took the locum money, which was immoral to my mind but they did it, and
the Health Authority coughed it up straight to the Trust ". PCG nurse
member 15, text units 405- 409
While Trust senior managers saw their meetings with the nurse members as
positive support, the nurse members reported these as thinly disguised attempts
to influence their behaviour. They described being 'summoned' and 'dragged in'
to these types of meetings as though they had no choice but to obey. Once there,
they portrayed the information flow as one way from the managers in a manner
that brooked no dialogue or dissent:
"And the Chief Executive of the Community Trust hauls us [nurse
members] in every 2 or 3 months to talk to us, or rather talk at us to be
quite honest, which none of us enjoyed very much ". PCG nurse member
4, text units 639- 641
Lay members, GP members and nurse members in all the PCGs recounted
incidents where nurse members had difficulties with Trust managers subsequent
to expressing a different view to theirs:
"It' s been a very difficult situation for the nurses to be in because they'd
been leant on by their Trust Chief Executive and made to feel traitors or
injeopardyfrom their Trust". PCG GP member 21, text units 201-203
Differences of opinion were reported on issues as wide ranging as: plans for the
new PCTs, formulae for allocating nursing staff to general practices; holding
meetings with nurses in the PCGs without Trust managers present. Nurse
members recounted having difficulties with Trust managers:
"I was asked by the Board for my opinion (about a Trust strategic plan).
And I have to say that I felt there were some problems and said so. And
that did not go down well with the Trust and there was very much a sub
text "well you will remember, won't you, that you workfor the Community
Trust". Now I'm old enough and I don' t have great career aspirations so
I just think 'tough But I think it would be very hard for people much
younger or not sure where they are going in life ". PCG nurse member 4,
text 181- 193
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One senior Trust manager informant reported that they had had discussions with
the PCG nurse members in that area to reassure them that it was acceptable to
express different views to the managers. However, a nurse member in the same
area reported that differences of opinion were not tolerated. These tensions and
covert conflicts could become more pronounced when nurse managers were also
nurse members:
"I'd just got a parking ticket, and one manager [in the Trust] said they
would pay for it and then this one [manager and nurse member on the
same Board } said, 'no, we won't One of the things we bring to the
Board is the parking problems. We have to get that sorted out as a
community because it causes nurses so much stress. And i'm being told
by my colleague, 'no, she won 't help I'm like, you know, I can 't believe
this. And Igot into trouble when I raised the nursing shortage issues. So
those sorts of things have been quite dWIcult. Its a bit of a power thing I
think." PCG nurse member 18, text units 409 —414
Many of the nurse members reported that they actively avoided coming into
conflict with their Trust managers. They described having to behave in ways
that took account of their very different places in the two organisations, using
terminology such as performing "a balancing act", and walking on" a bit of a
tightrope ". Some of them reported curtailing their contributions at Board
meetings that were attended by Trust managers. This phenomenon was
observable in one set of PCG Minutes. Other nurse members reported that they
felt unable to raise issues, which challenged the Trust services and managers, at
any Board meetings
"So issues like about workforce, there not appearing to be any attempt to
recruit new staff when we have really loads of vacancies, things like that.
I really wanted to bring those kind of things up but I couldn 't". PCG
nurse member, 40, text units 5 9-66
The only nurse member criticism of Trust managers recorded in the Minutes
was from a nurse member who was not employed by the local Community Trust.
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Another strategy to avoid conflict was to keep away from the Trust managers
when they knew they had differences of opinion:
"I have meetings with nurse members. And from this difficult PCG, the
nurse is doing her own thing, and has limited understanding and is not
growing in her understanding. She doesn 't turn up to the meetings. So
there's a gap in communication there. And you try and have face to face
contact, and she doesn 't turn up ". Community Trust Director 5, text
units 261 —7
The overarching impression was that the nurse members and Trust managers had
conflicting viewpoints. However, in this relationship it was the nurses who
acted to accommodate to the managers, unlike the relationship between the
doctors and the managers where the managers accommodated to the doctors.
9.4. Relationships between Doctors and Nurses
The relationship between the doctors and nurses had the potential to challenge
the adoption of leadership roles by the nurse members. The perception of this
relationship is discussed in this section from three points of view: the doctors, the
nurses and the other informants
9.4.1 Relationships between Doctors and Nurses: The GPs' Views
The participants were all asked directly whether, as suggested in the nursing
press, the GPs dominated the nurse members. The GP members stated that they
and their colleagues did not dominate the nurses. They used two types of
evidence to support their perceptions. The first type of evidence was that the
nurse members held lead responsibilities within the PCG:
"No. As a matter offact we have got a very good relationship on the
Board with the nurses. You will be suiprised that we gave the practice
nurse the lead for clinical governance, and the eyebrows were raised
when I said, 'we are pleased to offer so and so to be the lead for the
clinical governance'. And she is doing an excellent job. And the district
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nurse she raises her voice now and again and then we accept it." PCG
GP member 26, text units 160-162
The second type of evidence was that the nurses contributed to the Board
discussions and voiced their opinions. A number of them also noted that the
quality of chairing of the meetings was a factor in ensuring that all members of
the Board contributed, although not necessarily the main factor:
"No, in our instance I would say that the Chair is very good at ensuring
that everybody has their voice heard and in addition our nurses are very
vocal and are able to speak up on all occasions. PCG GP member 2, text
units 85-87
One GP Board member noted that it was not just the quality of the chairing that
was important but that the chair of their Board was a woman. He was clear that
she set a tone of participation for all and contrasted it with his experience on an
all male LMC:
We have the benefit of having afemale Chair which is quite useful She
is very facilitative in committee work otherwise you end up with doctors
shouting. I think females are much better at communicating. It has
helped our style. The LMC locally is very definitely different through
being male dominated". PCG GP member 19, text unitsl79-182
One GP Board member confirmed that the style of GP behaviours towards each
other in meetings made it difficult for some nurse members:
"As a Board we are an outspoken, argumentative bunch and certainly,
two of the four nurses who have been on the Board have fitted that really
quite nicely, the other two have been quiet wenches, and not said very
much ". PCG GP member 21, text units 199-200
Some of the GP Board members noted that the nurse members employed within
the Trusts tended to only speak on certain types of topics raised at the Board, and
contrasted that with themselves and with nurses employed in the GP practices.
One GP Board member attributed this to the nurse members only having a
narrow range of interests:
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"I think we as GPs are able to see the overall impact on practices and
see the issues much more widely. Although, of course, one of our nurse
members is a practice manager so she has a similar sort of view. But in
the main the nurses only see things within their own professional role and
their organisational role ". PCG GP member 2, text units 74-77
Some of the GP members were less categorical that they did not dominate the
nurses and more aware of issues that might impede nurse members from
contributing. These issues included their employment position, their lack of
experience in Committees, and their lack of time to be as involved in the Board:
"I think it 's been more a case of the nurses developing the confidence to
put forward their views and I think that's something that will improve.
But I think they have had difficulties because some of them, for example,
are employed by a GP. And also being used to having involvement on
Boards and talking in front of groups ofpeople is not always something
that people are used to and prepared to do. And I think perhaps not
being self employed as well they have had dfficulties finding the time to
do as much as they would like to do." PCG GP member 29, text units
187-198
Two of the GP members commented that working with a wider group of
professionals, including the nurses, had been one of the positive aspects of the
PCG in comparison to the previous GP only commissioning arrangements.
9.4.2 Relationships between Doctors and Nurses: The Nurses' View
Most of the nurse members reported that they joined the PCGs Boards aware that
they were in the minority to the GPs and therefore the GPs could dominate the
proceedings. Some reported that having worked closely with GPs, they were
aware of a GP culture that would not readily look for independent contributions
from the nurses:
"Oh, I think I knew it would be very GP dominated, you 're weighted by
both the sheer numbers, by the personalities and by the stereotypical
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attitudes about nurses really that sort of revolve around general
practice". PCG nurse member, 15, text units 77-80
The early period after the establishment of the PCGs was reported by most nurse
members as the most difficult in their relationship with the GPs. During this
period they related that the GPs dominated the discussions, reached decisions
outside Board meetings and, while very pleasant to the nurse members, did not
look for any contribution from them:
"To begin with it was bad. It got better. When it started up first, there
was the seven GPs and myself and the other nurse. And they had already
been meeting before they officially became a Board and so they
established a cosy little club for themselves. And then we entered. They
were exceptionally nice, but it was a little bit 'pat on the head You know
two little nurses' coming in. Until they got to know me better and
realised I'm not a 'pat on the head' type". PCG nurse member 17, text
units 97-103
Some nurse Board members reported being frequently close to resignation in this
early period, while informants from half the PCG sample reported that nurse
members had resigned in the first six months:
"The two nurses we had at the beginning for a variety of reasons which
were historical and personal, didn 't manage to work with the GPs on the
Board. That's all I can say, they didn 't. And they left." PCG lay
member 23, text units 355-357
However, three Board nurse members were categorical that from the outset they
had no difficulties in their relationship with the doctors and the doctors did not
dominate them. They were more than aware of the potential for low expectations
of their input but had not experienced that in their Board membership. One of
these nurses had joined the PCG Board a year after its inception after the
previous nurse members had left the area. She was employed by a Community
Trust and viewed her own and the PCG managers as the groups who attempted to
dominate her activity on the Board. The second of these nurse members had been
part of a commissioning group with the GPs prior to the inception of the PCG.
221
She, too, was employed by a Community Trust and reported significant problems
in her relationship with the managers. She recalled that not only were the GPs
welcoming but they were supportive over some of the problems with her
managers. The third nurse member was employed in a general practice. Early
on she had been made lead for clinical governance in the PCG. She had invested
a significant amount of her own time in undertaking very operational activities
with the general practices of the PCG to introduce the concepts of clinical
governance.
The remaining nurse members described relationships between themselves and
the GPs that were much more problematic in quite subtle ways. Two underlying
dimensions created tensions in the relationships between doctors and nurses and
challenged the concept of nurses as leaders: firstly, the assumptions of the
inferior position of nurses to doctors and secondly, differences between nurses as
employees and the GPs as independent business professionals. These will be
discussed in turn.
The assumption of the less important position of the nurse was reflected in the
reports of the GP members not recognising the nurses members had any opinions
of value. Consequently, the nurse members reported that they had to constantly
challenge this view and assert their right to participate. One of the PCG chief
executive reported that in her PCG the GPs did not initially view the nurse
members as having equal responsibilities to the GPs for running the business of
general practice and therefore did not accept their right to air their views. The
nurse members described challenging the GPs' attitude to them by:
• Asserting their opinions,
• Questioning the doctors' views and decisions
• Voicing their disagreement with the doctors in the meetings.
These nurse members recognised that they had to be assertive in making the GPs
and the rest of the Board hear their views, although, as in this example, the level
of assertion could be tempered through apology:
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Our Board has a stormy history and it has a number of strong
characters on, which f you weren't fairly confident and perhaps have a
'sod you then' attitude, and that doesn't sound very professional, but
sometimes you have to be confident enough to go in and say 'you have
got to listen to me, I'm sorry'. PCG nurse member 4, text units 502-505
Some of the nurse members and some of the lay members commented on the age
of the nurse as significant, noting that they observed younger nurse members to
be more assertive. Those nurse members who discussed age did so in terms of a
younger generation of nurses educated to challenge doctors while their own
generation of nurses were taught to obey doctors. The evidence in this small
sample belies that generalisation. The one nurse member who all other
informants in her PCG described as very assertive in challenging the doctors (to
the point where the lay member described the GPs as being in awe of her) was
very close to retirement age.
Most of the nurse members recognised that to assert their opinions they needed
to be sure they understood the issues and context; consequently they invested
time and energy in the first six to twelve months learning about those areas they
felt weakest in.. They also described learning, mostly through experience, how
to construct their oral contribution in a way that was more likely to be heard:
"There have been quite sharp exchanges sometimes. You have got to
know what you are going to say and prepare it and be quite clear, they
[the GPs] can be quite unmerciful if you don't explain yourself very
clearly, which is fair enough. PCG nurse member 15, text units 496-498
Some nurse members described it as an ongoing struggle to have their voices
hear& Others were clear that there were only certain parts of the PCG agenda
that they engaged with because it was a) of more interest to them and/or b) they
knew they were knowledgeable enough about it to feel confident in their views:
"If I don't know about something I keep my mouth shut and there is a lot I
don't know about or its couched in very complicated language. And quite
frankly, a lot that I won't say I don't care about but a lot of the agendas of
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PCGs is GP agenda. And I don't necessarily want to get involved in all
that". PCG nurse member 33, text units 282- 284.
Although some nurse members chose to become involved in only some areas of
Board work, others were more systematically offering different viewpoints to the
GPs:
"The nurses hold their own, they hold their own. And the only time one of
them said 'oh, I agree with the doctor all the doctors cheered." PCG
lay member, 1, text units 142
However, these nurse members were aware that despite successfully challenging
the doctors' views as to their place on the Board this did not necessarily change
their views overall as to the position or visibility of nurses in primary care:
"On the sub groups on clinical governance we find constantly that you
would think that nurses and practice nurses out there didn't exist when it
comes to issues around money for education and training. We constantly
have to remind them [the GPs] that they are not the only people involved
in delivering health care". PCG nurse member 17, text units 120-127
One of the nurse members concluded that, despite challenging the status quo
over the lifespan of the PCG, she remained excluded from much of the decision-
making. She was also the one nurse member who argued that as a woman she
experienced exclusionary sexist attitudes from the male GP members:
"I've always ftlt that we [nurses] were rather tokens on the Board, and
it's a bit of a male doctors club. We've had afew wor/chops and things
to try and develop the Board, and then I have felt quite included. And to
some extent the sexism was less obvious so I have had some quite
interesting and meaningful conversations with doctors then. But when
we are just in a Board meeting, I still feel a bit token like and I still feel
there's an awful lot of stuff going on that I haven't got the faintest idea is
going on ". PCG nurse member 40, text units 59- 66
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There was only one other comment by a nurse member concerning gender. She
noted that a female OP in the Board chair position ensured that Board meetings
were conducive to nurse participation rather than discriminatory.
The second dimension of tension was between the culture of the majority of the
nurse members as state employed professionals and the culture of the GPs as
independent professional business people. Many of the nurse members
employed by the Community Trusts found the underlying assumptions about
general practice as a business difficult to comprehend and to work with:
The doctors and money situation really always seems to be at the
forefront. It always seems to be about them beavering away and working
out systems to line their own pockets, it 's quite a dfferent culture from
being an NHS employee all your lfe, it 's really hard to come to terms
with ". PCG nurse member 40, text units 139- 141
Even those nurse members who worked in general practice found examples
where the business culture of the GPs was discordant:
"I think I've seen it all, but every now and then something comes up. This
was at a public Board meeting, the GPs sought clarflcation as to
whether they could claim an item of service payment for flu vaccine that
was given by a district nurse. And Ijust found that absolutely staggering
that they thought they should be getting paid for something they hadn 't
done." PCG nurse member 15, text units 150-155
Some of the nurse members had never bad to deal with the business culture of
general practice before and challenged aspects of it in the meetings of the Board:
"Yes, It [the GP business focus of the meetings] did make me angry and
I didn't actually keep it quiet that I was finding it difficult, I did voice my
view on the board, so people knew that I was finding it dfficult ". PCG
nurse member 8, text units 68-70
These PCG nurse members reported that the meeting agendas were filled with
items related to the business of general practice. They reported attempting to
challenge the focus by trying to get additional items on the agenda and by
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constantly raising the issue of the wider population and workforce perspective.
These strategies received a variety of responses from being ignored, to 'friendly
running battles with the chairman', to something that could be interpreted as
more acrimonious:
"I think the GPs need to be reminded that we are actually there for the
patients in (PCG name), which we do say quite often in meetings. One of
the GPs said that I should have it tattooed on my forehead. " PCG nurse
member 3, text units 100-102
One nurse member reported that her PCG Chairperson and Chief Executive had
in fact attempted to stop her challenging the GPs on the Board. In this Board,
individual meetings were held with all the Board members by the Chairperson
and Chief Executive in order to discuss how their Board membership was
developing. The nurse member reported that they had told her she was too
outspoken and that this was counter productive on the Board. The Chairperson
had told her to change her Board behaviour. The nurse member reported that her
reply was to agree to differ.
The majority of the nurse members stated that at the time of the interview they
had good relationships with the doctors on the Board and that their views were
listened to, not necessarily agreed with, but definitely heard.
9.4.3 Relationships between Doctors and Nurses: the Views of Managers and
Lay Board Members
The other informants held mixed views about the relationship between the GP
members and the nurse members. Generally, the managers inside and outside the
PCG observed that the GP members did not expect the nurse members to have an
opinion or one of value on PCG issues:
"It's been very d[JIcult for the nurses to take an independent view which
has been taken seriously by the doctors ". Health Authority Director 11,
text units 44-46
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Some managers observed that it was not just that the views of the doctors
dominated the PCG but the behaviour of the GP members implied that the nurse
members were almost invisible. Some managers analysed this as the GP
members perceiving nurses as people who followed orders rather than had an
independent input:
"There does seem to be this strange relationship there between the GPs
and the nurses. It 's like the traditional relationship between the GP and
the nurse, the GP tells the nurse what to do. It's a bit like that in the GPs
not hearing the nurses ". PCG Chief Executive 6, text units 208-2 10
Some of the PCG chief executives confirmed the nurse members' viewpoint that
the GP members were dominant during the early period of the PCG but that this
changed during the life of the PCG:
"They [the nurses] were intensely frustrated for a great period of the first
year, because they felt that they were not acknowledged to the degree
they should be. They felt they were outnumbered. They had never done
anything quite like this before. They were not used to the style. They felt
they had come into a group of GPs, all of whom knew each other and
were used to working together. And that they were the outsiders ". PCG
Chief Executive 39, text units 178-183
One PCG chief executive was adamant that the GP members intimidated the
nurse members and subjected them to blatant sexism. She pointed out that the
GP members accepted challenges from the lay member but would not accept
them from the nurse members. The lay member in this Board agreed that the
nurses had been dominated by the GP members but cited the reason as the lack of
nursing issues on the agenda. The nurse member in this PCG reported that she
had good relationships with the GP members and they were very supportive of
her. The dissonance of accounts is an issue that occurred repeatedly in this area
of inquiiy.
One Health Authority Director, who had a medical background, analysed the
relationship not just through the occupational assumptions of medical dominant
and nursing subordinate roles but also through assumptions of male dominance
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over females. She and the PCG chief executive discussed in the previous
paragraph were the only two managers who mentioned the gender distinctions.
This Health Authority Director also drew class distinctions between the two
groups in her analysis:
"If you start being told you are going to be a doctor from the age of 18,
you do get quite socialised and fyou are a man as well! We!!, we have
had some problems about sexism in the Boards. I think it 's the whole
package isn't it: you are nurses, so doctors think you 're handmaidens.
You're earning a quarter of what the doctors are earning. You are more
likely to be female, yeah all of that, what a package!" Health Authority
Director 30, text units 144-159
Some of the managers and the lay members attributed the weaker position of the
nurse members to their lack of knowledge on many of the financial and health
planning issues, combined with their lack of experienced in corporate
governance. Some managers commented that the behaviour and attitudes of the
nurse members implied they were in a subordinate position to the GP members.
The Community Trust managers, who had been nurses, were particularly critical
of the nurse members they observed in this respect:
"I was genuinely someone who believed this had to be practicing nurses.
They would have the impact. But honestly, with practicing nurses, there
is still, and I can 't believe it but it's true, this subordination".
Community Trust Director 5, text units 387-389
The managers external to the PCG were more likely to describe the nurse
members as being dominated by the GPs. The PCG chief executives were more
likely to describe a difficult relationship in which they, the chief executives,
facilitated an improvement in over time. In contrast the lay members were more
likely to describe nurse members who were assertive and made their opinions
known without any help from Chief Executives:
"Certainly the first one [nurse member] who was the Locality manager
wasn 't dominated by anybody, she was very assertive. The two we've got
now are much younger; they are quite senior in the community trust, but
much younger. They're not dominated, they will say what they think, and
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it's just that their range is rather more focused". PCG lay member 25,
text units 337-342
The contrast between the lay member perceptions and the managers' perceptions
of this relationship is most notable. One explanation could be that the lay
members, also in the minority and struggling to have their voice heard,
recognised behaviours in the nurses that the managers did not see.
In contrast to other views, one Trust Director was exercised by the developing
alliances between the nurse members and the GP members:
"And some of them [nurse members] are going native and becoming
friends with the GPs as well". Community Trust Director 7, text unit 100
The nurse members, like the GPs, had mixed views as to whether they were
interested and willing to put themselves forward for a place on the professional
executive committee and Board of the PCT. Some of the nurse members were
keen to continue their involvement into the PCI because they had enjoyed their
experience on the PCG and were proud of the achievements to date. Some of
them felt that their knowledge and position on the Board had been hard won and
should not be lost. There was a concern amongst most of them that new nurse
members of a professional executive committee should gain from their learning
or at least should be made aware of the types of knowledge that they would need.
Some of the nurse members were clear that the experience had been costly to
them personally, either in time or self-esteem, and they would not be pursuing a
place on the professional executive committee.
9.5. The Board Membership Role Undertaken in Conflict or
Collaboration?
This chapter demonstrates that the nurse members were enmeshed in complex
relationships with both the managers and the GPs. The tensions experienced
between the managers and the nurses were different from those between the
managers and GPs. Conflict theorists argue that professions use their
professional membership as their authority to lead and that conflict with the
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managers' authority derived from their position in a hierarchy. This was broadly
true for the managers and GPs relationships. However, managers from different
points in the NHS hierarchies viewed the nurse members in different ways. They
were almost unnoticed by the managers in the Health Authority, and as such
reflected Robinson and Strong's observation of the invisibility of nurses and
nursing in the policy making of the NHS (Robinson and Strong 1989).
Managers from the Community Trusts viewed the nurse members' position as
problematic and a challenge to their authority. The nurse members' position
through the Board technically gave them authority beyond their place in the line-
managed bureaucracy. The ambiguity of their position provoked mixed
responses from the managers: from ignoring them, to hostility, to attempting to
control them and occasionally to support them. The overarching impression was
that the front line nurse members presented a challenge to the established order
of the hierarchy and as such the managers within the hierarchy attempted to find
ways of reducing the challenge. This contrasts with the analysis of Robinson
and Strong (Robinson 1992) in which they argue that the invisibility of nurses
was an accidental by product of the power struggles between medicine and
managers. The nurse members recognised the tension between themselves and
the managers in their own organisation. They identified the different strategies
employed by the Trust managers to control them and expressed little surprise,
although they were outraged at the withholding of finance for locum cover.
The nurse members mainly reported avoiding overt challenges with their
managers, using tactics of passive resistance and accommodation to the situation.
Some nurse members reported that other nurse members allied themselves with
the GPs in order to challenge the Trust managers. The nurse members
contrasted with the GPs in that they were employees, whereas the GPs were not.
As one GP pointed out this resulted in a significant difference:
"We couldn 't care about the Trust managers, unlike the nurses". PCG
GP member 9, text unit 73.
While the nurse members recognised the tension with their own managers, none
of them reported a tension with the PCG managers. The PCG managers
appeared to be supportive their Board members but were often acting in ways
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that negated a leadership role for nurse members. The roles that the PCG
managers particularly valued in the nurse members were not ones of leadership.
The PCG managers were not involved in overt conflict but in alliances with other
managers that challenged the authority of the nurse members.
One proposition of this study suggested that the increased numbers of female
doctors in general practice would mean that roles would not be so closely
associated with gendered occupational divisions. The study was however unable
to comment on the impact of increasing numbers of female GPs because they
were in the minority on the PCG Boards. The assumption that greater numbers
of women would be reflected on the Boards was flawed and will be discussed
further in chapter 10.
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Chapter 10: Doctors and Nurses in the Driving Seat of PCGs?
10.1. Introduction
Four propositions were made at the beginning of this study. They were that:
1. The doctors and nurses would not equally hold leadership roles. The
dominant structural interests expressed in the Board activity would be
medical and specific to the general practitioners
2. There would be conflict between the professionals and the managers as to the
role of professional leadership in the activity of the PCG. This conflict
would be experienced differently for GPs and nurses
3. The increasing numbers of women GPs would mean that gendered
experiences of Board membership would be less clearly associated with
occupational groups
4. The nurses would have a differential experience of leadership according to a)
their position in the bureaucracy of the community health services or general
practice, and b) their clinical relationship to general practitioners
The study revealed a complex web of roles and relationships between managers
and professional Board members and between GP and nurse members in the
decision-making arena of the PCGs. The concept of leadership roles for
professionals was simultaneously supported, challenged and subverted. The first
propostion was supported :doctors and nurses did not equally hold leadership
roles. The study revealed great complexity in distinguishing the dominant
structured interests in the Board activities. It is this issue that will be explored in
the first section of this chapter (10.2) by considering Alford's framework of
dominant, challenging and repressed interests in policy determination as applied
to the empirical evidence of this study.
The second proposition was supported, in that the professional and manager
relationships were characterised by tensions and, sometimes, open conflicts.
However, there was also evidence of collaborative working relationships and
distinctions in the relationships involving managers from different tiers of the
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bureaucracy, as well as different experiences for the nurses. The second section
of this chapter (10.3) considers the neo-Weberian thesis of conflict based on
differing sources of authority in the light of the empirical evidence of the study.
The third and fourth propositions were derived from theories concerned with the
division of labour in the health service and the socially structured occupational
relationship between nurses and doctors. The third proposition was not
supported. Although women occupy half of all general practitioner positions in
the UK this was not reflected in the PCG Boards. Women doctors were in the
minority on the PCG Boards. The experience of leadership for the nurse
members was shaped by their structured occupational relationship with doctors,
gender was one component but there were many ohters that were equally
significant. . The dominant position of medicine on the PCG Boards was socially
structured and consequently it was hard to discern the element of the fourth
proposition concerned with individual nurse members' clinical relationship with
GPs. The third section of the chapter (10.4) considers the structured dominance
of medicine and to what extent subordinate group theories explain the roles and
experiences of the nurse members.
The absence of nurse Board member informants who held management posts
meant that part a) of the fourth proposition could not be fully explored through
contrast with nurse members who were front line clinical nurses. The experience
of the clinical nurses, however, was influenced by their position as employees in
a bureaucracy. The clinical nurse Board members and the interests of nursing
were invisible in the work of the PCGs in ways that could not be explained
solely by their occupational relationship medicine. The fourth section of the
chapter (10.5) considers explanations for these observations that include neo-
Weberian conflict theories between professionals and bureaucrats. It argues that
the position of nurses has to be viewed not just in terms of the relationship with
medicine but also in relation to the aspirations of managers
The chapter then considers the findings in the context of the emerging policy
context, reflecting on lessons from the process of this study for future research. It
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concludes by an examination of the nature of the policy of leadership roles for
clinicians in PCG Boards.
10.2. Dominant, Challenging and Repressed Interest Groups
Alford (1975) developed a theoretical framework that has been used repeatedly
in UK health policy analysis. He argued that the inertia and repetitive
announcements of crises in American health care provision was the result of the
interplay between three sets of structured interests. The dominant structured
interest was the preservation of the professional monopoly of medicine. The
challenging interest was to break that monopoly, drawing on the imperatives of a
corporate organisation. The repressed interest was that of those not served by
current arrangements either of the professional monopolists or the corporate
rationalisers. The evidence from this study suggests that the assignment of all
groups to one type of structured interest is an oversimplification that limits the
analysis and understanding of the dynamics in decision making in the UK health
arena. Alford's typology based on one structured interest, preservation of
professional monopoly provides too broad a brush to understand the nuances of
the power relationships in the interstices of local decision making for policy
implementation in the UK.
None of the groups studied in this research fitted neatly into only one category of
structured interest group. The GPs in particular were a poor fit. The GPs'
dominant position on the PCG boards was politically structured. The
membership regulations for PCGs were negotiated between the medical
profession and the politicians to give GPs the majority of the seats and the most
powerful of those seats (Anon 1998b). The GP members viewed themselves and
were seen as leaders in these decision making bodies. However, they presented
themselves as leaders of a challenging interest to two structured dominant
interests within the NHS: the professional monopoly of the acute sector
consultants and the corporate business agenda of the NHS. The GPs' defining
interest was the maintenance of the professional monopoly of general practice,
not of medicine. They came to the PCGs to continue the pursuit of the GPs'
agenda, which was to both increase funding to primary care and make secondary
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care more responsive to patient problems as perceived from a general practice
perspective. The GP members neither saw themselves nor were seen as a unified
interest group with doctors from other provider sectors. The Minutes of the
Boards repeatedly recorded complaints at hospital consultants' disregard for GPs
and their patients. Alford (1975), in his American analysis presents a medical
profession homogeneous through its opposition to challenges to its monopoly
over the production and distribution of health care. Ham (1981) noted in the UK
context that dominant structured interest was not a generalised professional
monopoly but the monopoly of the elite strata of medical school and hospital
consultants in the specialities of general medicine and surgery. In this study, the
medical profession was split and structured through a number of socio-economic
factors that resulted in differing interests. GP members were oflen reported to
hold conflicting viewpoints, but they were unified in attempting to change the
current hegemony of hospital medicine. Alongside this unifying aim, the
repeated references to the involvement of the LMC in PCG business would
suggest that the collective professional interests of GPs continued to be as well
organised as when observed in previous governance bodies (Alsop and May
1986). Further evidence for this was provided by Sheaff et al (2003) who
suggested from their study in four PCGs in 1999 that the LMC had negotiated
behind the scenes within the GP community to identify the GP Board members
before going to election.
Alford (1975) did not posit a thesis of more than one structured dominant interest
but the GP members argued that they were dealing with the hegemony of the
acute hospital sector and the structured power of the corporate NHS to determine
the resources for health care. Ham (1986) argued that the introduction of general
management into the NHS had created a mechanism whereby the issues of the
corporate rationalizers were now more powerfully placed on the agenda of local
decision making bodies. Klein argued that the political history of the NHS was
that of relationships between two dominant structured interests in the NHS
(Klein 1983,1995, 2001). The GPs did not offer a view of themselves as
dominant in the face of the corporate NHS managers. Rather they portrayed
themselves as David to the Goliath of the corporate NHS: David-like through
their championing of the patient and using their intellectual abilities, Goliath-like
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in terms of its bureaucratic size and lack of intellectual abilities. The GPs did not
view their interests as dominant or supported by the corporate NHS managers
despite the continuous presence of a health policy stream since 1986 that
proclaimed the importance of general practice to the NHS.(Department of Health
and Social Security 1986).
The behaviour of GP members demonstrated three sub-groups:
• Archetypal professional monopolists who came to the PCG Board with a
purely watching brief to ensure that their general practice interests were
preserved. They did not engage in the corporate business agenda of the
PCG.
. Modified professional monopolists who came to the PCG Board to
actively challenge the dominance of both the acute sector consultants and
the corporate managers of the NHS. This challenging interest was
designed to defend and promote their own monopoly
Boundary spanners (Williams 2002) who actively worked to the
corporate business agenda of the NHS, taking on the mantle of corporate
rationalizers on some issues and at some points in time. However, this did
not mean they were trying to break the professional monopoly of general
practice.
The potential to span the boundaries of interest groups has been noted before.
Elston (1991) in her review of the validity of the de-professionalisation of
medicine thesis (undertaken at the point of the introduction of the internal market
in the NETS) suggested that some members of the medical profession were also
members of the 'corporate rationalisers' interest group (p76) but acted to invoke
new forms of professional control rather than managerial flat. Contemporary
accounts of the entrepreneurship of GPs in developing total fundholding and GP
consortiums would suggest that these GP members were not alone in their
boundary spanning activities (Colin-Thomé 1996, Paynton 1996).
The managers from different elements of the local NHS were also differentiated
in their attitudes and behaviours to the GPs as professional monopolists. The
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more distant the managers were from working directly with the GP members the
more likely they were to resemble archetypal corporate rationalizers. Many of
these described the creation of the PCGs as one step in a longer term strategy to
break the professional monopoly of GPs as independent contractors and make
them salaried employees of the NHS. The managers working closely with the
GPs presented themselves as boundary spanners (Williams 2002) across the
structured interests. They supported the professional monopoly of the GPs in
some instances but also worked to the corporate business agenda of the NHS,
which challenged that professional monopoly. They contrasted themselves to
other NHS managers in this. Neither group within the GPs or managers had
"gone native" to the other interest group but they were able to span the
boundaries of the two interest groups (Williams 2002).
Alford (1975), and subsequent policy analysts using his framework, chose not to
consider the presence of other groups of health care workers in the policy arena.
Rendering large groups such as the nurses invisible may have produced a neat,
tripartite model but it fails to account for all the dynamics within the policy
arena. At the very least, it fails to acknowledge the diversity of interests in the
labour costs and labour relations of the health care sector. Only by ignoring the
scale of the health care labour force could Alford separate out the community as
a separate interest group rather than one that also contained significant numbers
of health care workers who experienced and witnessed the failures of the health
care system.
The nurses in this study, like the doctors and the managers, demonstrated that
occupational groups are divided between different structured interests. Unlike
the GPs however, they were neither homogeneous in their occupational interests
nor organised as a single interest group. The nurse members portrayed
themselves as a challenging interest group. However, they could not articulate a
unifying aim beyond their collective intent in taking up the places at the table
and aspirations to articulate their own and their patients' experiences. At the
same time as they had their interests repressed, the nurse members were active in
both challenging the professional monopoly of medicine and general practice,
supporting the professional monopoly of general practice, and challenging the
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corporate rationalizers in the provider Trusts and the corporate NHS. The nurse
members were always boundary spanners across the structured interests in order
to attempt to place their own interests onto the agenda. The nurse members
operated alone and in alliance with the GP members, the PCG managers and the
lay members depending on which structured interest they were pursuing.
However, the GPs and the managers rarely portrayed the nurse members as allies
with a shared structured interest. The absence of the nurses and other health
care workers from most analysis of the politics of policy makes it hard to test
these observations against other empirical work. Participant accounts by nurse
leaders in professional organisations detail their pursuit of mutual interests both
with the medical profession and sections of the government and Department of
Health to influence single issues in the interests of nurses (Clay 1987, Jones
2004). Dingwall et al (1988) argued that nursing was successful in promoting
its interests only when these synchronised with the interests of the government of
the day.
North noted that, "the original tri-class/Ication [by Alford] of interests is
somewhat inflexible when fitted against the complexity of local markets" (North
1995 p1 24). This thesis contends that the assignment of sectional interests
(professionals, managers and the community) in health policy to one of three
types of interest groups (dominant, challenging or repressed), as suggested by
the Alford framework, is an oversimplification of a complex set of relationships
and interests that exist at a local level in the NHS.
10.3. Conflict through Competing Sources of Authority for
Leadership
Neo—Weberian theory posits conflict and tension between professionals and
officers of a bureaucracy. In this study covert, and sometimes overt, tensions
were a very tangible feature of the relationships between the professional groups
in primary health care and managers in the NHS. Tension in relationships was a
strong feature of the study although there were some professionals and managers
working collaboratively between the structured interest groups for mutual benefit
i.e. the boundary spanners (Williams 2002). The neo-Weberian thesis contends
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that the tension arises through the different sources of authority each group
draws upon. In this study, an added dimension was that the national policy
guidance for PCG Board membership gave the doctors and nurses, but not the
managers, the authority of a leadership role. Tension and conflict in
relationships through contested sources of authority had some resonance in this
study. However, it did not adequately explain the different types of relationships
between the GPs and managers from different tiers within the NHS bureaucracy
or the differential experience of nurses and doctors in their relationship with
managers.
The neo-Weberian conflict thesis suggests contested authority through individual
encounters in time and place. However, in this study the GP members presented
an almost visceral antipathy to the managers in the corporate NHS bureaucracy.
This thesis argues that a history of opposing perspectives has shaped attitudes
between GPs and NHS managers. Commentators from within general practice
have pointed to repeated examples of corporate and local NHS bureaucracy
marginalizing primary care medicine (Fry 1977, Tudor-Hart 1988). Klein
(1995) reported the bitter resistance of GPs to the General Medical Services
Contract of 1990, which they saw as an infringement on their autonomy and the
ascendancy of managerialism. Glennerster (1994) recorded the reluctance of
Health Authority managers to support the establishment of GP fundholding,
while contemporary accounts by GP fundholders were redolent with criticism of
corporate NHS managers and bureaucracy (see for example MacLean 1996,
Edmonds and Sloane 1996). The GP members in this study saw their
contemporary tensions with corporate NHS managers as a continuation of past
challenges to their expert knowledge, their autonomy and, significantly, their
claim to NHS resources. It is noticeable that, in all the empirical studies of NHS
Boards, the only two that reported a situation where the non-executive members
seriously challenged the executive members were Boards on which the majority
of the medical non-executives were GPs (Taylor 1977 and Ashburner 1993a).
The corporate NHS managers presented the tensions as the result of the GPs
protecting their business interests and enhancing their individual practice income
and services. While they viewed the GPs as leaders within the PCGs, they also
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viewed them as a group to be managed into accepting the authority and
imperatives of the bureaucracy. Those managers working in close proximity to
the GPs actively avoided open conflict with them. The PCG managers in
particular operated in ways that recognised both the GP business imperatives and
the corporate NHS imperatives. This did not, however, affect their primary
acculturation to their own group. Both groups expected the other to act in ways
that supported their own priorities and these were not identical. Inevitably there
was discord. GP members were most positive about PCG managers' when they
acted on the directions of the GPs, in a manner reminiscent of administrators
rather than managers. They were most critical about them when they acted in
ways that demonstrated their allegiance to the NHS bureaucracy. PCG
managers were most positive about the GPs when they supported their priorities,
most critical when they considered the GPs were viewing issues through their
own business interests and the collective interest of general practice. However,
even when a PCG manager acted in direct opposition to the views of the GP
members on the PCG she did so in a way to avoid open conflict. It is difficult to
differentiate in this study whether the managers acted in these ways because they
recognised the cultural authority of the GPs or because they recognised that they
were outside the bureaucratic jurisdiction of the NHS. Given the evidence
from other studies, which detail how general managers working with doctors
employed in the same service actively avoided conflict (Harrison et a! 1992), one
must conclude that cultural authority played a significant role. As Hunter has
pointed out, despite shifts in recent years in the relationships between doctors
and managers within the NHS, doctors alone continue to hold public confidence
in their judgement to "make life and death decisions" and all that flows from that
(Hunter 1994 p19).
Shaeff et al (2002) argued from a study of four PCGs that the GP members who
were active in the PCG business were evidence of the start of a professional
'restratification' i.e. a minority group forming a leadership elite within the
medical profession. This conclusion mirrors the assumptions of the managers in
the present study. The managers believed that the doctors held the authority,
which managers did not have, to lead their peers. There was an assumption that
membership of the medical profession gave the GP members the authority to
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judge the quality of service and clinical practice of other GPs and that taking up a
leadership role on the Board indicated that GPs were willing to take on this role.
There is, however, nothing in the occupational history of general practice that
suggests GPs have seen themselves as assuming any authority towards each
other (Klein 2001). In fact the evidence from the Medical Audit Advisory
Groups in primary care suggested that GPs actively resisted taking up such roles
or letting other GPs attempt such roles (Humphrey and Berrow 1993). The
managers' assumptions in this study were made at a time when a number of
medical scandals had created a policy window that allowed the Labour
government to establish a raft of managerially driven processes for the
judgement of clinical medical practice (Salter 1998). Despite the fact that the GP
Harold Shipman was being tried for the murder of fifteen of his patients at the
same time as the data collection for this study, at no point did any of the GP
members refer to the case or its implications for their role on the Board. There
was no indication that the GP members saw themselves as leaders of other GPs
or were willing to assume authority to make judgements on the clinical activity
of their peers.
The managers and others did not view the nurse members as joint leaders with
the GPs in the PCG, despite the assertions of the nurses to the contrary. In fact,
the Board was structured in ways that made it unlikely that the nurses could be
leaders, for example, the national constitution of the PCGs ensured that nurses
were a minority group (Department of Health 1998c). Nurses in the UK have
not achieved a professional monopoly or the cultural authority claimed by
medicine (Salvage 1992, Witz 1994). Nevertheless there were active tensions
and conflict between the managers in both the PCGs and the Trusts and the nurse
members. The source of the tension was the attempts by the nurse members to
assert the authority of their expert knowledge against the managers' assertion of
authority from bureaucratic position. Theorists have not identified this as an
aspect of the power dynamic in the NIHS. When nurses have been considered, it
is usually accepted, following the analysis by Trevor Clay (1987) and Jane
Robinson (Robinson 1992), that the diminution of authority of nurses in the NHS
was an accidental by-product of the attempts by the government and Department
of Health to control the medical profession. The analysis offered here suggests
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that, rather than accidental, the diminution of nurses' authority has been actively
pursued by managers throughout the elements and tiers of the NHS. What is not
clear and would need further investigation is the source of the motivation to
subordinate the nurses. Is the motivation to ensure the power and status that
accompanies a large staff budget in a bureaucracy remains with the managers, or
is it one element of the corporate rationalizers' struggle with the professional
monopolists as to who controls the subordinate group?
10.4. Relationships between Doctors and Nurses
The empirical data of this thesis is drawn from an arena that is not direct clinical
activity and this distinguishes it from other published studies that have
considered the relationship between doctors and nurses. There was technically
no division of labour to be made between occupational groups sitting on a
governance body, unlike in clinical care settings. Identifying which profession
was ultimately responsible for the clinical care of the patient, which is the usual
litmus test of power, did not apply in this arena. So how did the doctors behave
towards the nurses and how did the nurses respond in this context?
The doctors' behaviour was not ostensibly a repertoire of dominance: it did not
need to be. The national negotiations had ensured the GP members the numeric
dominance and the most influential positions. The doctors declared they were
not dominating over the nurses. They explained the limitations they perceived
regarding the nurses' contribution in ways that did not devalue the nurses or
place them in a subordinated role. They variously attributed the limitations to
nurses' employee status, to their inexperience and to their lack of knowledge of
business issues in the NHS. There was, however, no suggestion that the
structured position of nursing should be changed. In some of the PCGs, the GP
members were reported by others as positive or at least neutral to nurses actively
participating in aspects closely linked with a leading GP or in an aspect of
marginal interest to the GPs. However, overall others reported a range of GP
attitudes and behaviours that did indicate a view of the nurses as subordinates.
These included:
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• Considering the nurse members' views as irrelevant so not seeking them
or hearing them once expressed,
• Excluding the nurse members from the behind the scenes decision
making fora,
• Not tolerating opposing viewpoints from nurse members,
• Belittling contributions by nurse members,
• Being positive when nurse members undertook administrative tasks.
• Expecting nurse members to take a subordinate role to the GPs,
The overall impression was that the GP members acknowledged a space for the
nurse members but generally did not engage with them. It was noticeably in this
small sample that the nurse member who reported the most exclusionary and
negative attitudes from the GP members was a member of the only Board with
no women GPs. The only female GP chair of a Board was singled out as
actively managing meetings and the Board in ways to include the nurses.
Despite the fact that women represent a significant percentage of practising GPs
(Royal College of General Practice 2004), they were in the minority on the PCG
Boards in this thesis. There is no published data to confirm if this was
representative of the national situation. However, some studies in other
European countries have identified that female doctors are less likely to be in
leadership roles than males (Kvamer Ct al 1999). This raises questions for
further research: to what extent do women GPs participate in arenas beyond their
practice and what factors influence that participation? Further research would be
also be needed to explore any correlation between the presence of women GPs
and the participation of nurses on these and subsequent Boards and Professional
Executive Committees in PCTs.
While the dominance of medicine in the constitution of PCGs was an example of
Lukes' (1974) third dimension of power i.e., structured into the institution as the
natural order of things, it was not hidden from the nurses. The nurse members
were more than aware that they were in a situation that was structured against
their effective participation and that assumptions would be made by GPs that
they were subordinate. However, the nurses also worked in posts that placed
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them at different degrees of proximity in clinical work to GPs. This meant some
were very familiar with GP attitudes to nurses and others less so. This variation,
combined with the range of attitudes from the GP members, resulted in an array
of responses from the nurse members. These responses were either in a mode of
resistance and challenge or in a mode of accommodation and mediation of their
position. In this, they reflected what Clarke et al (1975) described as a repertoire
of strategies by subordinate groups to cope with as well as resist the dominant
group. Some of the nurse members resisted the subordinate role to which they
had been assigned by insisting on voicing their opinion. A few of the nurse
members went further and challenged the subordinate role by voicing different
opinions to the doctors and insisting on their right to be participants in the sub-
groups with financial responsibilities. Some of the nurse members
accommodated themselves to the assigned subordinate role but mediated that
role in ways that maintained their own self-esteem. They took on roles and
areas of work that were of marginal interest to the GPs in that PCG. These were
rarely associated with the core financial business of the PCG. However, they
were purposeful activities that had the potential to add value to the PCG Board
work either with other health professionals or with the wider public. What is not
clear from this thesis and would need further investigation is what
characteristics in the nurse member and/or her work role might correlate with
each mode of response to an assumption of a subordinated position.
The literature also suggested that a subordinate group creates its own culture,
sometimes a counter culture, to the dominant group. The time frame of the
thesis and the lifespan of the PCGs were too short to determine whether a
culture specific to nurse PCG Board members was in the process of being
created. The occupational diversity of the nurse members meant that it was hard
to determine whether they brought a specifically nursing culture with them.
These features also make it hard to discern any evidence of other elements of
"oppressed group behaviour" (Roberts 1983).
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10.5. The Invisibility of Nurses and Nursing in the Policy Arena
Understanding the relationship and responses between the medicine and nursing
in this arena is further complicated because it was not an exclusive relationship:
the managers were also significant. It is suggested that one effect of this triangle
of relationships was to render nurses and nursing almost undetectable in the
PCGs. The parts the nurse members played in the PCGs and the issues of
nursing were invisible both in the Minutes of the Boards and also in the accounts
given by other informants. It is suggested that this was neither accidental nor
the product of incompetent nurse members. Rather the combination of structured
mechanisms and the agency of the other interest groups, the doctors and the
managers, produced this effect.
The national negotiations of the Board membership as detailed in Chapter 1
demonstrates the hegemony of medicine. The constitution of the PCGs reflects
both Lukes' (1974) first and third dimension of power: the exercise of power in
observable conflicts of interest and the latent conflict through the acceptance of a
less influential position by the nurses. Other indicators suggested that the
primacy of medicine remained a feature in the assumptions of the government
and the civil service, for example, the Department of Health set a lower financial
remuneration for nurse members than for GP members (Department of Health
1998d). Only the threat of legal action from one of the nursing unions, the
CPHVA, on the grounds of sex discrimination changed this (Kline 1998).
Once on the Board, a number of mechanisms structured a less visible and
influential position for the nurses. Firstly, the majority of the nurse members
were disadvantaged by their lack of a communication infrastructure that the
managers and the GPs took for granted in their work. Secondly, many of them
were denied access to the finance for locum cover to release them from their
clinical work for Board activities by their employing managers or the managers
in the Health Authority. Thirdly, the business agenda for the PCGs was
structured to primarily address the issues of general practice. The agenda for the
PCGs was set from the corporate NHS priorities (Department of Health 1998).
While these were not necessarily the priorities of the GP members, they were
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primarily concerned with the business and financial aspects of the clinical
activities of general practice. The agendas of the PCG Boards were dominated
by discussion of the General Medical Services budget, the prescribing budget for
general practice and the budget for acute sector service commissioning. The
majority of nurse members in the study, and nationally (Cook 2004), came from
the Community Trusts and not general practice. They had little knowledge of,
and in some cases little interest in, controlling the financial flows into and from
the business of general practice.
The effect of the GPs' and NHS managers' focus on financial issues associated
with medical practice was to ensure that issues of concern to the nurse members
were rarely placed on the Board agenda. Sometimes issues like the local
shortage of nurses in the community nursing services reached the agenda.
However, during the lifespan of the PCGs the central government had major
policy initiatives that promoted nursing. These included;
• New types of nurse led services (Department of Health 1997, Department
of Health 2000a),
• New roles for nurses that were previously medical roles (Department of
Health 1 999c),
• The creation of nurse consultant posts (NHS Executive 1999d),
• Expansion of the legal right for nurses to independently prescribe
prescription only medicines (Medicines Control Agency and the
Department of Health 2000).
There was a singular absence of these types of items on the PCG agendas and
minutes in the study. The National Tracker Study of 69 PCGs portrayed a
similar picture. Although the majority of chief executives and chairs reported
that investment in nursing services was a high priority, less than a third had any
development underway (Dowswell et al 2002). The nurses may have gained a
seat at the decision making table but their collective occupational interests did
not make it onto the table.
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The nurses and nursing were invisible in the accounts given by other informants
and in the records. In most instances, this was dissonant with the account the
nurse member gave of their involvement and activities. There are problems in
all interviews where participant informants present a public persona that is
positive and restrict information that might suggest the contrary (Robson 2002).
In Goffman's terms, this is the presentation of the front stage persona and the
obfuscation of the back stage so that the individual's status is maintained or
enhanced (Goffrnan 1959). However, there were examples in this study in which
the nurses had named and publicly recorded leadership roles but doctors,
managers and lay members attributed the activities of that PCG business stream
to either doctors or managers. The empirical data revealed that the nurses'
accounts of themselves were not just a public presentation to maintain status and
self esteem.
To note the invisibility of nurses and nursing in the policy world is not new.
Robinson and Strong highlighted this phenomenon in the policy research
undertaken to examine the impact of the introduction of general management on
nursing (Robinson 1992). They offered "the black hole theory" in which they
argued the internal preoccupations of nursing locked nurses into a gravitational
force that made them invisible. This was the social equivalent of an astronomical
black hole from which they were unable to extricate themselves and others were
unable or unwilling to look in (Robinson 1992). Seen through the lens of
subordinate group theory, this internal preoccupation can be interpreted as a
mechanism to accommodate to the situation and create an alternate culture to the
dominant group. Robinson argued that in part the lack of well-educated nurses
accounted for the inability of nurses and nursing to escape from the black hole.
This view seems to suggest that the problem of the invisibility of nurses and
nursing stems to some degree from their own agency.
Celia Davies (1995) has offered an analysis that challenges this almost victim-
blaming stance. She locates the occupation of nursing in a world shaped by two
social institutions: profession and bureaucracy. She argues that these two
institutions are inherently masculine in their cultural codes and as such actively
devalue occupations and activities that embody feminine attributes. Critiques of
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this analysis have suggested it has dealt in stereotypes without considering the
empirical realities (Latimer 1996), or the active agency of nurses in the structure
of their occupational world (Wicks 1998). It is hard to discern social institutions
in the UK that do not demonstrate the hegemony of masculinity, however, the
nurse members in this thesis became invisible in ways that the female GPs,
managers and lay members did not. How can this be accounted for?
This thesis suggests that the position of nursing was significantly influenced
firstly, by the occupational strategies of both medicine and managers and
secondly, by the health service managers' struggle for power and influence with
the medical profession. Both occupational groups need the nursing workforce to
occupy a subordinate position to their own. For medicine, the subordination of
other occupational groups, particularly nursing, is an important mechanism for
maintaining professional monopoly. For health service managers, their
bureaucratic power and status is derived from the size of the budget and the
numbers of staff they directly control. The control of the nursing workforce as
the largest staff group in most health organisations is therefore important in order
for many managers to maintain their position. Authority derived from senior
positions in the bureaucracy enables managers to interact with doctors in
different ways to managers lower in the bureaucracy, both in collaboration and in
conflict.
However, this does not fully explain why issues related to nursing did not appear
in the Minutes and agendas. It is possible that they were just crowded out by the
need to attend to general practice issues. Nevertheless, the government policies
and legislative changes towards nursing just before and during the data collection
period gave the managers mechanisms whereby they could extend their influence
over health care and diminish that of medicine. The legislative changes enabled
some nurses to provide medical services autonomously of doctors. This was
potentially a substantial tool for local corporate monopolizers to challenge the
monopoly of medicine. However, items related to this new legislation rarely
reached the PCG Board discussions and, in the light of their potential use to the
managers, this was surprising. Ham (1986) had already demonstrated that the
introduction of general management in the NHS had allowed the corporate
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rationalists to place their items on Board agendas, which had not happened
previously. So, it is unlikely that if the managers chose to pursue these issues
they would not reach the agendas. So why did these items not reach the PCG?
It is suggested in this thesis that these legislative mechanisms have the potential
to make some nurses emulate the expert knowledge base of the medical
profession and therefore move outside of the mainstream NHS bureaucratic
structures. It is suggested that the need to ensure nursing remains subordinate to
local health service managers might explain the absence of the government
policy for nursing from PCG agendas. These conclusions are illuminated by an
aspect of White's (1985) thesis on the relationships between nurse managers and
the other interest groups internal to nursing: generalists and professionalists
(detailed in section 2.5). White argued that nurses who moved into managerial
positions, assimilated the values and behaviours of managers in the NHS. She
contended that the managers preferred the generalist nurses, as they did not
challenge their authority. When viewed through a lens of competing power
bases, the interpretation of the relationships alter. The managerial group of
nurses has gained the only source of authority that brings nurses and nursing
status in the eyes of others, that is a budget holding position in the bureaucracy.
The nurse managers may or may not prefer generalists to professionalists but
what they need is the numeric volume of the generalists under their control to
derive the accompanying budgetary status. This analysis suggests that the
status and authority of nurses would be in direct relationship to the size of the
operational budget they held. The absence of budget holding nurse members in
the thesis sample was a weakness in the design as discussed in section 5.7,
although difficult to overcome given the small numbers nationally (Cook 2000).
Further study would be required to compare the status and authority of budget
holding and non-budget holding nurses with places on decision making bodies
such PCT Boards, Professional Executive Committees and Foundation Trust
Boards.
These conclusions do not negate the influence of a gendered culture of the
overarching social institutions. Rather they illuminate one aspect of a complex
set of social relationships. Likewise, the study is unable to make comment on
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the impact of social class on the mechanisms that made the nurses invisible.
Some informants alluded to the issue through the indicators of occupational
remuneration levels and educational attainment. However, the study did not
systematically collect data on these factors to draw conclusions on the impact.
Further study is required that systematically records and compares proxies,
indicators and features of social class in the UK for women and men from the
different occupations and holding office in decision making bodies.
10.6. The Current Context
Despite the fact PCGs had some unusual characteristics and a brief life span in
the organisational turbulence of the NHS, they embodied policy themes that have
continued after their demise in PCTs and Foundation Hospitals. In summary
these were:
. The devolution of decision making to a local level,
The incorporation of general practitioners in the mainstream of the NHS
through commissioning of other health services, developing locality wide
primary care and clinical governance processes,
• The presence of doctors, managers, nurses and lay people on governance
bodies.
Policy themes of devolved decision making have been set out in the 'Shfling the
Balance of Power' papers (Department of Health 2001,2001c, 2002) and re-
iterated in the overall plans laid out for 2004-8 (Department of Health 2004).
Klein (2001) has argued that as the policy arena at the local level opens up, so
the central government control increases through performance management
techniques. The tension between these two policy elements was well illustrated
in this thesis of the Primary Care Groups. The empirical data also indicated that
the activities of the intermediary layer(s) of bureaucracy between the Department
of Health and the local level increased tensions. These tensions fed into the
general practitioners' negative views towards the bureaucracy of the NHS to the
point where many of those who empathised with the wider agenda of corporate
rationalisation were sceptical and disaffected.
	 This dissonance between
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increased local decision making and increased central control has the potential to
disengage those GPs who span the boundaries between interest groups in the new
and emerging governance arrangements in the NHS. The Primary Care Trust
commissioning managers cannot afford local GP disengagement because of the
central role of GPs in the cost containment of the hospital sector, the increased
care delivery in primary care and the maintenance of public confidence in their
actions. The new GMS and the expansion of PMS contracts for general
practice has also moved detailed decision making on general practice finance
from national negotiations between the Department of Health and the BMA
General Practice Committee to the PCT level (Neal 2004). This study
demonstrated that the managers who worked most closely with the GPs took a
boundary spanning perspective towards the professional monopolists and
avoided outright confrontation. It therefore seems unlikely that without
significant number of GPs becoming boundary spanners to the corporate
rationalists, the managers will be effective in shaping local GMS and PMS
contracts to address PCT wide resource and access equity issues.
These issues overlap with the second policy theme, that of incorporating GPs in
the mainstream of the NHS. It has been suggested that incorporating doctors into
the management activities of the NHS offers a mechanism for asserting authority
over the medical profession (Harrison and Pollitt 1994). The GPs continue to
have a strong numeric presence in the governance and commissioning activities
of the PCT (Department of Health 2003c). However, the study demonstrated the
ambivalence of GPs to both engaging in the priorities of the mainstream NHS
and also to assuming authority to question the clinical practice of peers. Even
amongst GP Board members, there were those who did not engage in the PCG
activities and behaved as archetypal professional monopolists. This ambivalence
was demonstrated more recently in the reticence to hand over the provision of
out-of-hour services to the local PCTs (Pati 2004). It is also demonstrated in the
re-emergence of individual general practices holding commissioning funds on
behalf of their patients rather than remaining as part of a collective
commissioning endeavour within a PCT (Rutter 2004, Lewis 2004).
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It is suggested in this thesis that the tensions and conflicts observed between GPs
and Community Trust managers are likely to become more evident as GPs gain
greater power and authority in the local health economy through this initiative.
The presence of three very different sub groups (boundary spanners to the
corporate rationalists, modified professional monopolists and archetypal
professional monopolists) suggests that practice based commissioning will gain
ground. Many GPs are likely to draw on their collective memory to contrast
their experience of GP fundholding against their frustrations at participation in
the PCGs, documented here. They are likely to opt for a return to a mechanism
that will be under their control to pursue their dual aims of developing their
general practice services and making the hospital sector more responsive. The
tensions and conflicts between GPs and managers, evident in the commissioning
networks surrounding GP fundholding (Flynn et al 1996), look set to re-emerge.
An early marker of the increase in GP authority, vis-à-vis the community
managers, will be the speed with which those areas, with practice based
commissioning, re-attach their community nurses back to the general practices
from their geographical patch coverage, an arrangement which has regained
ground since the demise of GP fundholding (Anon 2003). This example of the
triangle of relationships is linked to the third policy theme.
The third policy theme was the presence of multiple stakeholder groups on
governance bodies. The continuation of this theme is demonstrated in the
revised Parliamentary Directions for the PCTs (Department of Health 2003c) and
in the membership policies of the Foundation Trust Boards (Department of
Health 2002c). The policies ostensibly support a structured position of greater
numeric strength for lay members. In principle, the community is no longer a
repressed interest group. However, anecdotal evidence suggests the cultural
authority of the medical profession remains a deterrent to challenges from lay
members in PCTs (Edwards 2004) and the powers of governors on Foundation
Boards were subject to much pruning before legislation (Smith 2003).
Although the number of places assigned to the medical profession in PCTs and
Foundation Hospitals precludes overall numerical dominance, the wider medical
hegemony is not necessarily diminished. The membership guidance for
Governing bodies of the Foundation Trusts does not specify places for nurses,
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rather including them in a general staff allocation, but it does specify places for
the medical director and representatives of any local medical school
(Department of Health 2002c). The government membership directions for
Professional Executive Committees (PECs) offer the possibility of equal
numbers between nurses and GPs. There are no nationally available figures on
the balance of constituent groups in the PECs or their representation on the PCT
Board. However, a scrutiny of several London PECs with their membership
posted on the internet suggests that the local negotiations of the PEC constitution
has resulted in the maximum number (allowed by the government directions) of
places for the GPs, combined with the Chairperson position, in contrast to the
minimum number of places for nurses. The numeric assignment of places is a
very tangible demonstration of potential power and influence on a governing
body.
Although this thesis could not identify the precise mechanisms that operated to
reduce the nurses to invisibility, it provided further evidence of their presence.
The invisibility is a consequence of a tapestry of structured elements. The
hegemony of the medical profession provides one set of threads, interwoven with
the subordinating activities of medicine and health service managers in the
maintenance of their position. The class and gender divisions between
occupational groups are another set of textured threads, often difficult to separate
in the wider tapestry of relations. These divisions are not easily altered. The
route of social mobility through a university education for nurses has been
deflected. The academic level for nurse registration has been set as a diploma
and even that has been challenged (Meerabeau 2001). The underlying social
class background of current cohorts of medical students remains similar to past
generations despite initiatives to alter it (Seyan et al 2004). The enormous
increase of people from developing countries entering nurse training and nurse
positions during the late nineties to meet the shortfall of UK applicants (Buchan
2004) is likely to increase occupational divisions based on country of origin and
race. However, writ large across all of these is the division of gender and the
hegemony of the masculine in society. While there are increases in men entering
the occupation of nursing (Department of Health 2003), it remains overwhelming
a female occupation particularly outside of hospitals (Drennan et al 2004).
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Although there is discussion of the feminisation of medicine in the UK, female
doctors are prepared to publicly acknowledge the need for their occupation to be
seen as masculine in order to retain its power (Laurence 2004, Heath 2004).
Against this tapestry of social mechanisms, it is unlikely that nurses with only
clinical responsibilities will be viewed as more authoritative or influential in
governing bodies than their predecessors described in this thesis.
Before addressing the final unanswered question of the thesis, it is worth
reflecting on the process of undertaking this study in order to emphasis two
issues that future researchers in this field should not lose sight of in designing
their studies. An assumption was made in the beginning of this study that, given
half the GP population of England was female, this ratio would be reflected in
the PCG Board membership. It was an incorrect assumption. Careful
consideration of the levels of participation of women in corporate and public
bodies should inform future theoretical propositions and study design on decision
making in the health service.
Although it was recognised in the initial period of study design that an empirical
study focused on a specific policy initiative was at risk of a changing policy
environment, it was not appreciated how fast those policy shifts would occur.
The initial guidance for PCGs indicated that the governance body with the
greatest autonomy would be a PCT, however, there was no indication that in less
than eighteen months significant numbers of PCGs would disband and be
replaced by PCTs. For this study, the PCGs became a very specific case study
in one period of time. The interviews conducted with some key informants as
they left the PCG became a strength in this study. However, the levels of
organisational turbulence and disruption had the potential to make data collection
impossible. Researchers planning to study social phenomena in particular health
policy contexts should be alert the possibility that the context may be short lived,
although the underlying elements may well endure in a new iteration.
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10.7. Doctors and Nurses in the Driving Seat?
There remains one question as yet unanswered in this thesis on the leadership
role assigned to doctors and nurses in the PCGs. Were the findings of the thesis
were just an example of the real, but imperfect, world of policy implementation
(Hogwood and Gunn 1984) or whether it was ever really intended that doctors
and nurses should lead the PCGs?
It is suggested in this thesis that the policy statements of a leadership role for
both GPs and nurses in PCGs were symbolic and has to be viewed within the
context of the period that they emerged. Edelman (1985) first drew attention to
the use of policy as a symbol of generalised values to the electorate by
politicians. It is suggested here that the policy was intended to symbolise a
diversity of values to the public, the GPs and the nurses.
The Labour government was, first of all, using the policy to symbolise to the
public at large their support of the professionals over the managers. A major
strand of the attack on the Conservative government by Labour in opposition had
been the inexorable rise of the numbers and costs of managers in comparison to
those of doctors and nurses since the introduction of the internal market (Webster
2002). It is suggested in this thesis that the policy was used to symbolise
Labour's difference from the Conservatives. It demonstrated to the electorate
that Labour drew on the expertise of professionals to lead the health service
rather than the managers who had been leading the NHS through the well-
publicised, pre-election crises of waiting lists, hospital bed shortages and
professional exodus. In announcing the Labour party's plans for in the 1996/7
election campaign, the shadow Health Secretary stated that the value of the GP in
the proposed locality commissioning groups was that "they were the health
professional closest to the patient" (Anon 1996). In short, Labour drew on the
cultural authority of medicine to augment public confidence in its ability to
address the ills of the NIHS.
However, this does not explain the symbolism of the nurses in these policy
statements. The inclusion of nurses was symbolic in two ways. The first,
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symbolised the value the Labour Party placed on nurses at a significant point in
the general election campaign of 1997. The initial Labour Party manifesto for
the health service did not include nurses (Anon 1996). The resulting negative
press publicity for the Labour Party, together with polls that showed that about
40% of the 400,000 strong nurse work force were undecided in how to vote at
the general election in April (Kenny 1997), rapidly brought generalised
statements from the Labour Party of the inclusion of nurses in locality
commissioning activities. (Anon 1 997a). The second was to symbolise the
value the Labour Party placed on women. The creation of a named Minister for
Women in the Cabinet (Prime Ministers Office 1997) and the transfer of the
Women's Equality Unit to the Cabinet Office (Cabinet Office 1998) were two
public symbols of the importance the Labour Party placed on this issue. At the
time the detailed PCG guidance was being drafted, all government departments
had adopted the use of the Women's Equality Unit's guidance for ensuring that
all policies reflected equality of opportunity (Cabinet Office 1998). The
inclusion of nurses, culturally defined as female, was a symbol of the visibility of
women throughout Labour's policies. The cultural association of a gendered
division of labour between doctors and nurses made this deceptively simple
shorthand for equality of position for women.
At the same time, the Labour government was using the policy to symbolise to
the medical profession as a whole and general practice in particular that it
acknowledged the importance of having its members in a pre-eminent position in
decision-making in local services. Klein has argued that the Labour government
"had flattered the medical profession into acquiescence, with the threat of
battering held in reserve," (Klein 2001 p 211) to its policies for national equity in
the efficiency and the quality of the clinical activities. It is suggested in this
thesis that this particular policy statement was one element of that flattery.
The Labour government also used this policy as a symbol to the nurses of the
value they placed on nursing in the NHS. It is suggested that the Labour
government was also using flattery as a technique with the nurses. An analysis
(Davies 2004) of a national policy for nursing, which was produced in the first
year of the PCG's existence, confirms that the rhetoric of flattery was very
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evident in this period. The government needed the acquiescence of nursing not
only to the expansion of its work roles into new types of service and previously
medical domains but also crucially, to containment and curtailment of its
aspirations for increased financial rewards. This was particularly relevant in the
first years of the Labour government when the Chancellor had spending plans of
less than 1.1% real growth (Klein 2001).
It has been noted many times that it is the local level negotiations and power
plays that shape the degree of implementation of a national policy (Hill 1997).
This was true in this study, where the extent to which doctors and nurses were
considered and considered themselves to be leaders in the PCG was shaped by
very local power relationships internally and externally. So, were "Doctors and
nurses in the driving seat of Primary Care Groups"? (Department of Health
1997 5.1) The extent to which individuals believed the policy statements in the
first place depended on their previous experiences in health care politics arenas
and the health services. However, this policy was also symbolic of the claim to
decentralise decision making without a return to "the old centralised command
and control systems of the 1970's" (Department of Health 1997, Foreword). In
reality, the performance management policies of the centre combined with the
accountability to another intermediary layer of the NHS meant effective
decentralisation of decision making to the local level of the PCG was very
unlikely (Klein 2001). The disjuncture between the policy symbolism and the
implementation was all too apparent to many of the study participants, and is
perhaps best summed up by the GP who agreed that the experience had been one
of being in the 'driving seat' but without any control on the direction or speed.
In his words: "The driving seat has no wheel and no pedals".
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Glossary and Organisational Acronyms
AHA	 Area Health Authorities
(1974-1981)
AMAC	 Area Medical Advisory Committee
(1974-1983)
DGM	 District general manager
(1983- 1991)
DHA	 District Health Authority
(1981 —1995)
DHSS	 Department of Health and Social Security
(1970-198 1)
DMT	 District Management Team
(1974-198 1)
FHSA	 Family Health Services Health Authority
(199 1-1995)




GMS	 General Medical Services
RHAs	 Regional Health Authorities
(1974— 1995)
LMC	 Local Medical Committee
(1949- present)
PCG	 Primary Care Group
(1999-2002)
PCT	 Primary Care Trust
(2000 —present)
PMS	 Primary Medical Services
SHHD	 Scottish Health and Home Department
(pre- 1974)
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Appendix 2: Letter of Invitation to Participate
Royal Free and University College Medical School
UNIvERsITY COLLEGE LONDON
Department of Primary Care & Population Sciences
Holbum Union Building,
Highgate Hill, London N19 3UA





Clinical Leadership in Primary Care Groups
We are writing to request your help with a study of clinical leadership in Primary
Care Groups which is currently being undertaken in this medical school. The
purpose of the project is to explore the part played by clinical professionals (GPs
and nurses) on PCG Boards and assess their input to PCG development and
strategy. The findings of the study will provide valuable information for planning
the future evolution of PCTs.
We are undertaking brief interviews with a range of Board menthers (including
GPs, nurses, lay members and chief executives) in 8 PCGs within the London
region, chosen to represent a wide cross-section of populations and localities.
As a [insert type of PCG member or informant] we would be extremely grateful if
you would agree to help us with this study by reflecting on your experience of
PCG work. The interview would take approximately 20 minutes and could be
conducted over the telephone at whatever time most convenient to you. With your
permission, the interview would be audio taped and subsequently transcribed. All
interview data are, of course, regarded as confidential and will be seen only by the
research team.
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Any subsequent publications or reports will be presented in such a way that
anonymity is assured both for individual participants and PCGs.
We will contact you within the next week to find out whether you are able to help
us with the study in this way. We fuiiy appreciate the many pressures on your
time, but hope nevertheless that you will be able to give a positive response.
Thank you very much for your consideration.
Yours sincerely
Ms Van Drennan	 Dr Michael Model!
Senior Lecturer in Primary Care	 Professor of Primary Care
314
Appendix 3: Aide Memoire for Interviews
Aide memoire for topic areas in interviews with PCG Board Members -
adapted to each type of informant group
. Motivation for becoming a PCG member?
. Describe your role to date and then compare it to expectation
• Explanation for difference? Probe for what has helped or hindered?
• What would you describe as the benefits and problems of having a majority
of clinicians on the Board? Why? Examples
During the creation of the PCGs, the government and the professional press
seemed to suggest certain roles for the clinical professionals on the Boards
such as providing expert voices - would that be accurate ? Probe why or
why not?
. Are these distinct from the non- clinicians roles? Is there a difference
between the doctors and the nurses in these roles? Why?
• Types of relationships between clinical and non-clinical Board members?
• In the professional press, prior to the establishment of PCGs there were a
number of concerns raised about the potential difficulty of relationships of
clinician board members with their peers in the PCG area -has this been your
experience? Why?
• Also a number of concerns were expressed about the domination of the GPs
- has this been your experience? Probe reasons
• Drs and nurses in the driving seat - would this reflect your experience?
Probe reasons?
• Given all you've said - how would you advise on the future composition and
preparation of PCT members
• Will you be continuing as a Board member in PCTs?
NB Check background information
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Aide memoire for topic areas in interviews with non- PCG Board Members
- adapted to each type of informant group
1. Involvement with PCGs to date?
2. Have PCGs and Board members operated as you anticipated —explore reasons
3. From your experience what has been the benefits of working with PCGs
formed of a majority of clinical members? - Probe for explanations
4. Conversely could you identify problems in working with PCGs formed of a
majority of clinical members ? - Probe for explanations
5. During the creation of the PCGs, the government and the professional press
seemed to suggest certain roles for the clinical professionals on the Boards
such as providing expert voices - are there particular roles you have observed
the clinical professionals taking?
6. Are these distinct from the non- clinicians roles? Is there a difference
between the doctors and the nurses in these roles? In what way and why?
7. Relationships between clinical and non-clinical members on the Boards?
8. In the professional press, prior to the establishment of PCGs there were a
number of concerns raised about the potential difficulty of relationships of
clinician board members with their peers in the PCG area -has this been your
experience? Why?
9. Also a number of concerns were expressed about the domination of the GPs -
has this been your experience? Probe
10. Drs and nurses in the driving seat - would this reflect your experience?
Probe for reasons
11. Given all you've said - how would you advise on the future composition and
preparation of PCT members
12. Anything else?
13. Own background?
NB Check background information
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Appendix 4: Coding Framework for Analysis of Data
REPORT ON NODES from N5
Background coding on current role, occupation, gender, length of time in PCG area,
occupational background.
(1)	 /board members original motivation
(11)	 /board members original motivation/strategist
(1 2)	 /board members onginal motivation/loyalist
(1 3)	 /board members original motivation/back bencher
(1 4)	 /board members original motivation/specialists
(1 5)	 /board members original motivation/representatives
(1 6)	 /board members original motivation/mixed
(2)	 /board members subsequent motivation
(2 1)	 /board members subsequent motivation/strategist
(2 2)	 /board members subsequent motivation/loyalist
(2 3)	 /board members subsequent motivation/back bencher
(2 4)	 /board members subsequent motivation/specialists
(2 5)	 /board members subsequent motivation/representatives
(2 6)	 /board members subsequent motivation/mixed
(3)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles
(3 1)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/Confusion
(3 2)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/rubber stamping exec
decisions
(3 3)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/influential
(3 4)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/non-influential
(3 5)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/representative
(3 6)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/clinical leaders perceive a
difference in their role to others
(3 7)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/nurses view role same as
gps
(3 8)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/gps view role same as
nurses
(3 9) /non-exec members perception of their roles/gps view role different to nurses
(3 10)	 /non-exec members perception of their roles/nurses view role as different
from gps
(3 1 1) /non-exec members perception of their roles/others perceptions of clinicians
role contrast/duff to their own
(4)	 /source of leadership authority in clinicians
(4 1)	 /source of leadership authority in clinicians/clinical knowledge of GPs
(4 2)	 /source of leadership authority in clinicians /knowledge of GP practice
by Gps
(4 3)
	 source of leadership authority in clinicians /knowledge of gp practice
by nurses
(4 4)	 source of leadership authority in clinicians/clinical knowledge of nurses
(4 5)	 source of leadership authority in clinicians/bureaucratic position of
nurses
(4 6)
	 source of leadership authority in clinicians cultural authority of Gps
(4 7)
	 /source of leadership authority in clinicians/clinician to clinician
relationship


























/clinical leadership activities/Across discipline
/clinical leadership activities/only in own discipline
/clinical leadership activities/UP effectiveness
/clinical leadership activities/nurse effectiveness
/clinical leadership activities activity in (lip interests
/clinical leadership activities/activity in nurse interest
/clinical leadership activities/nurses confmed to nursing
/clinical leadership activities/promoting user/community voice






















/elitism or pluralism/dominant interests evident
/elitism or pluralism/challenging interests evident
felitism or pluralism/repressed interests evident
/elitism or pluralism/oligarchic elite
/Gps as elites
/Gps as elites/medicines internal stratification
/Gps as elites/structured powerful position
/Gps as elitesJLMC involvement in PCG
/Gps as elites/cultural authority of medicine
/Gps as elites/GP as independent contractor
/Gps as elites/GP practice v population
/Gps as elites/small practices v group practices
/Gps as elites/conflict of interest
/Gps as elites/tension between Ups
/relationship between Gps and managers
/relationship between (lips and managers/overt conflict with 1-IA managers
/relationship between Gps and managers/overt conflict with local trust
(8 3)
	
/relationship between Gps and managers/covert tension with HA
managers and beyond















relationship between Ups and managers/co-operation with managers of
relationship between Ups and managers/co-operation with PCG
relationship between Gps and managers/contrast cultures
relationship between Ups and managers/tension with all managers
relationship between Ups and managers/racism
/managers attitudes to GPs
managers attitudes to GPs/ adversarial
managers attitudes to GPs/avoid conflict
managers attitudes to GPs/accept them as most powerful
managers attitudes to GPs/collaborative
/nurses and managers relationships
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(10 1)
	 /nurses and managers relationships/nurses in conflict with HA managers
and beyond
(10 2)
	 /nurses and managers relationships/over conflict with local trust
managers
(10 3)
	 /nurses and managers relationships/covert tension with HA managers
and beyond
(10 4)
	 /nurses and managers relationships/covert tension with trust managers
(10 5)	 /nurses and managers relationships/collaboration with all managers
(10 6)
	 /nurses and managers relationships/collaboration with PCG managers in
contrast to others
(11)	 /nurses and doctors
(111)	 /nurses and doctors/domination of nurses by GPs
(11 2)
	 /nurses and doctors co-operation between nurses and doctors
(11 3)
	 /nurses and doctors/recognition of clinical authority of nurses by
doctors
(11 4)
	 /nurses and doctors recognition of bureaucratic authority of nurses by
doctors
(11 5)	 /nurses and doctors/invisibility of nurses to doctors
(11 6)
	 /nurses and doctors/support to nurses from doctors
(11 7)
	 /nurses and doctors/accommodation by nurses to subordinate role
(11 8)
	 /nurses and doctors/conflict between nurses and doctors
(11 9)	 /nurses and doctors/challenge and resistance to doctors form nurses
(11 10)
	 /nurses and doctors/creation of a counter culture by nurses
(12)	 /nurses and nurses
(12 1)
	 /nurses and nurses/cultural authority of clinical nurses recognised by
other nurses
(12 2)
	 /nurses and nurses/bureaucratic authority of nurse managers recognised
(12 3)
	 /nurses and nurses/wider nurse forum
(12 4)
	 /nurses and nurses/nurse manager support
(12 5)	 /nurses and nurses/nurse manager control
(12 6)
	 /nurses and nurses/suspicion of nurse managers by clinical nurses
(12 7)
	 /nurses and nurses/nurses support nurses against GPs
(12 8)
	 /nurses and nurses/nurse managers fail to support clinical nurses
(12 9)
	 /nurses and nurses/Nurse managers repress clinical nurses
(12 10)
	 /nurses and nurses/inter nurse tribe hostility
(12 11)
	 /nurses and nurses/regional level support
(12 12)
	 /nurses and nurses/peer clinical nurse support
(12 13)
	 /nurses and nurses/apathy from peers
(12 14)






	 /selection processes/rules for nurses
(14 2)
	 selection processes no contest for places
(14 3)
	 /selection processes/Gp rules
(15)	 /PCGs performance
(15 1)	 IPCGs performance initiatives
(15 2)	 /PCGs performance successes
(15 3)	 /PCGs performance prescribing
(16) /pcts
(17) /process and context
(17 1)
	 process and contextichange over time
(17 2)
	 process and contextlincreased knowledge of health services
(17 3)	 process and context/increased knowledge over time of GMS
(17 4)











/process and context/comparison of experience
/process and context/importance of the chair
/process and contextlPCG v HA
/process and contextiPCG work well with HA
/process and contextlPCT imminent
/process and context/change in board members
/process and context/central gov policy impact
process and context/decision making outside the board
/process and context/chief exec has OD activities
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Appendix 5: Example of Summary Documentary Analysis for One PCG
Element	 Key aspects
Presentation and detail Speakers occasionally identified but action points and who to action them
of the minutes	 always identified
Attendance patterns Never less than S GPs
Mostly only one nurse
1-3 PCG officers
I CHC observer throughout
Community Trust Associate Director co-opted half way through the year
Acute Trust representative attended one meeting only
Health Authority officers never attended





• Primary Care Investment Plan
• Premises
• Prescribing
• Chief executives report
Decision making	 Many decisions formally voted upon - e.g. voting on timing to move to
___________________ P0', co-option of Community Trust manager
Non public decision 	 Non-public Board business meeting two weeks before public Board
making meetings	 meeting
Conflict of interests	 Not referred to
Sub Committees	 Only four referred to





	 Discussed at every meeting
Commissioning	 • GMS under spend
• Commissioning deficits
• Prescribing overspends
PCG specific new	 PMS/ Salaried GPs scheme reported to being developed
service developments 	 IT Beacon status for a group of practices reported
or initiatives
Clinical governance	 A quality initiative with other PCGs to develop standards on common
disease management
Developing a patient survey - only to the point of piloting it in two board
members practices
Coronary Heart Disease activity baseline assessment in some PCG
_______________________ practices.
Health Improvement	 Only referred to in terms of as a Health Authority activity not as a PCG
Plan	 activity.
Community and lay
	 Lay member vice chair, chaired meeting in absence of GP chair once
member involvement Reported to speak at each meeting
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Clmical Board	 Views and activities of at least two GPs reported in every meeting.
member involvement	 Action points on agenda always referred to the chief executive or a GP
member.
Nurses never recorded as having a lead action out of any meetings.
Three references to nurse Board members:
• One reported to have joined HA wide commissioning group on
community services commissioning
• One asked for a hand held personal computer as did not have
access to a computer at work
• Reported to hold a Nurses forum
Relationships with
	 Relationships with Local Authority not mentioned
other health and social
care organisations	 Relationship with Community Trust —Co-opted manager half way
through year but only to public Board meetings
Relationship with Health Authority (HA) reported as very difficult to the
point it appeared acrimonious:
• Repeated reference to slow decision making by HA in budget
setting e.g. 3 months late on grading of its officer posts
• Repeated comments on lack of public health consultant input to
PCG
• Reported repeated delays in devolving HA monies and posts to
PCGs
• Reported HA changing decisions on devolving posts and monies
• Repeatedly questioned HA stance on not placing more emphasis
on locality issues in PCT development plan
Relationship with Acute Trusts:
• Reported indignation at refusal of consultants in one hospital to
take new diabetic referrals from GPs raised - but follow up not
reported on in subsequent meetings
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